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aBstract
Human history is marked by progressive stages of dominant human 
interrelation patterns.  Marx examined these patterns and believed that history could 
be understood as a variation on a Fichtian science of material dialectics where a thesis 
would meet its antithesis, and a new synthesis would emerge from the violent struggle 
found at their intersection.  This dissertation takes a slightly different perspective, 
concentrating on the contemporary stage of dominant human interrelation patterns, 
their origin, and consequences from an educational organisation perspective.
This is an emerging discussion of the foundational and philosophical 
structures of interorganisational relationships involving educational administration. 
Beginning with a discussion of the origins and development of contemporary 
relational structures writ large—in terms of social, political, and economic 
antecedents—I show how their convergence around a dual falsehood has produced 
a self-perpetuating dominance in the modern era.  The dual falsehood is manifest 
in the conflation of science and technology, and social Darwinist assumptions of 
human nature.  Misunderstanding the nature of this dual falsehood, proponents of 
post-modernity are exposed as providing an anaemic or counterproductive response 
to the problems of modernity.  
I explore the particular problems of modernity faced by education as a general 
area of study and practice, and educational administration more specifically. The 
root of these problems is demonstrated in a misalignment of (a) dominant relational 
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structures falsely self-declaring their basis in science, and (b) education as a genuine 
scientific pursuit (as defined herein).  I further explore psychopathologies of 
relationships when negotiated in terms of such false self-declared and contextually 
dominant beliefs.  The implications of psychopathological relationship negotiations 
are discussed for educational administration and strategies are explored for 
educational leadership and advocacy.
Two stages of correction for the dominant issues described herein are posited 
on behalf of educational organisations.  Stage one advocates the construction of a 
singular definition of pedagogy for public consumption.  Stage two articulates areas 
of responsibility for various intraorganisational elements within education. The 
purpose of stage two is to disseminate widespread propaganda based upon Habermas’ 
(1970) communicative competence to eradicate dysfunctional communication 
that perpetuates the dominance of modern and post-modern relational structures. 
Furthermore, stage two advocates the adoption of Mouffe’s agonistic position for 
interorganisational relations between education and non-education entities. Stages 
are to be evaluated in terms of an adaptation upon Giddens’ (1979) analysis of 
sedimented practices of educational administration within the context of the 
Mouffian (2005) political.
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Preface
I expect the pages that follow to present an odd dissertation within the field 
of Educational Administration.  Perhaps this is because, as van Manen (1997) and 
others (Morf, 1998; Palys, 1997; Schwandt, 1994, 2000; von Glasersfeld, 1991, 1998) 
implied, the researcher can be nothing but an integral component of his or her own 
work.  My interests are broad, and such breadth will be demonstrable throughout.  I 
intend to employ literature from fields including physiology, psychology, sociology, 
linguistics, psycholinguistics, psychohistory, cognitive science, philosophy of 
mind, evolutionary biology, sociobiology, political science, organisational theory, 
communication theory, educational psychology, research in curriculum studies and 
learning, educational foundations, history of education and, of course, educational 
administration.
While necessity may constitute sufficient justification for such an inclusive 
corpus, the challenge that persists is one of depth.  Proof of my argumentative 
dexterity herein will indeed be judged on the basis of a balanced measure of depth 
of understanding within the context of my presented breadth of interest.  The 
balance of these two seemingly disparate notions provides an ample test for those 
who maintain a wide interest—as, it can be said, depth with little breadth one 
calls specialization, but breadth with little depth one calls illusionary- or perhaps 
unfounded insight.
My larger intent in writing this dissertation appears (superficially) simple; 
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I seek to find proof of the obvious.  In attempting so, however, I have come to 
appreciate Plato’s report of Socrates’ self-reflection in both the Apology (c. 360 
BCE/1966a) and the Symposium (c. 360 BCE/1925) that his search for wisdom 
in fact yielded the extent of his ignorance.  It is through a similar and personal 
encounter with my own faculties of thought that I have come to learn the true mass 
of my conceptual ignorance—but also the true, original meaning of philosophy 
[ ]: the love and pursuit of understanding.  To this end, I have 
learned that what appears to be an obvious conclusion is, in truth, always a point of 
departure.
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Yes, Simmias, replied Socrates, that 
is well said: and I may add that first 
principles, even if they appear certain, 
should be carefully considered; and 
when they are satisfactorily ascertained, 
then, with a sort of hesitating confidence 
in human reason, you may, I think, 
follow the course of the argument; and if 
that be plain and clear, there will be no 
need for any further enquiry.
Plato 
Phaedo, §107b.
1Part I
IntroductIon, method, and PersPectIve
2chaPter one
IntroductIon to the dIssertatIon
a.  Introduction to the First Phase of the Project
When I first went to university, it was to study politics.  I was fascinated by 
power relationships among individuals and groups and since that time my fascination 
has not waned, it has merely become more specific.  Early in my undergraduate 
studies, I was mentored by my introductory political science professor—we both 
shared an interest in international relations, and specifically those embedded 
historically under the auspice of Soviet hegemony.  I studied Marxist-Leninist-Mao 
Zedong Thought and centred my research papers on contemporary issues faced by 
post-1991 (post-Soviet) influenced governance in East-Central Europe.  
In the summer bridging my first and second year of study, I was awarded 
a scholarship to attend a class in Post-Soviet Societies in Transition at the State 
University of Chernivtsi, Ukraine.  Questions that confronted students such as 
myself at that time related to political behaviour in contexts of change, the merits of 
foreign investment in emerging capitalist economies, and generational differences 
in political and economic behaviour in new democracies.  In the senior year of my 
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honours degree, I wrote major papers examining predictions of likely reunification 
scenarios for the Korean peninsula—assuming analogies to be drawn with East and 
West Germany, and the imminent collapse of the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea in the north (based in part upon my own self-initiated study tour of North 
Korea in 1996).
Following convocation, I was one of a few to gain meaningful experience in 
my chosen field of study, taking a posting with the United Nations Non-Governmental 
Liaison Service in Geneva, funded by the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs 
and International Trade, and organised by the United Nations Association in Canada. 
Over the next few years I travelled in Europe and Asia, returning to Canada as the 
millennium changed.  In the time between convocation and returning home, I had 
gained some experience working broadly with non-governmental organisations 
engaged in intra- and inter-organisational relationships.  
Striking among the relationships I encountered were what appeared to 
be significant contextual challenges to organisational mandates and success, not 
the least of which included the problem of embedded assumptions about the 
relative power or weight afforded to partners.  I had witnessed similar embedded 
assumptions, theoretically, in political science textbooks, but also practically in 
various communities during my travels.  At the time, this intrigue was neglected, 
because I had more pressing issues to engage—specifically, finding work in 
Canada.
I was somewhat disappointed with the disinterest that government agencies 
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showed toward my applications for analyst positions.  While contemplating the 
default position for most of my undergraduate colleagues, entering law school, I 
decided to point my attention in another direction—toward secondary education. 
Faced with what seemed to be insurmountable technocratic walls around my 
application to the college (political science was not, according to the College of 
Education, a social science), I decided to make an application for graduate studies 
in Educational Administration.  To my surprise, my application was received and 
I was now left with the task of measuring the identity crisis I had just made for 
myself.  Would I be political scientist first and educator second, or educator first 
and political scientist second?  Was I really an educator, at all?  Would there be a 
place for a non-teacher within the walls of a college of education and exactly what 
was educational administration, anyway?  I thought it may be a specialized political 
science.
As weeks progressed into my graduate program, I came to better understand 
my foray into the field.  Educational Administration was potentially a focused 
political science; and I endeavoured to construct it as such in my own mind, even if 
members of my cohort did not appear to view its place beyond the walls of schools 
or perhaps the surrounding community.  For this reason, my initial topic of research 
interest may have appeared anomalous—a study of high school students’ experiences 
within catastrophic social, economic, and political change.  It was obvious to me 
that the field was broad, after all, I had just written a thesis that did not mention the 
principalship, school improvement, or school-based learning communities.   Even 
5this work was  mundane in comparison to where I next focused my sights.
While in writing my master’s thesis I sought to combine school-based 
micro-experience with my academic history in political relationships,1 it became 
clear to me that I would next examine macro-experiences of political relationships 
involving school systems.  At this time, I returned to my interest in partnerships 
involving non-governmental organisations, focusing these partnerships within 
education, and specifically international post-conflict delivery.  Little did I realize 
that early attempts at writing a literature review would thrust me into a major area 
of research—a project for which my dissertation work might only represent the 
initial phase.
Two examples of serendipity would open doors of academic pursuit.  The 
first of these emerged as I began to notice growing evidence of minimal discussion 
in the literature surrounding interorganisational partnerships (what I would come to 
more accurately employ as interorganisational relationships).  Within this body of 
literature, I could find little meaningful discussion of the antecedents of partnered 
educational delivery—all of the discussion seemed to rest upon weak or assumed 
foundations.  “Interorganisational relationships must not simply rely upon existing 
organisational theory: such relationships are clearly different,” I silently reaffirmed 
to myself.  But this presumed difference was based upon nothing more solid than 
my feelings, not rigorous peer review. 
The second example of serendipity was a reinvigoration of study in philosophy 
as a result of doctoral course expectations.  I had studied political philosophy in 
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some depth during my undergraduate course work, but the philosophy under-girding 
a specialized political arena like education was different.  It seemed to provide 
often indirect and sporadic pieces of support for my presumptions surrounding 
interorganisational relationships.  Embryonic, at the time, as my theories were, I 
decided that something currently absent needed to be said.  Precisely what or how, 
I did not know.
Some time for distillation elapsed.  Midway through my doctoral studies, 
my wife and I bought a new car, packed it full of our most needful things and 
drove across Canada for a year of school in the Maritimes.  I attended classes in 
educational philosophy and social science methodology toward a baccalaureate in 
education.  At the conclusion of a year, two things happened.  First, a portion of my 
earlier identified identity crisis evaporated—I was now an educator, and had the 
papers to prove it.  Second, time had permitted me important reflection and I now 
more fully understood my program of research, doctoral and otherwise.  I returned 
to doctoral work in great earnest.
My project of research is focused on interorganisational relationships.  I 
continue to struggle with qualifiers—specialising adjectival phrases—such as 
in education, among educational entities, or between educational and non-
educational entities.  These addenda are helpful when depicting the differences 
found in relationships among contrasting organisational Forms. The first phase of 
my project, however, as described within the core chapters of this document, has 
emerged in more broad strokes than those refining its analysis into what may still 
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seem to many educators to be a recalcitrant and overly liberal view of the field of 
educational administration.  This first phase seeks to describe the milieu in which 
contemporary interorganisational relationships operate and the disadvantaged locale 
from which educational organisations enter such relationships.  The second phase 
of my project relates to the application to research methodology of the descriptive 
account I present in phase one.  The third phase will be to test these theoretical 
pronouncements in real contexts—directly in international post-conflict delivery. 
Phases two and three are not widely discussed in this dissertation; I plan to pursue 
them in years to come.
1.  Introduction to the Problem
1.1. organisations, educational administration, and collaboration.
Organisations exist because humans are social beings with purpose (Hall, 
1991; Hall & Tolbert, 2005).  Humans find their goals more easily achieved through 
the collective activity of a group than on their own (Plato, c. 400 BCE/1945).  The 
goals and purposes to which the individual subscribes provide a rationale for the 
organisations into which one enters.  At times, these shared organisational goals and 
purposes complement those of other similarly constituted organisations; at other 
times they do not (Dewey, 1927/1963; Handy, 1988; Mulgan, 1998).2  
Every organisation has engaged, or will engage, in some sort of relationship 
with another organisation at some point within its life (Aldrich, 1971, 1974, 1979).3 
The nature of these relationships is frequently directed toward collaborative ventures 
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where an integration of resources is perceived as beneficial to one party, the other or 
both, other parties, or humanity in general (Hall & Tolbert, 2005).
Increasingly, the role of educational administration is being linked with 
collaborative efforts between individuals, private and public organisations, and 
governmental agencies (Davis & Sumara, 2001; Farmakopoulou, 2002).4  As a 
result, western governance models employed in education systems have begun 
a shift from a representation—organisational meta-policy or organisational 
ontological position—of democratic hyperrationalization (Wise, 1977) to a more 
individual needs-centred appreciation of existential complexity, which is no less 
democratically based.  
Contemporary observations of this relationship are growing ever more 
contextual and, as a result, ever more relative (Peterson, 2002).  For example, 
in the area of educational change, a key point of caution that appears ubiquitous 
is that change is unpredictable. That is to say, owing to the multiplicity of social 
antecedents that impact, demand or result in change, change itself never occurs in 
the same (nor is interpreted the same) way twice.  To this end, it has been argued that 
a complete and singular understanding of change is neither possible, nor perhaps 
desirable (Böröcz, 1997; Burgess, 2003; Fullan, 2000; Moore, 1963).
A further observation of relativism in relationships arises within the area of 
educational leadership. The recent popularity of servant-leadership has concentrated 
educational leadership studies on the pleasantries of the social experience among 
those being led, rather than the adherence of a leader to a guiding principle or 
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ethic.  In Spears’ (1998) collection of articles on servant-leadership, Batten (1998), 
for example, seemed to suggest through his power tools for passionate living that 
asking, listening, hearing and making love visible are of greater importance for 
leaders than being capable of explaining the rationale behind a vision and why 
that vision is appropriate—foundational notions that generally receive little or no 
attention within the broader work.  Along a similar vein, Badaracco (2002) argued 
that successful leaders do what is right for those around them, seeing leadership 
as interested in and managing a kaleidoscopic world rather than perusing a fixed 
target—a largely reactionary design.
Alternatively, and from the perspective that schools are microcosms of 
social change, Hopkins’ (2001) research on the stereotypical models of leadership, 
transactional and transformational retained the underlying notion that the dynamic 
complexity of contemporary school-based social environments requires a 
transformational model.  For, as Leithwood, Jantzi and Steinbeck (1999) suggested, 
times change.  The transformational model for which Hopkins advocated, 
however, focuses the school’s orientation within change upon school improvement 
while maintaining foundational principles of pedagogy—student wellbeing and 
development.  The transformational model is, in this way, broadly analogous to 
Etzioni’s (1967; 1986; 1989) mixed-scanning model in decision-making.  In 
Etzioni’s model, reactionary (or precautionary) decision-making within a context 
of social or other change is guided by two fundamental questions that force the 
organisation’s foundational principles both into the open and into focus: “(1) What 
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is the basic mission of the organisation? and (2) What incremental decisions will 
move the organisation in that direction” (W. K. Hoy & Tarter, 2004, p. 49)?  
The importance of such a focus will be made apparent within the larger 
project of my research, of which this dissertation represents early and foundational 
reflections.  Central to my ever-developing view of interorganisational relationships 
remains a singular construct: educational administration and leadership must define, 
articulate, and advocate a unified and universal focus as the central determinant for 
interorganisational relations in education.   I define interorganisational relations 
in this context, broadly, as the social relationships of educational organisations 
with government, business, justice, health services, among others, and how their 
relationships are manifested within a societal context.  Yet, it is not sufficient for an 
organisation practitioner, especially an educational professional and administrator, to 
merely assume that a determination of focus, as discussed above, is instantaneously 
accessible to decision-makers during times of interorganisational social interaction. 
Rather, such an assumption is wholly irresponsible.  Specifically, its presupposition 
that decision-makers, principals, educational leaders, teachers and students are, 
within an interorganisational context, are either able to (a) instantaneously and 
coherently articulate such focus, and (b) capably and lucidly justify or defend those 
articulations they have spontaneously generated.  This assumption is tantamount 
to an infinite loop error within Etzioni’s (1967; 1986; 1989) model.  In effect, by 
avoiding meaningful discussion of the underlying nature of a focus and irresponsibly 
assuming its presence, the mixed-scanning model—and similarly transformational 
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leadership—is, in its precise application, ill-focused.  At best, such an inherent lack of 
focus on the foundational aspects of an organisation5 leads to floundering (Peterson, 
2002) among the organisational participants, and, a fortiori, the organisation itself. 
Further examples of this assumption of what I call the spontaneous generation 
of and aptitude for the justification of the organisational Form appear to greater and 
lesser extents within other contemporary and similarly concerned educational works 
(Dimmock & Walker, 2005; Shapiro & Stefkovich, 2005; Starratt, 2004; Watkins, 
2005).  Nevertheless, Etzioni’s and the transformational models, while assuming 
and therefore problematic, do represent an improved vision of decision-making and 
leadership when juxtaposed against more ad hoc or classical models (W. K. Hoy & 
Tarter, 2004)—for they recognize the importance of a fully understood point toward 
which organisational behaviour must be focused.
Collaborative models of service delivery characterize a growing area of 
interest for educational administration (Walker, 1996); this is especially true as the 
burden of educational opportunities for students with specific needs develops.  Such 
models provide a third example of relativity in relationships for the purposes of the 
broader discussion.  Much of the present literature in this area is clear in its contention 
that systems of service-delivery marred by duplication, stagnant institutionalism, and 
independent goals are not currently demonstrating a high degree of success when a 
client-centred principle is used as a point of reference (Chaskin & Richman, 1992; 
Chaudry, Polivka, & Kennedy, 2000; Clarke, Coombs, & Walton, 2003; Polivka, 
Dresbach, Heimlich, & Elliott, 2001; Robson & Beattie, 2004).  This contention is 
12
especially true when examined in the context of service delivery for children with 
exceptionalities (Robson & Beattie, 2004).  Unable to step away and conceptualize 
the proverbial forest for the trees, services appear hidden, to the general public, 
from view (Chaskin & Richman, 1992), plagued by insurmountable bureaucracy 
(Chaskin & Richman, 1992; Robson & Beattie, 2004), and consequently abundant 
in general mistrust (Atkins, Graczyk, Frazier, & Adil, 2003). 
Perhaps justifiably, such duplication of service has been severely criticized 
in recent years as competition for government funding of service programs becomes 
ever more desperate in neo-liberal budgeting practices (Nelson, Prilleltensky, 
& MacGillivary, 2001).  This trend, known within public administration as the 
hollowing of the state,6 is characterized by a growing relentless reduction of active 
government participation in the delivery of public services (Agranoff & McGuire, 
1998; Bardach & Lesser, 1996).  Services are hired out through contract, agencies 
are told to do more with less, and thus a major impetus for alternative delivery 
methods appears (Bazzoli et al., 1997; Certo & Pumpian, 1997; Levy & Shepardson, 
1992; McCallin, 2001; Myrtle & Wilber, 1994).
An interesting by-product of the hollow state phenomenon is its obfuscation 
of accountability.  Within the hollow state—stemming from its economic roots—
accountability is seen in economic terms: based upon fiscal responsibility and the 
quantitative hyperrationalization (Wise, 1977) of facts and figures (Bardach & 
Lesser, 1996).  As such, critics (Habermas, 1984, 1987) charge that such points 
of departure are detrimental to human services contexts when the complexity of 
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human systems is overlooked, or worse yet, observed exclusively through the 
banality of statistician’s tables.  For the requisite alternative delivery methods, 
exemplified most predominantly in the field of human services through interagency 
or interorganisational collaborative relationships and initiatives, success is thus 
measured under the guise of distorted indicators of accountability.
Bardach and Lesser (1996) explained the situation by arguing that the outgrowth 
of interorganisational initiatives that is a result of the hollow state phenomenon is 
positive for two fundamentally important reasons. First, within interorganisational 
initiatives, decisions are more likely to be made by those individuals closest (or 
at the very least closer) to the clientele affected by the decisions (also supported 
by Foster-Fishman, Salem, N. E. Allen, & Fahrbach, 1999).  Second, the micro-
management of funding of service delivery is de-legitimised.  Yet, the authors 
warned, offices of government that hold financial control are not quick to relinquish 
their control over the administrative actions of service providers and have moved 
to equate general accountability with financial accountability (the nouveau facade 
of political authority).
Questions rooted in the culture of accountability are therefore of great 
importance because interorganisational initiatives are contemporaneously viewed in 
terms of their relation to the complex realities of schools, communities, and the needs 
of both students with exceptionalities and their families.  Indeed, much literature 
appears to link the complexity of contemporary environments—such as those in 
inclusive schools and communities—with the flexibility of interorganisational 
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partnerships (Agranoff & McGuire, 1998; D. Allen, Lyne, & Griffiths, 2002). 
Yet, there are some who point out the irony of this contention, suggesting that 
interorganisational initiatives are themselves complex ventures, often burdened 
by competing goals (Atwal & Caldwell, 2002; White & Wehlage, 1995).  To wit, 
others suggest that a multiplicity of competing goals within any organisation7 
represents a predicate for diminished quality of service delivery (Appleton et al., 
1997).  Bardach and Lesser (1996) explained that, notwithstanding the distorted 
reality, accountability within interorganisational initiatives should be focused on 
that which can be made accountable to one’s partners in the initiative, because this 
will foster interorganisational trust of one another.8
Such advice regarding accountability draws upon a similar assumption to 
that rooted in the critique of Etzioni’s (1967; 1986; 1989) decision-making model 
and transformational leadership.  It assumes that partners to the relationship have 
a deep, accessible, clear, and accountable understanding of their organisational 
purpose.  To complicate matters further, in an interorganisational context, this 
understanding is not only required for the participants’ own organisation, anything 
less would be seriously disingenuous and represent a pathological communicative 
act (Habermas, 1990/2001a). The participants must trust that their partners have a 
similar understanding before any form of meaningful intersubjective trust may be 
possible.  In essence, trust9 is potentially obstructed by a dualistic and interlocked 
reliance on the earlier discussed assumption of spontaneous generation of and 
aptitude for the justification of the organisational Form.  If this assumption remains 
15
substantive as praxis, trust is possible.  Alternatively, and—foreshadowing the case 
I shall argue in chapters to follow—more likely, if such a constitution of praxis is 
erroneous, malformed, or based upon deeply embedded fallacy, trust and ethical 
behaviour, despite the participants’ best intentions, will be (in a Habermasian sense) 
distorted and developmentally dysfunctional.  In the latter case, distorted trust and 
distorted ethical behaviour are clearly non-examples of the hopeful end sought in 
Bardach and Lesser (1996). 
In the study of interorganisational relations, change represents an analytic 
a priori assumption—a manifest-given by virtue of the implied dynamism of 
relationships in space and time (Kant, 1783/1950, 1784/1982).  Social interplay is 
similarly understood and therefore interorganisational relationships in general have 
a prerequisite social nature.  In this regard, considerable literature since the late 
1960s in the study of business- and commerce-based decision-making generally, 
and marketing ethics in particular, has arrived at the same conclusion (Pelton, 
Chowdhury, & Vitell, 1999).  Peculiar, however, is the apparent reliance of this 
body of literature on a behavioural description of ethics, that is codes of ethics 
and normative models of ethical behaviour (Pelton, Chowdhury, & Vitell, 1999).10 
Such a behavioural definition I do not share; further, I intend to argue that for the 
very reason that relationships exist in a dynamic social theatre, such a definition 
merely obfuscates the central ontological and epistemic issues of importance within 
the assumption of spontaneous generation of and aptitude for the justification of 
the organisational Form: What is the organisational (or shared interorganisational) 
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Form (in its Platonic sense) and how do we as organisational participants know it?
Nowhere within this document will one find an argument against the 
contention that the contemporary educational environment is dynamic, complex, 
or at times chaotic—indeed, it may be ever-more so as time progresses (Burgess, 
2003; Fullan, 1991, 1993, 2000, 2001; Lieberman & Miller, 2004).  Yet, despite, 
and perhaps because of, the complexity of the milieu in which education exists, this 
dissertation will show that it is necessary for an institution of public significance 
to be guided by a singular and salient end—an end around which the diversity of 
anomalous circumstances remains fast.  Though the end to which I refer may seem 
a flight of fancy, as my arguments unfold in chapters to follow, the necessity of this 
end for the justification and maintenance of a practice claiming professionalism 
outweighs any argument that may stifle or make to be folly its pursuit.
While the intent of the previous paragraphs has been to introduce a number 
of issues around which my broader project of research will find its place, the sections 
that follow introduce the reader first to the space this dissertation occupies within 
the field of interorganisational relationships, and second to a contextual position. 
Although most statements of context provide an informative background to a piece 
of writing, I present in section 3. a statement describing the framework at which I 
intend to arrive.
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2.  A Place within the Knowledge Base
The literature on interorganisational relationships is vast, and several 
attempts have been made to provide meta-analyses (see for example, Aldrich, 1979; 
Aldrich & Whetten, 1981; Galaskiewicz, 1985; Guetzkow, 1966; Oliver, 1990; Van 
de Ven, 1976).  I do not endeavour to recreate an additional concatenation at this 
time—for past attempts have been plagued by particular issues, including a vast and 
fractured knowledge base, and the absence of comparative analyses (Ebers, 1997; 
Galaskiewicz, 1985; Ritter & Gemünden, 2003). Rather, I here explore linkages 
between my own work and an important and widely cited framework that has been 
employed since the 1980s to garner contemporary understanding within, and bring 
order to, the field.
A most prominent meta-analysis of the field is found in Galaskiewicz (1985). 
Galaskiewicz categorized the field in three broad areas of interest he dubbed arenas: 
(a) resource procurement and allocation through interorganisational relationships 
for the purposes of organisational survival; (b) political advocacy through 
interorganisational relationships intended to bolster one’s own position relative 
to the contemporary social, political and economic milieu; and (c) organisational 
legitimacy through relationships with more influential organizations as a means 
of garnering favourable public opinion, funding opportunities, and licensing 
for activities.  Primary in his analysis (and in the work upon which he drew his 
conclusions) was the question, why does one organisation engage in relationships 
with other organisations?  These questions are tangential to my work in this area, 
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but they do offer insight as to motivations that may inform strategies embedded in 
the nature of decisions made under the guise of interorganisational relationships. 
Galaskiewicz’ (1985) framework is therefore helpful, but provides an 
incomplete picture of the more foundational aspects of interorganisational 
relationships addressed in my study.  It is interesting to note that several meta-
analyses conducted over the body of knowledge in this field reflect exclusively on 
Galaskiewicz’ question of engagement.  On this point, Ebers (1997) explained that 
“[a]lthough it is important to know what motivates organizational decision-makers 
to forge inter-organizational relationships, motives alone provide only a weak guide 
when trying to explain the emergence of inter-organizational networking relationships 
or their organizational form” (p. 7). Additionally, most relationships are observed 
by researchers as necessary reactions to economic conditions and therefore are 
conditionally constructed so long as economic need persists (Ritter & Gemünden, 
2003).  It is perhaps for this reason that Ebers highlighted the virtual lacuna in 
understanding related to the processes of relationship hardening (variously referred 
to as building and development phases) within interorganisational relationships and 
their dissolution.  From the work of Ritter and Gemünden, one might conclude 
that two very different classes of relationships have been conflated into one 
designation: interorganisational relationships referring equally to instances where 
two organisations interact briefly (which they designated as interorganisational 
interactions), and those where organisations interact over longer periods of time 
and where relationships develop beyond reactions to superficial economic stimuli 
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(which they designate as interorganisational relationships).
Notwithstanding the issues addressed above, Galaskiewicz’ (1985) 
framework remains instructive in its treatment of key notions discussed in later 
chapters of this dissertation.  In terms of the arena of resource procurement and 
allocation, these include (a) dependency and power differentials among parties to 
a relationship, (b) the conceptualizing of such dependency and power differentials 
among parties to a relationship in terms of organisational representation, and (c) 
the managing of constraints (see Zeitz, 1980) and uncertainty (or, in terms outlined 
in Chapter Seven, managing irrationality).  In his discussion of political advocacy, 
I draw attention to Galaskiewicz’ critique of research in this arena. In particular 
I explore his commentary on monopolizing control over divisible resources for 
political gain.  Furthermore, in terms of the arena of organisational legitimacy, 
resource monopolies are distilled into both structures of dominance and structures 
of legitimacy.  I will highlight these issues in turn.
In the first of Galaskiewicz’ (1985) arenas, research has principally observed 
power differentials among parties to interorganisational relationships in economic 
terms.  The outcome has been to attribute power issues in neoliberal terms, dismissing 
them as artefacts of the free market—simply manifestations of imperfections of 
the market.  As such, researchers focused upon the resource procurement and 
allocation arena sought only to “describe the patterns of dependency or exchange 
relations among structural positions within a field of organizations rather than to 
test for effects of dependency/dominance on organizations’ strategy, structure, or 
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reputation” (p. 285).  In this dissertation, however, I argue contrary to the neoliberal 
usurped modern position, and in so doing explore the very effects of dependency 
and dominance upon interorganisational strategy and structure that Galaskiewicz 
portrayed as absent.  Specifically, I attempt to bridge the gap in analysis by theorizing 
the effects of exchange patterns and what guide them (guidance that I ultimately 
attribute to organisational representation).
Closely related to Galaskiewicz’ (1985) critique of descriptive economic 
accounts of power artefacts rests his commentary on the absence of meaningful 
discussions around environmental constraints as factors in organisational strategic 
choice in decision-making.  While Galaskiewicz appeared to be traditional in his 
description of available environmental resources (including natural, labour and 
investment resources), in Chapters Seven and Eight of this dissertation I refocus 
the notion of environmental constraint to explore organisational representations 
in terms of environmental dominance and weakness.  Doing so, I expose how 
environmentally dominant representations constrain (through psychopathologies 
of communication) the decision-making activities of non-dominant organisations 
party to relationships. 
Political advocacy and legitimacy are established as additional arenas in 
which research on interoganisational relationships has been conducted.  In this 
arena, Galaskiewicz (1985) made clear his assessment of relationships engaged as 
a result of the political environment.  “[W]e have seen no evidence to date showing 
that prestige or good fellowship play any role in organizations joining political 
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coalitions” (p. 295).  To this end, questions must be raised around the consistency 
of educational organisations under such conditions.  I am unable to comment on 
this point as a result of this study.  However, Galaskiewicz went on to explore 
political advocacy as a means of environmental change for organisations party 
to relationships.  He suggested that “[a]t the same time they are bringing about 
changes in the institutional environment, collective actors may have to monopolize 
control over some divisible resource in order to provide selective incentives to 
their membership.  At this point, resource dependency theory once again becomes 
important” (p. 295).  In Chapters Eight and Nine, I entertain a similar point.  I 
suggest that the divisible resource in question is the definition of education itself—to 
this end I contend the monopoly of educational administration over this definition, 
grounded by work in educational foundations, is a precursor to agonistic political 
advocacy.
While the bulk of my analysis in this dissertation clearly rests within the 
domain of the field of interorganisational relationships as defined by Galaskiewicz 
and others, the particular route I have elected to follow does not.  It is my contention, 
however, that in addressing many of the critiques and shortcomings Galaskiewicz 
highlights within the various arenas of interorganisational relationships, I am 
compelled to circumvent past means employed by researchers.  In circumventing 
past practices, I hope to articulate what they have not.  I hope to bring alternate 
views forward for meaningful debate—especially in terms of interorganisational 
relationships involving education.
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3.  The Inspirational and Culminating Position
In this document, I develop a theoretical conceptualisation of 
interorganisational relationships in education systems.  I seek to provide an 
analysis of contemporary issues regarding the relationships among partners in the 
delivery of education programs.  Although I focus primarily on the philosophical 
antecedents of relationships among schools, governments, ministries of education, 
and non-governmental organisations in their most broad and abstract form, other 
conceptual partners including the public at-large are discussed.  I employ, as 
its many theoretical and conceptual frames, literature drawn from physiology, 
psychology, sociology, linguistics, psycholinguistics, psychohistory, cognitive 
science, philosophy of mind, evolutionary biology, sociobiology, political science, 
organisational theory, communication theory, educational psychology, research in 
curriculum studies and learning, educational foundations, history of education and 
educational administration, and I culminate the discussion in terms of a pedagogic-
inspired political account of a project concerning acts of communication among 
actors situated in social collectives.
It is not my purpose in this section of the dissertation to examine the nature of 
this study in detail. However, a brief exploration of the culminating and, in a sense, 
inspirational conceptualisation of this dissertation provides a context in which the 
various arguments I employ may be placed.  
While not specifically cast in terms of the relationships among schools 
and their partners, Howe (2000), Held (1980), and McCarthy (1978) have noted 
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that Jürgen Habermas is himself similarly interested in social and collaborative 
relationships, the ideologies that direct them, and their shifting nature.  The 
sentiments of Howe, Held and McCarthy are supported by a growing body of work 
that has found utility in the use of Habermas’ philosophical perspective to evaluate 
the nature of organisational representations in educational administration (Bates, 
1982; Evers & Lakomski, 1996, 2000, 2001; Foster, 1986; Kochan, 2002). 
As a critical theorist, Habermas has established a post-Marxist analysis of 
social relations and ideology that has evolved beyond, and contributed greatly to, 
his philosophical and sociological foundation in the Frankfurt School (Bates, 1982). 
To understand Habermas’ evolution in thought, one must first understand the nature 
of critical theory.  
3.1.  critical theory and habermasian understanding-directed behaviour.
Critical theory has been described by Burrell and Morgan (1979) as one of 
two evolutionary paths resulting from a modern interpretation of Marxist thought: 
“emphasising the ‘subjective’ aspects of Marxism (Lukács and the Frankfurt School, 
for example) [as opposed to one] advocating more ‘objective’ approaches, such 
as that associated with [French post-Marxist] Althusserian structuralism” (p. 22). 
Burrell and Morgan described a subjective post-Marxist philosophy as favouring 
change over regulation and therefore, according to their paradigmatic frameset, 
described this philosophy as radical humanist in nature.  Foster (1986) expanded 
upon this definition, noting that
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[a] critical theory locates human relationships in structural variables, 
particularly those of class and power, without, however, compromising the 
possibility for change.  Thus, a critical theory examines sources of social 
domination and repression, but with the caveat that since we ultimately 
make our worlds, we can ultimately change them.  Finally, a critical theory 
is committed to values; its critique is largely oriented toward how created 
social structures impede the attainment of such values as democracy and 
freedom.  (p. 72)
For Habermas, a Marxist discussion of a dialectic progression of history is 
important, though incomplete because of its narrow and exclusive belief that the 
antecedents of all progress and change are economic (Habermas, 1975, 1987).11   In 
“Discourse Ethics: Notes on a Program of Philosophical Justification,” Habermas 
(1990/2001a) argued that change in the human condition is far more social in 
nature than Marx had described.  Rather, change and progress are based on key 
components of ontological and social understanding: community, communication, 
and reflection—or perhaps more accurately, change occurs through the breakdown 
and reconstitution of these elements.  It is therefore a goal of Habermasian critical 
theory to enrich the nature of social understandings of community, communication, 
and reflection in ways that will ultimately lead to a more democratic ethos of social 
relationships.
Habermas’ (1984; 1987; 1990/2001a) discourse ethics and communicative 
action theory provided an intriguing assessment of the historical progression of 
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social collectives that hold the nature of communication as a key to unlocking 
the relationships among individuals and, by extension, among organisational 
entities—be they organisations proper, or groups and sub-groups within or betwixt 
organisations.  
Figure 1.1 depicts in basic terms Habermas’ (1987) exploration of the 
temporal progression of human communication—and, by extension, the history of 
social collectives.  In this diagram, the temporal path of progression is shown by the 
solid line (A) depicting the path that leads from its origin in the life-world (or the stage 
of personal consciousness).  The line continues through the stages of organisation 
or public sphere (Habermas, 1962/2001)—described originally by Tönnies 
(1887/1957) as Gemeinschaft or community—and finally system—Gesellschaft or 
society12—visible in their arrangement as columns.  These columns are canopied 
by two supra-headings: pre-/post-hyperrationalization and hyperrationalization 
that denote Habermas’ distinction between community interests and interests of 
competitive advantage respectively.  The longer-dashed line (B) continues the path 
of line A, but returns to the organisation stage. This line represents my own addition 
to Habermas’ thought by linking the shift in popular educational administrative 
thought since the work of Callahan (1970) in the mid-twentieth century.  Although, 
a basis for my addition is found in the earlier commentary of Dewey (1937), 
Montessori (1966) and Neill (1960).
In Figure 1.2, I have added my own conceptualisation onto the theory 
presented in Figure 1.1.  This second diagram depicts both the placement of three 
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stakeholders that I believe are important to the study (governments, non-governmental 
organisations, and educational administration and schools) and the communicative 
interaction among them; Figure 1.1 is therefore a behaviour diagram and Figure 1.2 
is a state diagram.  It is my suspicion that this conceptualisation of communicative 
interaction modes (of the system or the community lifeworld) among stakeholders 
provides a reasonable explanation for problems of their communicative action—
and the place of educational administration as a professional field.
I shall speak of communicative action whenever the actions of the agents 
involved are coordinated not through egocentric calculations of success 
but through acts of reaching understanding.  In communicative action 
participants are not primarily oriented to their own individual successes; they 
pursue their individual goals under the condition that they can harmonize 
their plans of action on the basis of common situation definitions.  In this 
respect the negotiation of definitions of the situation is an essential element 
of the interpretive accomplishments required for communicative action. 
(Habermas, 1984, pp. 285-286, emphasis in original)
It is therefore the nature of this first phase of my project to explore these 
communicative relationships in an attempt to better understand the issues that result 
in Habermasian “understanding”-directed behaviour, as well as their contraries and 
corollaries.  In addition to this, however, is a critical evaluation of the historically 
constituted roles assumed by organisations and the political theatres in which 
organisational relationships are balanced. 
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B.  statement of Purpose
This is a conceptual and emergent study of foundational structures embedded 
in contemporary relationships among educational and non-educational organisations. 
In writing this dissertation, I seek to more clearly construct an hypothesis of 
interorganisational relationships involving educational administration.  To achieve 
this end, I examine those conditions under which educational administrators engage 
educational organisations in relationships with other (both complementary and 
incompatible) organisations.
c.  the Primary Problem and secondary areas of Focus
In addressing the statement of purpose, the question of this study is as 
follows:
•	 What are the dominant foundational and philosophical structures of 
contemporary interorganisational relationships involving educational 
administration?
The following are secondary areas of focus for this study:
1. The historical development of selected contemporary political 
(relational) positions.
2. The foundations of contemporary political (relational) positions.
3. The impact of and responses to contemporary positions within 
political (relational) discourse.
4. The impact of contemporary positions on organisational 
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representations.
5. The impact of and responses to contemporary positions on 
interorganisational relationships.
6. The impact of contemporary interorganisational relationships on 
education and the role to be played by its administration to ensure 
educational interests are served.
d.  Limitations and delimitations
This study is limited by the knowledge, skill, parsimony, and critical thought 
of its author.  The study is delimited to include only those topics that provide, what 
I, as its author, in conjunction with my doctoral supervisor and committee, believe 
to be necessary in order that a thorough and logical argument be presented to the 
reader.  The final analysis, its content, and the point at which I chose to render it 
complete must be satisfactory to my doctoral defence committee.
E.  Significance
The significance of this study is found in its reflection upon and organisation 
of basic tenets of education that give rise to a need for educational administration. 
Furthermore, in this dissertation I advocate the focus of educational administration 
on those tenets that impart a distinction from other forms of administration—thus 
calling into question the relevance for educational administration of those bodies of 
literature that are alternatively focused.  In doing so, I seek to present an Archimedean 
point, against which such questions may be called, and against which all positions, 
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theories, and practices of educational administrators, and all literature held by the 
corps administratif, may be evaluated. 
My aim is to show that educational administration is itself multidisciplinary 
in nature despite its educative focus.  Furthermore, an important revelation of this 
study is the centrality of educational administration’s philosophical antecedents—
including, in their contemporary manifestations, the linguistic foundation of 
philosophical accounts in the social sciences. 
F.  Limitations and assumptions of the Writer
As I wrote this dissertation I contemplated my role within it.  That I was a 
part of the result seems clear.  I have pondered such questions as: Who am I beyond 
a part of the product?  How is it that I am here writing these words? 
Research in psychology and psychiatry has suggested that all individuals go 
through phases in life (Flach, 1988; Richardson, 2002; Richardson, Neiger, Jensen, 
& Kumpfer, 1990; Rutter, 1985, 1993, 1999).  While these phases are commonly 
interrupted by changes, if surroundings and background provide support, one’s 
ability to develop through change is assured (Burgess, 2003; Rutter, 1985, 1993, 
1999).  To this end, Socrates, as Plato (c. 360 BCE/1966b) recorded of his final 
hours, suggested that the true philosopher is wonting of such interruptions and 
change—in Socrates’ case, his forced death—for only in the self-reflective rebirth 
that accompanies change does one come to understand one’s self.
Mine has been a supported life, and perhaps support explains to some 
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degree the diversity of my interests and experience.  While I might at times take the 
“resilient” state in which I live for granted, I am by nature one to frequently reflect 
upon these supports, ever-mindful of how I might learn from them—how I might 
better understand myself and my role.  
Principally, I have come to recognize three social factors to which I owe my 
place: I am male, I am Caucasian, and I am Canadian.  These three elements of my 
social history characterize a certain lot in life that has provided both privilege and 
support, and offered me the opportunity to be seated as a doctoral student of philosophy 
and educational administration in a western university.  I have further inherited a 
body of literature in my studies that is perhaps similarly privileged.  Plato, Aristotle, 
St. Augustine, Descartes, Rousseau, Kant, Dewey, Piaget, Habermas, et al.—the 
work of each is among that body that I employed.  So, I felt that I was confronted by 
a challenge that extended beyond ontological or epistemic persuasion; a challenge 
to which I have dedicated much time and thought.  How could I separate what some 
see as the elitist, misogynistic, and otherwise contemptuous historically manifest 
ideas and opinions of many of these individuals from those ideas and opinions that 
I would maintain to be equitable, enlightened, and eminently valuable?  Though 
I cannot fault these men for the fact that they were unable to separate themselves 
from the time in which they lived, was I able to separate them from the time in 
which they lived?  Does a promotion of their ideas within a dissertation such as 
this similarly promote or maintain the privileged position from which they and 
from which I wrote?  The answer at which I have arrived is no—but this response 
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requires some explanation. 
I maintain the belief that an individual’s ideas may be selectively removed 
from their time so long as both the time in which they were written, and the current 
impact of their ideas, if taken beyond their face value, are understood and where 
appropriate steadfastly avoided.  In essence, I suggest that it is wrong to refuse to 
accept the entirety of Rousseau’s work, for example, on the grounds that he was 
unable to see male (Émile) and female (Sophie) children in the same light.  His ideas 
retain contemporary positive value only if we critically examine those ideas that 
we deem misogynist or contemptuous—and then hypothesize their negative value 
as potential traps against which one should be on guard.  Our best defence against 
such traps, needless to say, is found in the depth of our critical examination.  In this 
way, my privilege has been accounted for in my critical vigilance as thinking writer. 
Thus, in my role as author of this dissertation, I was thinker first and writer second. 
To be anything else was to deny the importance of critique, and risk an account that 
was contrary to an academic ethic (Sears & Parsons, 1991).
G. acknowledgements
I have elsewhere stated that the thinker can be nothing but an integral 
component of his or her own work.  However, it is only fitting that as I embark upon 
self-examination of mind I come clean (Dimitriadis, 2001), so to speak, regarding 
three particular influences.  Dr. Larry Sackney, as teacher and advisor in the writing 
of this dissertation, provided both an inspirational introduction to philosophy, and 
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more specifically to the work of Jürgen Habermas.  Dr. Adam Scharf is a process 
philosopher, a Whiteheadian and Hegelian, whose patience surrounding my many 
(what must have seemed) pedantic questions during the advent of my examination 
of the subject is very much appreciated.  And finally, Dr. Philip Peterson is a scholar 
and teacher of epistemology, history of education, and developmental philosophy 
whose insights, questions and encouragement advanced within me the faculties of 
mind to write such a work as this.  It is through our many conversations  (especially 
regarding the works of Rousseau, Kant and Piaget) that my present understanding 
and interpretation of mind and its relationship with the world has come into being. 
h.  terminology
To clarify six particular notions, connotations and elements of language used 
within this dissertation, the following definitions of terms were used:
1. Organisational Representation
At the heart of this dissertation is a notion that I have struggled with for 
a number of years.  The notion arose from the question: Do organisations have 
beliefs? And specifically, what are the relationships between these beliefs and what 
Rousseau (1762) called the general will?  
Much has been written on organisational culture—I need not detail this issue 
here—but I was particularly inspired after reading Mitroff’s (1983) unorthodox 
take on the subject titled Stakeholders of the Organisational Mind, especially when 
I placed this work within the debates engaging cognitive science—Searle (to whose 
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argument I most readily subscribe) and the Churchlands (from whom Evers and 
Lakomski, in our own field, draw insight).   Simply put, Mitroff suggested that 
organisations (in their problem-solving, management, actions, etc.) are ruled by the 
interests of stakeholders; but not just the run-of-the-mill stakeholders embroiled 
within a particular issue, which is for Mitroff too constrictive a picture.  Rather, 
organisations are ruled by psyche-based stakeholders (of which he identifies three: 
cognitive styles, ego types, and archetypes) within each stakeholder.   From these 
psyche-based stakeholders, Mitroff surmised an organisational soul. 
For my own purposes, the third of Mitroff’s (1983) stakeholders, archetypes, 
seem to be most closely related to the issues embedded within my questions 
regarding organisational belief.  In this dissertation I examine these questions and 
employ as an assumption something akin to these archetypes.  For reasons that 
I discuss in Chapters Five through Nine, I see these archetypes as collectively 
held, rather than specific to a particular stakeholder.  Since they are not, therefore, 
identical to Mitroff’s archetypes, I struggled with a name that captures the meaning 
I was attempting to reify.  Originally I named this as “organisational ontology.” 
More recently, I have come to accept the name “organisational representation,” and 
removed any contention that these “representations” were only indirectly linked to 
the nature of organisational being qua being.
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2. Science
In various locations within the present text, the term “science” was 
distinguished from both “technology” and “neo-science” (or technology qua 
science).  Some writers (Burke, 2007) more loosely equate the two.  I, however, 
echo McClellan and Dorn (1999) and do not equate them due to differences exposed 
through historical review. I herein defined “science” in Kuhnian paradigmatic and 
evolutionary terms, viz. a method (or collection of methods) for discovery based 
upon historically accumulated insight and critical evaluation.  As such, I made no 
particular claim to universality of method (both temporally or disciplinarily) beyond 
basic and fundamental appeals to reason and an ethic of critique (Starratt, 2003).
Rapoport (1989) argued that there are two ways of defining science.  The first 
way, which he attributed to Lundberg (1939) and other neopositivists (as Lundberg 
was monikered by Furfey, 1948), is as “organized body of instrumental knowledge”; 
that is, “knowledge of how to get from here to there, what to expect under given 
observed conditions, what to deduce from given premises” (Rapoport, 1989, p. 
158, emphasis in original).  Lundberg believed that science could be understood 
as a series of if/then statements: if you have condition x, then you can expect y 
to happen.  Further, as Rapoport summarized, this notion also applies to goals; 
“[g]oals are given; it is the scientist’s job to find the means to attain them” (p. 158). 
I link Lundberg’s definition with technology, below. 
Alternatively, science can be understood as “enlightened way of thinking,” 
where science is seen as an activity of emancipation; “[i]t provides means of 
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breaking the strangle-hold of conventional wisdom, of hand-me-down prejudices, 
of veneration of authority backed by power” (Rapoport, 1989, p. 159).  Ideas 
emerge, then, from long and hard thought, invention, discussion, improvement, and 
acceptance or refutation.  In this way, science is educative.  But it is also a moral-
enterprise, for even if our emergent ideas turn out to be wrong, as Plato (c. 380 
BCE/1967) wrote in the Meno, “we will be better men, braver and less idle if we 
believe that one must search for the things one does not know” (§ 86b).
3. Technology
“Technology” was distinguished within this document as the tangible 
product of science.  In this manner, technology is more closely linked to Burke’s 
(2007) notion of economies of planned obsolescence and novelty than his particular 
definition of technology, for mine was similarly linked to economic expansion 
through historical example.  The neopositivist definition of science provided by 
Lundberg (1939), was, for my purposes, technology.
4. Evolutionary Change (Behavioural versus Cultural)
In this dissertation, I discuss ideas around evolution, specifically, ideas 
stemming from the evolution of the mind and certain behaviours.  I am careful not 
to mix and match behaviour with culture.  One of the authors from whom I draw 
insight in Chapter Four is the biologist Dawkins.  Dawkins is known for the notion 
of memes.  A meme is an analogy that Dawkins drew in his (1976/2006) book The 
Selfish Gene to describe how replication can explain the spread of ideas, as well as 
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genetic material.  
The notion of a meme is illustrative, and tempting to employ as an analogy 
for cultural influence, but it was not intended to represent how social evolution 
progresses.  If it were to, memes would imply that social changes occur via the 
replication of minor errors (mutations) in thought.  But random substitutions or 
typos do not make change.  Cultural changes are directed and invented.  In this light, 
a meme is an epidemiological notion rather than a genetic one.  Memes explain how 
ideas become popular, but not from where they come.  Pinker’s (1998) insight on 
the matter is helpful. 
The geneticist Theodosius Dobzhansky famously wrote that nothing in 
biology makes sense except in the light of evolution.  We can add that nothing 
in culture makes sense except in the light of psychology.  Evolution created 
psychology, and that is how it explains culture. (p. 210)
Pinker’s view defines cultural evolution within this dissertation.
5. Micro/Macro Educational Administration
In Chapter Eight, I focus my more general discussions upon the context 
of macro educational administration; one of two subdivisions I ascribe.  I draw 
a distinction within this dissertation between (a) the administration of education 
when focused upon the management of schools and education systems, and (b) 
when educational administration is focused upon leadership and advocacy for 
schools and education systems within social, economic, and political contexts. 
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When discussing a I employ the phrase micro educational administration.  When 
discussing b, I employ the phrase macro educational administration.
6. Post-Modernity
In this dissertation, post-modernity is generally defined as a reaction 
to modernity represented by three related elements: (a) relativism, (b) social 
construction, and (c) the absence of a grand narrative.  I understand relativism and 
social construction in terms presented by Gillet (1998), and I understand the post-
modern rejection of grand narratives through Lyotard (1979).  
Under Gillet’s (1998) regime, two forms of epistemological relativism and 
social constructivism exist.  The first he dubbed noncontroversial.  Noncontroversial 
constructivist relativism suggests that belief about the nature of reality is a product of 
the mind of the individual under certain historical, cultural, and subjective conditions. 
This form of constructivist relativism is inconsequential.  It is generally accepted as 
reasonable, but is argumentatively unsatisfactory.  This form does not define post-
modernity in this dissertation.  Alternatively, controversial constructivist relativism 
implies that truth is a product of the subjective experience of the individual.  It is 
this form of constructivist relativism that post-modernity implies.
A logical consequence of Gillet’s (1998) controversial constructivist 
relativism is that because truth can have no arbiter, knowledge can not be held within 
a singular project—as was believed during the Enlightenment.  Thus Lyotard’s 
(1979) rejection of grand narratives.
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Post-modernity and post-modernism have been defined in terms of 
organisational theory in educational administration by a variety of authors (see 
for example, Furman, 1998; Sackney & Mitchell, 2002; Scheurich, 1994). The 
definitions these authors provided tended to employ the noncontroversial form of 
constructivist relativism.  Due to their acceptance of the need for some form of 
arbiter, I classify their work as a derivative of critical theory.  I therefore do not rely 
upon this body of literature when I define post-modernity.
I.  organisation of the dissertation
This dissertation is divided into three principal parts: (I) Introduction, Method, 
and Perspective; (II) A Conceptualisation of Interorganisational Relationships; and 
(III) A Response to the Conceptualisation.  In the first part, encompassing the first 
three chapters, I introduce the topic and the researcher.  While the first chapter 
may bear some resemblance to the model for theses and dissertations employed by 
many of my contemporaries, the nature of this particular study precludes any such 
consistency in chapters that follow.  Since the majority of this dissertation involved 
the study and concatenation of hundreds of ostensibly disparate written works and 
arguments, a single chapter dedicated to a comprehensive review of the literature 
represented an impractical—and perhaps somewhat disingenuous—account.  
With this in mind, in Chapters Two and Three I explore four concerns that 
required some analysis prior to my entry into the body of the dissertation.  These 
were: (a) a brief overview of the conceptualisation of the notion of methodology 
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employed within the present phase and to be employed within future phases of this 
project and (b) the method of argument development explored in Chapter Two, 
and (c) my ontological and (d) epistemological positions as the writer found in 
Chapter Three.  My ordering of these topics may appear reversed.  Indeed, one may 
argue that ontology and epistemology are natural antecedents of methodology and 
method (an argument against which I hold no general opposition).  I can only submit 
that the most accountable construction of my ontological and epistemic positions 
is performed through the use of the method of argumentation I intended to employ 
throughout this document’s entirety.    
In Chapters Four through Eight, I followed the order and foci of those 
secondary areas of study listed above.  These chapters represent the main discussion 
explored in the dissertation.   I present them as Part II. 
Finally, in Chapter Nine I provide a summary and draw a conclusion to the 
arguments made around the primary problem—herein,  I construct an hypothesis of 
foundational structures of interorganisational relationships, and the responsibility 
of educational administration.  Chapter Nine and the Postscript represent Part III.
A synopsis of the structure of the argument is as follows.  As described 
above, in the first three chapters of the dissertation, I outline (a) the context of the 
problem, (b) the method through which I engage the problem, and (c) the ontological 
and epistemic assumptions I bring to the problem.  In the fourth chapter, I establish 
the underlying political, social, and economic context for modernity.  This context 
provides a background for contemporary interorganisational relationships and I 
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here claim that modernity’s present manifestation is corrupted by two principal 
flaws: modern ideology is rooted in a fallacious conception of (a) human nature, 
and (b) science.  I argue in Chapter Five that post-modern reactions to these flaws 
are at best anaemic in their responses to these flaws, and at worst perpetuate 
the longevity of the modern position.  In the sixth chapter, I show how present 
discussions in the organisational theory of educational administration that focus 
on coherentist decision-making through the use of game theory are also based 
on the above mentioned flaws of modernity.  In the seventh chapter, I show how 
these flaws, as revealed in game theory, demonstrate psychopathological reasons 
for modernity’s persistence, and influence on educational organisations that engage 
in interorganisational relationships.  The political consequences of these modern 
psychopathologies for education are discussed in Chapter Eight.  In Chapter Nine, 
I propose a plan of action for educators and educationalists that mitigates the 
contemporary psychopathologies of interorganisational relationships involving the 
administration of education.
Finally, a comment on the style employed within this dissertation.  As my 
intent is to construct a conceptual piece, the broad style in which the dissertation was 
written is intended to methodically reveal arguments.  I concatenate from disparate 
ideas a final conclusion.  The piece, therefore, cannot be held to certain strictures of 
the Publication Manual of the American Psychological Association.  Similarly, for 
the sake of clarity and to grant myself the ability to easily refer to past arguments in 
a reasonably effective manner, I have chosen to slightly modify APA’s requirements 
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with regard to section headings.  As is demonstrated within this and other chapters, I 
have taken the liberty of adding an organisational numbering scheme to all sections 
and their subordinates. 
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chaPter tWo
MethodoLoGy and the estaBLIshMent oF a  
herMeneutIc Method
I here present a conceptual study of foundational structures embedded in 
contemporary relationships among educational and non-educational organisations. 
This study employed a conceptualisation method based upon a hermeneutic system 
of philosophic discursive illustration—conceived and defended in the sections 
within the present chapter.  I call my method diagrammatic hermeneutics.
a. the Methodology and Method of the study
The pages that follow serve several purposes, and I have organised them to 
represent the arguments I have prepared as justification for the method I employed 
as I engaged in the philosophical analysis, interpretation, and treatment of this 
study.  In Section 1., I present an examination of the methodological foundations 
of the method that are employed and described in Section 2.  Both sections were 
summarized within the final paragraphs of the chapter.  I define terms throughout 
and sections and subsections were numbered to simplify their reference within the 
text.
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1.  Methodology
1.1.  Introduction
In the current and the following section, I have separated the concepts of 
methodology and method.  I provide a distinction between (a) who I am and what 
I bring to the table as a thinker (my methodology), and the process of thinking 
that I followed on the other (my method).  It is in Chapter Three, where a precise 
and detailed exploration of my ontological and epistemic positions proceeds by 
employing the very method I create in Section 2. of this chapter.  It is for this 
reason that although I view (a) ontology and epistemology as preconditions for 
(b) methodology and method, their respective orders have been reversed.  That is, 
I will use b  throughout my description of a—since accounting for a is an act of 
thinking.
1.2.  Methodological development
I begin my discussion by returning to the first statement made in Section 
1.1.  I claimed that there exists a distinction between methodology and method, 
and that the division of methodology from method was not diametrical, but rather 
more tenuous in nature.  It is my contention that the methods thinkers employ can 
have much of their own perspective found within,13 a notion that is complementary 
to my reflections on methodology.  It is important that I, as a thinker, select from 
the cannon of research methods a method that both recognizes the intent of my 
purpose, is complementary to my own methodology, and yet still complements the 
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way I think.  I see this final criterion to be of colossal importance, and believe that 
it requires some further clarification.
The more I read of Habermas’ philosophical project, the more I became 
intrigued by both its nature and the manner in which it has come to be.  I have been 
fortunate to become involved in research, of both the qualitative and quantitative 
varieties, that has highlighted not only the findings, but the nature of the research 
process itself.  From these experiences, I have drawn most pleasure from the academic 
challenge positioned in the analysis of findings.  It is the love of the challenge 
of analysis that I link with the manner in which philosophical projects, such as 
Habermas’, exist and grow—and I take as substance for such a claim philosophy’s 
Greek etymology: the love of wisdom (Bogomolov, 1985; Diogenes Laërtius, c. 
230/1991; Fuller, 1945)—indeed the analysis of findings is the challenge of drawing 
wisdom from findings.  The Rt. Hon. Lord Quinton (1995a) has suggested that 
perhaps the simplest definition of philosophy is best, and the least problematic in 
its lacklustre attempt at profundity—“philosophy is thinking about thinking” (p. 
666).  Lord Quinton’s aphorism implies the second-order nature of philosophical 
thinking; in terms of the discussion above, findings constitute a first-order concept, 
the analysis of findings provides the second-order while espousing no particular 
methodological lens through which the analysis should proceed.  
At the heart of the matter, therefore, rests the unique methodological lens 
provided by the individual performing the analysis, and furthermore the technique 
they employ within the analysis process. Or perhaps more simply: What has 
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influenced a philosopher’s thinking? and How do philosophers go about it?  From the 
words of Lord Quinton (1995a) I am left to contemplate the technique I personally 
employ as I academically analyse the findings, objects, events, relationships, and 
ideas that inundate my psyche.  In my own case, I analyse diagrammatically.
A general purpose of education is to recognize the analytic potential of the 
student and engage his or her thought processes through techniques, strategies, or 
models that better enable the student to achieve higher order analysis.  In modern 
educational philosophic interpretations (Dewey, 1927/1963, 1937; Gallagher, 
1992; Montessori, 1966), education draws-out from the student’s own mind those 
techniques, strategies, or models that best suit the student’s thought processes.14 
Having not yet found a technique, strategy, model, or method from within existing 
literature (Baggini & Fosl, 2003; Garrison, 1997; Newell, 1967; Plato, c. 360 
BCE/1966b; Whitehead, 1933/1969; Wittgenstein, 1958/1984, among others) that 
best suited my personal processes of analysis, I constructed my own.  I call my 
philosophic method-project diagrammatic hermeneutics.
1.2.a.  Diagrammatic hermeneutics
The method that I propose is a concatenation of two thought processes. 
The first is the well-established philosophical and qualitative research method of 
hermeneutics.  The second is a recently emergent branch of semiotics called pictorial 
semiotics, and is further influenced by areas of study including philosophical 
analogy, heuristics, educational mnemonics and educational multimodal literacy. 
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I shall briefly outline the literary foundations of each of these constituent thought 
processes of diagrammatic hermeneutics.
1.2.a.i. Hermeneutics and the hermeneutic circle
The root of hermeneutics is Greek, both etymologically and philosophically 
(Gallagher, 1992).  Plato (c. 380 BCE/1925) described the conversation between 
Socrates and Ion wherein the argument is constructed that interpretation [ἑρμηνεία 
/ hermēneía] is the work of poets.
Socrates. … For the god, as it seems to me, intended him to be a sign to 
us that we should not waver or doubt that these fine poems are not 
human or the work of men, but divine and the work of gods; and that 
the poets are merely the interpreters of the gods, according as each is 
possessed by one of the heavenly powers. To show this forth, the god 
of set purpose sang the finest of songs through the meanest of poets: 
or do you not think my statement true, Ion? 
Ion.  Yes, upon my word, I do: for you somehow touch my soul with your 
words, Socrates, and I believe it is by divine dispensation that good 
poets interpret to us these utterances of the gods.
Socrates. And you rhapsodes, for your part, interpret the utterances of the 
poets?
Ion.  Again your words are true.
Socrates. And so you act as interpreters of interpreters? [ἑρμηνέων ἑρμηνῆς 
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/ hermēneōn hermēnes]?
Ion.  Precisely. (§ 534d-535a)
Plato’s record does more than simply recall the conversation of his teacher and 
make claims as to the divine inspiration of poetry, it demonstrates the early 
held philosophical belief that interpretation is multi-perspectived, -levelled and 
transcendental (in Kant’s [1784/1982] sense: ever-developing understanding of 
one’s understanding)—each of which inform the modern discipline.
The path of modern hermeneutics is drawn through fields of philosophy, 
theology, law, literacy and social sciences.  Attempts at its definition are as diverse 
as these disciplines (Gallagher, 1992) but retain the ancient notions of interpretation 
and understanding as unifiers.  Schleiermacher (1819/1977) explained that 
hermeneutics is “the art of understanding” (p. 96) among individuals and the way 
through which understanding is achieved.  Kosman’s (2003) discussion of Plato’s 
(c. 380 BCE/1996) Euthyphro highlighted the ancient notion that understanding 
was embodied in interpretation and dialogue among individuals.  Kosman argued 
that, according to the ancient view, the transcendental act15 of interpretation literally 
is understanding.  
Ricœur (1970) provided a bridge between hermeneutics and semiotics. He 
described hermeneutics as “the theory of the rules that preside over an exegesis 
… the interpretation of a particular text, or a group of signs that may be viewed 
as a text” (p. 8).  Heidegger (1967), and Gadamer (as cited in Gallagher, 1992) 
following Heidegger’s ontological purpose for it, sought to employ hermeneutics 
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in the pursuit of understanding the existential individual through phenomenological 
enquiry around Being (Sein) and existence (Dasein) (Heidegger, 1967; Inwood, 
1995).16  Heidegger (1997) maintained, however, the link between hermeneutics and 
language when he wrote, “Language is the house of Being.  In its home the human 
dwells” (p. 193).  Heidegger here solidified the context of human understanding as 
linguistic.  Habermas (1971/1990) provided his own definition when he noted that
[h]ermeneutics refers to an “ability” we acquire to the extent to which we 
learn to “master” a natural language: the art of understanding linguistically 
communicable meaning and to render it comprehensible in cases of distorted 
communication.  The understanding of meaning is directed at the semantic 
content of speech as well as the meaning-content of written forms or even 
of non-linguistic symbolic systems, in so far as meaning-content can, in 
principle, be expressed in words. (p. 245)
Habermas thus provided an important point to which I return later: that meaning 
and hermeneutic interpretation are not exclusively found within language as we 
know it, but extend beyond language into symbolic depictions of knowledge—so 
long as that knowledge adheres to discursively reconcilable validity claims, as 
required in his principles of communicative action and discourse ethics (Habermas, 
1990/2001a).  Meanings must therefore be justified and the hermeneutic process 
provides the link between meaning and justification.
Habermas’ communicative link to hermeneutics was further demonstrated 
in the work of Stewart (1995) and articulated in Heidegger’s existentialism— 
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“[t]o be human is to be an understander, which is to engage in processes of coherence 
building or sense making [sic] processes that occur communicatively and that 
enable humans to constitute, maintain, and develop the worlds we inhabit” (p. 115). 
Furthermore, Stewart cited Madison (1990) to under-gird his definition: “language 
is the way in which, as humans, we experience what we call reality, that is, the way 
in which reality exists for us” (Madison, 1990, p. 165, cited in Stewart, 1995, p. 
137, emphasis in original).17
This broad collection of definitions en masse articulates the multiplicity 
encountered in the classical Greek context of hermēneía.  Modern hermeneutics 
does not find its significance in the study of language proper, but in studying the 
individual’s interpretation or understanding drawn from and through language 
and “non-linguistic symbol systems,” however one constitutes or defines them. 
“Hermeneutics examines human understanding in general.  All understanding is 
linguistic, and nothing that involves knowledge or seeking after knowledge escapes 
the domain of hermeneutics” (Gallagher, 1992, p. 7).  Modern hermeneutics embodies 
a reinforcement of the hermēneía (interpretations of interpretations) tradition.
The hermeneutic circle is found in all forms of interpretation (Gallagher, 
1992; Kincheloe & McLaren, 2000; Schwandt, 1994, 2000).  It is the interpretation 
of the hermeneutic circle’s very nature that marks a major schism within modern 
hermeneutics (Gallagher, 1992; D. C. Hoy, 1978), a schism found between the 
normative and philosophical varieties.  The former, more classical variety, seeks to 
define a hermeneutic method, a process, a protocol, or a cannon.  This normative 
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method provides a guide to follow in the hermeneutic practice.  The latter, defined by 
Gadamer, does not seek to provide a method of understanding.  Rather, philosophical 
hermeneutics seeks to clarify the conditions under which understanding takes place, 
including constraints and possibilities inherent within interpretation (Gallagher, 
1992).  
Normative or philosophical, the purpose of the hermeneutic circle remains 
basically the same: to provide an awareness that ideas, concepts, and thoughts are 
not representative of a whole unto themselves, but are depictions of a part of a whole. 
Furthermore, the hermeneutic circle establishes an awareness that the parts must be 
understood in terms of the whole, and the whole in terms of its parts—the unknown 
is found within the known, through recognition of the circularity of the expansion of 
knowledge (Gallagher, 1992; Habermas, 1971/1990; Heidegger, 1967; D. C. Hoy, 
1978; Schleiermacher, 1819/1977).  The debate among normative and philosophic 
hermeneutics emerges, in terms of the circle, between the Schleiermacherian/
normative principle that the circle, at a certain point, provides the answer to any 
question entertained through its loop, and the Gadamerian/philosophical doubt that 
such completeness is possible (Gallagher, 1992).
My own view is that hermeneutics seemed a combination of the two 
varieties.  I agree with the normative point that a loose process outlining a method 
of knowledge expansion is valuable as a tool, both for expansion and for recursively 
auditing expansion (or discursively reconciling validity claims in Habermasian 
terms).  Yet, I also agree with the philosophic critique that the circle provides no 
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end—a contention that ideas exist within more complex and developing theatres than 
are knowable by any one individual.  I therefore construct a method for hermeneutic 
interpretation and reinterpretation that makes no general claim to an eventual end. 
Having said this, certain constraints under which I wrote these pages precluded me 
from engaging in ceaseless circumnavigations.  Therefore, for the purposes of this 
dissertation, I found an arbitrary but appropriate point at which I concluded; a point 
at which I believed my research question had been answered sufficiently.
1.2.a.ii.  Pictographic depiction in philosophical symbolism and anal-
ogy, psychology, heuristics, mnemonics and education
Charles Sanders Peirce (1894/1992) explained that 
pictures alone,—pure likenesses,—can never convey the slightest 
information. … The same thing is true of general language and of all symbols. 
No combination of words (excluding proper nouns, and in the absence of 
gestures or other indicative concomitants of speech) can ever convey the 
slightest information. (p. 7)  
Peirce’s point seemed paradoxical, for words, symbols, and signs are indeed meant 
to convey information—from the advent of Sumerian cuniform (c. 3000 BCE) 
onward, humans have thousands of years of contra-examples.  Peirce’s suggestion 
was somewhat more foundational, however.  His was an exploration of the nature of 
signs (pictures, likenesses, diagrams) through a juxtaposition of linguistic concepts. 
It is not the sign that transmits information in and of itself, but it is the preexistent 
meaning that the sign reflects in its viewer.  
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The result of Peirce’s work was an articulation of the inherent differences 
between symbols unto themselves and referential language—which provides a link 
to the mantra of the hermeneutic circle: the parts must be understood in terms of the 
whole, and the whole in terms of its parts.
A symbol, as we have seen, cannot indicate any particular thing; it denotes 
a kind of thing. Not only that, but it is itself a kind and not a single thing. 
You can write down the word “star”; but that does not make you the creator 
of the word, nor if you erase it have you destroyed the word. The word lives 
in the minds of those who use it. Even if they are all asleep, it exists in their 
memory. So we may admit, if there be reason to do so, that generals are 
mere words without at all saying, as Ockham supposed, that they are really 
individuals.
Symbols grow.  They come into being by development out of other 
signs, particularly from likenesses or from mixed signs partaking of the 
nature of likenesses and symbols.  We think only in signs. These mental 
signs are of mixed nature; the symbol-parts of them are called concepts.  If a 
man makes a new symbol, it is by thoughts involving concepts.  So it is only 
out of symbols that a new symbol can grow.  Omne symbolum de symbolo. 
A symbol, once in being, spreads among the peoples [sic]. In use and in 
experience, its meaning grows.  Such words as force, law, wealth, marriage, 
bear for us very different meanings from those they bore to our barbarous 
ancestors. (Peirce, 1894/1992, pp. 9-10, emphasis in original)
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Peirce’s discourse may be understood to imply that language provides a discursive 
means of articulating and amalgamating minor concepts into larger one’s, while 
symbolizing, alternatively, provides a non-discursive means of articulating 
amalgamated or minor concepts in a broader context.
An important caution is provided by Searle (1979; 1984; 1992) and one to 
which I return in greater detail in Chapters Three and Nine.  In light of the direction 
toward which the current discussion is progressing, the concept of language must 
be deconstructed into two important antecedents: (a) syntax, and (b) semantics. 
Chomsky (2000) articulated definitions of these two components of language. 
Where syntax relates to the “organisation of … symbolic elements” of language 
(written letters, characters or symbols), semantics describes “a purported [mental] 
relation between symbols and things of the non-mental world to which they ‘refer’” 
(p. 46).  The distinction is important because it exposes the multi-levelled nature of 
language, and (when referred back to Peirce [1894/1992] and others to be discussed 
hereafter) symbolic representations and diagrammatic or schematic elements.  
Consistent with Chomsky’s account, a symbol is of no value to human 
cognition unless it holds some preestablished or reasonably inferred meaning.  That 
is to say, unless the symbol refers to something known, assumed or deduced through 
reference to another preestablished something or somethings.  Returning to Searle 
(2004), lines and circles potentially appear in nature, but it takes human knowledge 
of their meaning to interpret them as one’s and zeros—one’s and zeros are therefore 
observer-dependent, while objects of nature are observer independent.  Therefore, 
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I distinguish my discussion of symbols from that explored by Evers and Lakomski 
(2000) and advocated by Vera and Simon (1993) on the subject of physical symbol 
system processing in the field of cognitive science.   To foreshadow the extension 
of these notions into the ultimate conclusions of the present discussion in Section 
1.2.b., it is important to see that while individual elements of a singular diagram 
may carry no particular meaning (on account of their pure syntactic nature), a 
hermeneutic diagram assists the apperception of meaning by the observer.
In 1946, Price noted that “[o]ur whole civilization … is probably the most 
symbol-ridden civilization there has ever been” (p. 2).  He continued by explaining 
his perception of the mental-distance and difference between an instance of language 
and the image it depicts.
When we think by means of words, there are, as it were, two layers of symbols, 
or two stages of symbolization: let us call them primary and secondary.  The 
word does not directly stand for the absent object ….  What it directly stands 
for is an idea—a concept or an image—and this is itself something intra-
mental.  And then the concept or image in turn symbolizes the absent object, 
the extra-mental reality about which we are thinking.  It is the concept of, 
or the image of, that extra-mental object.  Thus, on this theory, words are 
secondary symbols, and apart from their relation to ideas they would not 
mean at all. (Price, 1946/1975, p. 4, emphasis in original)
Habermas (2001) supported this contention when he wrote, “[r]epresented objects 
can only come into existence within the horizon opened by the primordial creative 
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power of symbolic representation.  Outside of the symbolically grounded relation 
between a linguistic expression and what it affirms, such an attribution of existence 
is strictly meaningless” (p. 17).  Perhaps Wittgenstein (1949/1968) provided an 
analogy in his commentary regarding the complete capacity of language when he 
challenged:
ask yourself whether our language is complete;—whether it was so before 
the symbolism of chemistry and the notation of the infinitesimal calculus 
were incorporated in it; for these are, so to speak, suburbs of our language 
[Vorstädte unserer Sprache].  (And how many houses or streets does it take 
before a town begins to be a town?) (p. 8e)
At the root of the relationship between language and mental image is a 
concept known in psychology as mapping.  Mapping provides linkages between 
conceptual domains by applying the terminology employed by one domain within 
another.  Fauconnier (1997) explained, as an example of psychological mapping, 
that English speakers employ spatial terminology within the domain of time. 
We use structure from our everyday conception of space and motion to 
organize our everyday conception of time, as when we say: Christmas is 
approaching; The weeks go by; Summer is around the corner; The long day 
stretched out with no end in sight. (p. 9, emphasis in original)
Furthermore, mapping of this type has been extended into the fields of computer, 
computational and neural sciences through cognitive simulations and analogy 
(Forbus, 2001; Holyoak & Hummel, 2001; Wilson, Halford, Gray, & Phillips, 2001). 
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Yet mapping, as a concept, is used in very different ways within heuristics, mnemonics 
and education—in ways more similar to Lewin’s (1936; 1951) mathematical and 
topological representation, and ultimately field theory and Gestalt (Mayer, 1991) in 
psychology, than to the ways employed by Fauconnier (1997).  Although these fields 
of study have each implanted their own purpose within mapping, what binds their 
grouping as unit is their translation of the mental image employed in Fauconnier’s 
psychological mapping and analogy on the written page.
Klix (1983), writing in the field of heuristics, noted that “[f]or reasons 
that are connected with our prehistory in archaic thinking, thinking … can take 
place both in image-like pictorial and in a logic-conceptional or symbolic form 
of representation” (p. 33).  Klix’ notion of symbolic representation is a form of 
mapping where ideas that would be eminently difficult to articulate linguistically 
are more easily depicted spatially or graphically. 
Along an arguably complementary line of thought, Kant, in the Critique of 
Pure Reason (1784/1890), argued that the spatial representation of objects was an 
a priori sensibility—a faculty of our mind’s innate and natural capacity to receive 
representations of material objects.
Space then is a necessary representation à priori, which serves for the 
foundation of all external intuitions.  We never can imagine or make a 
representation to ourselves of the non-existence of space, though we may 
easily enough think that no objects are found in it.  It must, therefore, be 
considered as the condition of the possibility of phænomena, and by no 
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means as a determination dependent on them, and is a representation à priori, 
which necessarily supplies the basis for external phænomena. …
Space is nothing else than the form of all phænomena of the external 
sense, that is, the subjective condition of the sensibility, under which alone 
external intuition is possible. (Kant, 1784/1890, pp. 24-26; [A 24/B 38-A 
26/B 42])
We are, according to Kant, naturally designed to understand objects of our experience 
and imagination spatially.18  I revisit this point and its implications in the chapter to 
follow.
De Groot (1965), whose work is widely cited as seminal by heuristicians, 
argued that players of chess require no linguistic interaction in order to learn or play 
the game—“chess thinking is typically non-verbal” (p. 335, emphasis in original). 
All manœuvres in chess, De Groot argued, are “objects of perception, imagination, 
and thought, without any dependence on verbal formulations and concepts. … Thus 
chess thinking is nonverbal thinking and especially thinking in terms of spatial 
relationships and possibilities for movement” (p. 335, emphasis in original).  The 
linkage of De Groot’s work into the field of heuristics is found in its use of an 
image (whether drawn, imagined or depicted on a chess board resting before the 
player) that is constantly malleable and plastic, and where such malleability may 
be depicted within the image itself, or through a series of images used as tools for 
evaluation within real or hypothetical scenarios. 
In the entry titled Figures within his “Short Dictionary of Heuristic,” Pólya 
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(1957), whose work is similarly cited as seminal, explained the importance of 
drawing out ideas as pictographs.
On certain occasions, it might be desirable to imagine the figure without 
drawing it; but if we have to examine various details, one detail after the 
other, it is desirable to draw a figure.  If there are many details, we cannot 
imagine all of them simultaneously, but they are all together on the paper.  A 
detail pictured in our imagination may be forgotten; but the detail traced on 
paper remains, and, when we come back to it, it reminds us of our previous 
remarks, it saves us some of the trouble we have in recollecting our previous 
consideration. (pp. 103-104)
A connection may be drawn between the notion of drawing figures for the purpose 
of memory and discussions of mnemonics in the field of educational psychology 
(Anderson & Bower, 1980; Laird & Laird, 1960; Svantesson, 2004).  A further 
exploration of drawing pictographs to aid in education comes by way of teaching 
methods that include thinking technology (McKenzie, 1997)—of which constructing 
mental pictures and non-linguistic representations, graphical representations and 
organisers, semantic webbing and mapping, drawing pictographs and diagrams, 
multidimensional problem analysis, and concept and story maps provide examples.19 
Jewitt and Kress (2003) have recently proposed the theory that the figures individuals 
draw to assist in their thought processes are an extension, if not a branch unto their 
own, of the concept of literacy.  However, their work in multimodal literacy does not 
focus on pictographic depictions to the exclusion of all other multimodal thinking, 
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including film, hypertext, and music.
It is clear that representations of ideas in the form of pictures exists as a 
legitimate strategy for engaging thought processes in students.  The act of creation 
stimulates and challenges the thinking subject.  The artefacts that remain, if examined 
in accordance with the analytic system outlined in the following subsection, can 
be a useful record of thought processes and important in the justification of the 
concepts that emerge.
1.2.a.iii.  Pictorial semiotics
Pictorial semiotics, a branch of general semiotics and the second component 
of my method of analysis, studies “in which way the resources put at our disposal by 
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Figure 2.1 A Generic Pictograph
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picture-making are different from those, for instance, of verbal language” (Sonesson, 
2004, p. 26).  An example may provide some insight.  Consider Figure 2.1, a diagram 
that depicts a generic pictograph—its component dotted lines, arrows, “Area,” “A,” 
“B,” and “C” hold no specific meanings; the content is purely demonstrative and 
is not as important as the overall idea it depicts.  From the perspective of pictorial 
semiotics, such a pictogram is interpreted much differently than it might be within 
other fields, heuristics, or mnemonics for example.  As a heuristic, the pictograph 
exists as a tool through which a problem may be solved or through which the 
solution to a problem may be explained.20  As a mnemonic, the pictograph exists 
as a tool through which a possibly complex idea may be alternatively committed 
to memory.  Interpreted through pictorial semiotics, however, Figure 2.1 is seen as 
containing both understood and yet to be understood ideas, as well as a multiplicity 
of relationships that may or may not be currently visible to the viewer.  “[T]he 
picture immediately seems to give access to more than it literally contains, … the 
scene which we perceive directly is placed within the framework of a temporal 
sequences [sic] of typical happenings in the world” (Sonesson, 2004, p. 11).  
Sonesson suggested that what separates pictorial semiotics from heuristics, 
mnemonics, and even art history, is its treatment of a pictograph as an idea in space 
and time.  In other words, pictographs—among paintings, drawings, and other 
visual artistic forms—have interpretive meanings that make them ideal for thought 
processing.  The thinker can see what they literally contain (what is shown in Figure 
2.1) and anticipate or imagine what might come next, what might have existed as a 
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predicate, alternative routes that may have been followed in coming to the depiction 
as it stands and alternative routes that may be followed as the idea progresses—what 
Sonesson (1988) described as the narrative model.  I use Figure 2.2 to demonstrate 
this temporal (narrative) nature of depicting ideas and thoughts pictographically.
Pictographs are also understood as schematic in the sense that each of their 
elements may be made up of (or clothing) other elements beneath that are literally 
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Figure 2.2 The Past, Present and Future of a Pictographically  
Depicted Idea
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visible to the viewer.  For example, and speaking generally rather than in regard to 
a particular figure, if an element A depicted an individual, pictorial semiotics would 
see both the articles of clothing the individual wears as represented by a scheme and 
the organs, bones, and tissues within A as another scheme.  Furthermore, the element 
A may be understood to be a scheme element of B, A, and B may share the same 
scheme, or they may in fact depict the same element—although unknown to the 
viewer and thinker at the time.  Alternatively, A may depict only B’s schemes.  The 
idea here is that a particular element within a pictograph is understood as possibly 
both containing and clothed in a variety of other elements not necessarily visible 
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Figure 2.3 Beyond the Edge of a Pictographic Surface
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(Sonesson, 1988, 2004).  In other words, pictorial semiotics is by nature conscious 
of the hermeneutic principle of whole and parts.  Through successive iterations of 
similar or slightly modified pictographs, more information may be gleaned.
In Figure 2.3 I depict the area around the pictograph—an area that exists, 
according to pictorial semiotics, beyond the end of the pictorial surface.  These outer 
regions are understood as extending indefinitely and underscore the hermeneutic 
presumption that the pictograph “forms part of a greater whole” (Sonesson, 2004, p. 
11).  In fact, one may revisit Figure 2.2 and see it as depicting not only the temporal 
nature of the pictograph, but also the depth of the pictograph in terms similar to the 
outer region shown in Figure 2.3.  Sonesson (2004), describing Diego Velázquez’ 
1656 painting titled “Las Meninas”, explained this pictographic depth:
the canvas [depicted within the painting] erected at the left-hand limits of 
the scene, for instance, is not perceived to be cut off where the depicted 
scene ends.  If so, we could hardly have identified it as a canvas.  Nor do we 
doubt the presence within the same fictional space of those pictures hanging 
on the wall in the background which [sic] are partly covered by the canvas 
or the bodies of the depicted persons.  We also take for granted that the door 
in the background leads on to further rooms, and that the window opens up 
onto the outside world.  What is more, we never doubt that fictional space 
continues in front of the pictorial scene, beyond the limits of the depicted 
space.  Most probably, there are other walls there, other doors and windows, 
and perhaps other paintings on the walls. (p. 12, emphasis in original)
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I have admittedly oversimplified the principles of pictorial semiotics yet 
have provided a basic understanding necessary to comprehend the relationships that 
exist among pictographic sketches I submit as a component of the method I intend 
to employ.  Furthermore, I have shown how pictorial semiotic analysis differs from 
other fields that utilize pictographs or extol their virtues—a difference I continue 
to explore.  While pictorial semiotics describes a method of visual content analysis 
(Krippendorff, 2004) and interpreting existing depictions in various artistic forms, 
in the section that follows I explore the ways in which its concepts and principles 
are employed in philosophic knowledge extension.
1.2.b.  The hermeneutic diagram
In Section 1.2.a.i., I concluded with the claim that my personal belief 
surrounding the nature of the hermeneutic circle was one straddling the 
Schleiermacherian/normative contention that principles governing the structure of 
the circle were both valid and useful and the Gadamerian/philosophical suggestion 
that the circle has no end.  Pictorial semiotics, demonstrated in the previous section, 
is similarly inclined: loosely structured without a strictly demarcated boundary or 
state of completion.  In Sections 1.2.a.ii. and 1.2.a.iii., I underscored the general 
acceptance of a hermeneutic circular search for the parts within the whole and the 
whole within the parts as understood and justified by philosophical symbolism and 
analogy, heuristics in general, and pictorial semiotics in particular.  Of primary 
concern within this subsection is the distillation of the reciprocal use for pictorial 
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semiotic principles in the creation of pictographs for the purpose of exploring 
ideas.  
In the previous subsection, a basic overview of the interpretive cannon 
employed by pictorial semioticians was explored—and the ideas explored remain 
vitally important as the interpretive structure within the adaptation of the hermeneutic 
circle I propose below.  Furthermore, as was the contention of Wittgenstein 
(1949/1968) that supports the circular evaluation of pictographs, “[i]f you search in 
a figure (1) for another figure (2), and then find it, you see (1) in a new way.  Not 
only can you give a new kind of description of it, but noticing the second figure was 
a new visual experience” (p. 199e).
Linking the three concepts explored in Sections 1.2.a.ii. and 1.2.a.iii.—(a) 
the hermeneutic circle (both as a method and as a condition of a transcendental 
cogitation), (b) the relationship between pictographs as syntax and their observer-
dependent semantics, and (c) the pictorial semiotic account of image in space and 
time—reveals an exciting result: an ever-developing or transcendental mode of ante 
and post hoc cogitation and expression of meaning through the illustration of ideas 
as extending bodies.  To clarify this result, I deconstruct its content beginning with 
the referents of concepts b and c, and then conclude with concept a.
Discussed in Section 1.2.a.ii., Searle’s (1984) caution suggests a division 
between the existence of a syntactic element (a symbol, sign or diagram) and its 
observer-dependent semantic element (meaning).  An implication of this caution 
for the present discussion is that a diagram has no inherent or innate meaning unto 
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itself.  Rather, for a syntactic element to represent something, it must either (a) 
be employed by an observer beholden of a preformulated semantic element that 
requires a syntactic referent, or (b) be observed by an observer and understood to 
represent a preestablished semantic referent.  In the case of a, the process is ante 
hoc cogitation and expression of a meaning for the thinker, whereas in the case of b, 
the process is post hoc cogitation and expression of a meaning for the reader.21
In Section 1.2.a.iii., attention was drawn to Sonneson’s (2004) articulation 
that, in Searle’s (1984) terms, syntactic elements contain the potential for both 
previously understood and yet to be understood semantic referents.  The discussion 
was further developed to highlight the important conceptualisation of syntactic 
elements as potentially existing simultaneously at any point in both the dimensions 
of time (sequence) and space (extension).  I submit that the reciprocal notion is also 
acceptable.  It is reasonable to consider the same potential for the semantic referents 
of such syntactic elements—that they may likewise potentially exist simultaneously 
at any point in both the dimensions of sequence (time) and extension (space).  I 
argue that any procedural constraint upon one’s system of cogitation is released: 
freeing one’s method of thinking into the realm of speculation.  
In this way, thoughts, ideas, or contemplations regarding a particular 
something22 are both possible and instantly relational in a dimensional audit: a new 
diagram is simply created that is easily understood as an adaptation, deconstruction, 
reconstruction, assimilation, integration, or micro- or macro-examination of a 
particular syntactical element (and by extension its referent semantic element) within 
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the diagrammatic whole.  I further submit that a sequential depiction of the steps 
in one’s process of cogitation is limited by the distance between these steps, where 
a reasonable individual might lose track of the semantic elements about which an 
argument might be focused.  It is not necessary for every detail in one’s audit to be 
strictly accounted for in diagrammatic form.  Rather, only those key frames wherein 
reasonable symmetry between ante and post hoc cogitations may falter must be 
illustrated.  Put another way, sequential diagrams illustrate only manageable leaps 
in logic within a particular argument.
Stated as such, the entire process is finally transcendental and hermeneutic.  The 
process is a developmental method for cogitation (fulfilling the Schleiermacherian/
normative contention) and a statement of the conditions under which understanding 
takes place (the root of the Gadamerian/philosophical project).  The locus of both the 
normative hermeneutic and philosophic hermeneutic is therefore the apperception 
(Kant, 1784/1982)23—a contention that is entitled much greater elaboration, and to 
which I return frequently throughout the remainder of this dissertation.
The hermeneutic diagram, therefore, differs from any purely descriptive, 
mnemonic or heuristic diagram in its assumptions.  From the perspective of the 
thinker, the hermeneutic diagram is a perpetually developmental, but accountable, 
tool of speculative cogitation.  From the perspective of the reader, the hermeneutic 
diagram is but one audit of a philosophical position on a particular matter under 
discussion.  It is, from this perspective, a tool of understanding the development of 
a speculative position.
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A question remains: How do I, as thinker, intend to practically employ 
the hermeneutic diagram within the remainder of this dissertation?  I explore this 
question in the section that follows.
2. Method
A hermeneutic diagram is understood as eternally developing in both space 
and time, but captured temporally and spatially in an auditable ordering.  In Chapter 
Three I explore the ontological and epistemic considerations that precede my 
methodological conception and use of the hermeneutic diagram.  My purpose for 
this second section is to examine how I intend to bring the hermeneutic diagram 
into a useful practice.  Consistent with the methodological position set out earlier, 
here I limit my discussion to the practical ante hoc character of the hermeneutic 
diagram. Its philosophical post hoc character is more appropriately discussed in 
Chapter Three on account of its epistemic nature.
Park (2005) suggested that in process writing theory, ideas do not hesitate. 
Rather, they exist within us, bursting with potential and ripe with cognitive energies. 
While such contentions may appear apocryphal, one’s ability to cogitate upon any 
topic practically requires a point of departure.  Park’s explanation suggests that 
ideas are in some important way manifestly one’s own—for it is from somewhere 
deep within one’s minds that one was initially intrigued, curious, and interested.  It 
is from deep within that one begins to think.  Whatever the genesis of one’s thought, 
an account of its developmental path is revealing, instructive, and inspirational, 
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both for the thinker in his or her own working through of various difficult problems, 
and for the reader as he or she comes to understand the thinker’s position.
My ideas seem to emerge as malleable images—yet I hesitate to categorize 
myself within Gardner’s (1999) popular nomenclature of intelligences or as a 
“visual learner” (Dunn, Beaudry, & Klavas, 1989, among others).  The hermeneutic 
diagram provides a tool of speculative thinking in the absence of another such tool 
that might meet my particular and personal process of philosophic cogitation.  It is 
not simply a device for Gardnerian visual/spacial learners.
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Figure 2.4 A Multi-Step Hermeneutic Process
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2.1.  Procedure
I employ the hermeneutic diagram in accordance with a multistep hermeneutic 
process.  Figure 2.4 provides a basic syntactic representation of this process, and is 
elaborated in the paragraphs that follow.  Numbers below refer to numbers presented 
within Figure 2.4.
(1)  The process begins with the arrival of an idea.  The specific 
origin of this idea is of less importance than the implication of its arrival within 
the domain of the understanding°: it becomes the intentional object.24
(2)  An initial sketch is made of the idea in (1) (hereafter idea′). 
The depth of the idea′ limits this sketch—it is here accepted that an idea 
begins as a rough and perhaps superficial articulation of an acceptable, 
justifiable or valid idea.  The depth of the idea′ is sketched to the extent it is 
possible at that time.
(3)  A mental evaluation of the sketch in (2) (hereafter sketch′) 
is made.  The earlier discussed tenets of pictorial semiotics provide the 
theoretical basis for understanding the idea′ in its context.  Principles of 
pictorial semiotics remind the thinker that the sketch′ must be considered 
both temporally and spatially.  In this way, the evaluating thinker examines 
or contemplates a manipulation, tangential zone, particular implication, 
result, fallacy, redundancy or constellation of the sketch′.
(4)  At this point an emergent idea may develop as a result of the 
evaluation in (3) (hereafter evaluation′).  As is consistent with a general 
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hermeneutic circle model, the emergent idea (hereafter idea′′) becomes the 
new intentional object and is, in (5) and (6), sketched (producing the sketch′′) 
and evaluated (producing the evaluation′′) as would be the case in (2) and 
(3) respectively.
(7)  At this point a potential further emergent idea may develop 
as a result of the evaluation′′.  This further emergent idea (hereafter idea′′′) 
becomes the new intentional object and is, in (8) and (9), sketched (producing 
the sketch′′′) and evaluated (producing the evaluation′′′) as would be the 
case in (2) and (3) respectively.  Idea′′′ is considered potential in that its 
sub-process—referring collectively to (7), (8) and (9)—may or may not be 
of particular use, and may or may not be repeated (presumably no farther 
than ad infinitum less 1 since, if the process is to be of some practical utility, 
at some point before the end of time it should succumb to points [10] and 
[11]).
(10)  A meta-evaluation of those ideas′(n), sketches′(n) and 
evaluations′(n) is drawn en masse and a summary (11) of the larger process—
referring collectively to (1) through (10)—is written.  In this way, the 
syntactical elements of the hermeneutic diagram are provided to the reader 
through those sketches′(n) that reflect substantial points in the larger argument 
under consideration.  Furthermore, the summary (11), when encountered in 
conjunction with sketches′(n), provides the thinker’s semantic content for the 
purpose of assisting the reader in the development of their own, vis-à-vis the 
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thinker’s position on the subject. 
The repeating process of sequentially illustrating ideas and evaluating or reflecting 
upon insights that rest beyond, above or behind the content within their frames 
stimulates alternative ways of viewing a particular notion.   In the following 
subsection, I explore a philosophical justification for the method outlined in Figure 
2.4, and describe the means by which an audit trail of an argument’s progression 
is constructed.  The audit trail that results is helpful in both the process of writing 
out the logical path of an argument’s development, as well as in the process of 
discursive justification for the argument’s validity.
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Figure 2.5 The Paths of Norm Construction and Discursive Validity
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2.2.  the Path of norm construction and the Path of discursive Validity
The numeric order shown in Figure 2.4 denotes, in Habermasian terms, 
a directional path of norm construction (Habermas, 1990/2001a).  As a thinker 
follows the path through its completion (at point [11]), a newly created, but merely 
potential, norm is presented to the reader.  When the norm is accepted, it can be 
said that symmetry between the ante and post hoc characters of the hermeneutic 
diagram is achieved.  If the norm were rejected, the reader has one of two options: 
(a) the reader may retrace the argument’s steps through the presented sketches′(n) and 
summary (11), or summaries; or (b), if option a reveals no satisfactory justification 
of the potential norm, may discuss the matter with the thinker—who must provide 
a satisfactory justification for the argument to continue.  Arguably, option b does 
present a recognized limitation of this method in cases where a relationship between 
the thinker and reader does not, or cannot, exist.  Notwithstanding this limitation, 
and since Habermas names these potential norms validity claims and requires 
those who voice such claims to discursively justify them, the thinker following 
this diagrammatic hermeneutic method provides for a systematic discursiveness 
within his or her argument.  The path of discursive validity is therefore achieved 
by following the path of norm construction in reverse.  These are shown in Figure 
2.5.
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B.  summary
The purpose of this chapter was to establish the methodological underpinnings 
and method of the research/philosophic/thinking design I employed in this study.  I 
described a methodological project, which I have named diagrammatic hermeneutics, 
and I created a mental construct—the hermeneutic diagram—that is accountable 
to both the Schleiermacherian/normative and Gadamerian/philosophical accounts 
of hermeneutics.  To engender the hermeneutic diagram with utility, I determined 
a multistep process that provides both consistency with the inspirational and 
culminating position (described in the previous chapter) of this dissertation, and 
requires a functionally auditable practice of argumentation.  In Chapter Three, I use 
this system to deconstruct questions of ontology and epistemology.
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chaPter three
ontoLoGy, ePIsteMoLoGy, and reconcILIatIon
In this chapter, I examine the questions of ontology and epistemology.  I 
furthermore seek to reconcile issues found among my personal methodology and 
the method established in Section 3. of the previous chapter.
I have organised the following pages to represent a personal and primary 
account of questions related to existence and knowledge, and peripherally, to 
questions of value and purpose.  My response to these questions provides the reader 
with an account of foundational conceptualisations affecting the philosophical 
analysis, interpretation, and treatment of this study.  In Section 1., I examine my 
ontology through the question: What is?  In Section 2., I respond to the question: 
How can I know it? and in so doing, present my epistemological position.  Both 
sections are summarized within the final paragraphs of the chapter.  
a.  a relationship among ontology and epistemology
Questions of ontology are questions of the accessibility of existence.  The 
position from which I begin this dissertation implies that while an apprehension of 
what is is developmentally and universally accessible through natural epistemic 
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growth, such accessibility remains contemporarily, if not ad infinitum, within the 
realm of the potential.  The separation of the knowable from the knower is maintained 
by the limits of our faculties of understanding, and this dissertation reflects a Kantian 
(1784/1982) perspective.  The cognitively malleable nature of that separation, I 
argue, provides a key to certain developmentally or socially constructed limits on 
accessibility, and redress.  By extension, this separation implies an epistemological 
framework that guides discussions to follow in Section 2. of this chapter.
1.  Ontology: What is?
What is?  A formidable question, indeed, and perhaps one of the earliest and 
most formidable questions in the history of philosophy (Robinson, 1995; Seyffert, 
1896/1956).  I herein detail my own point of view on the subject.  
Copleston (1962a) identified the importance of providing one’s own point 
of view when he wrote that no one “can write without some point of view, some 
standpoint, if for no other reason than that he must have a principle of selection, 
guiding his intelligent choice and arrangement of facts” (p. 9).  On the alternative, 
idealist, point, and rooted in the phenomenalism of Hegel via Hume, volumes of 
literature (in the area of the contemporary study of a social construction of reality 
and phenomenology) argue less for Copleston’s limitations as the impetus for a 
standpoint. The phenomenalist alternative advances the account that writer and 
object are subjectively linked (van Manen, 1997).  On this view, the reader needs to 
understand the standpoint of the writer in order to interpret the writer’s description 
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of the object of interest.  If not to fully separate the two, then to provide contextual 
basis for accepting or rejecting claims.
1.1.  dualism and Monism
Searle (1984, 2004) suggested that an appropriate point from which a 
modern account may take root is found, historically, in 1637.  It was in this year 
that Descartes (1637/1969) published A Discourse on Method, wherein he provided 
justification for the now infamous cogito ergo sum [I think, therefore I exist].  From 
this work, modern philosophy of mind takes its shape.  The world is divided into 
two substances (in accordance with Aristotelian [c. 350 BCE/1989] science): mental 
substances or minds (the primary essence of which is thinking and the nature of 
which is indivisible), and physical substances or bodies (the primary essence of 
which is extension and the nature of which is infinitely divisible).25  
The separation of the world into the two categories, known as Cartesian 
dualism and depicted in Figure 3.1, appeared consistent with folk wisdom in this 
regard.  After all, the separation of human thoughts from human physical bodies 
does seem intuitively accurate to the man on the street (Paley, 2002; Searle, 1984, 
2004).26  The natural question stemming from a Cartesian point of view is, however, 
to ask how the two elements relate to one another.  This question seems to be an 
appropriate place from which to begin the present dissection of my own ontological 
position.  If there is no relation, then what I can know is clearly limited by the nature 
of my mind.  If a relation exists, then to what degree can I, as a thinking subject, 
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know the physical world? 
According to the meaning of the Cogito, the only thing for which Descartes 
(1637/1969) argued he could be certain was the content of his own mind, and 
so long as God was not deceiving him, he could extrapolate his own existence. 
Furthermore, Descartes argued that mental substances were limited to humans. 
This claim in itself is revealing, in terms of the profound statement it makes about 
Minds
Bodies
Mental Entities
Thinking
Free
Indivisible
Domain of Theology
Physical Entities
Extending
Determined
Infinitely Divisible
Domain of Science
Figure 3.1 Cartesian Dualism
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the abandonment of any possible animal sentience—for animals were deemed to be 
little more than cleverly designed mechanical clockworks (Descartes, 1637/1969), 
a claim contemporarily disputed (Carruthers, 1989, 1998; Cavalieri & Miller, 
1999; Darwin, 1874). The argument is also derived from the certainty of Descartes’ 
premises, through which the existence of others could be solidly deduced.   This is 
to say, the Cogito permitted Descartes to derive at a nonsolipsistic position.
Those who historically followed Descartes, including Hume and Berkeley, 
objected to a dualistic view of the world, preferring a monistic view based exclusively 
on the mind—with the body being epiphenomenal.  Berkeley (1710/1998) argued 
that minds were the only basis of human existence and Hume (1777/1904) argued 
that one’s experience was limited to phenomena as perceived by the mind.  The 
orthodox exploration of this type of mind-based monism is found in Hegelian idealism 
(Searle, 1984, 2004).  Alternatively, notwithstanding the materialism of the ancient 
and scientific revolution periods, it was not until the late nineteenth century that 
body-based monistic orthodoxy arrived in the Huxley-esque mechanistic form of 
epiphenomenalism where the mind is an impotent byproduct of the body (Campbell, 
2001; Clifford, 1874/1879; Huxley, 1861/1906, 1863/1905, 1874/1904; Romanes, 
1895).27  Huxley’s form of mechanisticism was akin to a more general suggestion 
that all animals (including humans) are like Cartesian animals (Chomsky, 1966a). 
That is to say, even if humans have mental states, they do not directly affect human 
physical states but are merely along for the ride.  The relationship among these 
dualistic and monistic forms is shown in Figure 3.2.
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1.2.  an Initial examination of Kant
In the preceding section, I provided background to the point at which the 
discussion becomes interesting—that is, where Immanuel Kant enters.  Searle 
(1984; 2004) argued that Kant was, according to the scheme developed above, a 
pure idealist, but it has been elsewhere argued that Kant’s conclusion is distinct 
from Hegel’s (Copleston, 1962b). The nature of this distinction rests in Hegel’s 
maintenance of Fichte’s elimination of the noumenon—what I would argue is 
Varieties of
Monisms
mind is epiphenominal
(Huxley, Clifford,
Romanes)
body is epiphenominal
(Hume, Berkeley,
Hegel)
Cartesian Dualism
Figure 3.2 Dualistic and Monistic Typology
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a difference among Hegel and Kant.  Furthermore, Kant’s view is more closely 
paralleled with Searle’s (2004) transcendental argument for direct (naïve)28 realism 
than in name alone.  Yet, to fully understand the implications of these differences 
and similarities, and, more importantly my own position within the larger context, 
I begin by presenting a picture of my understanding of Kant’s (1784/1982) most 
famous and important work: the Critique of Pure Reason.  
It is important to contextually place Kant’s argument in its time.  Published 
in the 1780s, the Critique predates many contemporary notions, especially 
with regard to evolutionary biology and modern—quantum—physics.  This is 
principally evident in Kant’s ironic and uncritical acceptance of Newtonian physics 
as manifestly prior to (a priori) one’s ability to understand the world; for Kant 
believed that Newton’s account was the zenith of all possible explanations for the 
physical universe.  Furthermore, it can be said that while Kant was not necessarily a 
particularly religious man, he was persecuted for a time based upon the potentially 
negative implications of his work for certain theological assumptions held by 
much of Christendom (his work was banned by the Holy See between 1793 and 
193929)—although these implications were in no way linked to an evolutionary 
view.  It is also important to understand that Kant’s work was largely directed 
as a critique of what might be understood as the arrogance of two schools of his 
predecessors’ thought: the empiricism of individuals like Locke (who believed that 
the physical world can be empirically accounted for through our sensual perception 
of objects therein) or Hume (who believed that physical matter exists only as 
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mental phenomena), and rationalist philosophers like Descartes30 (who believed 
that beginning with [a] the Cogito and [b] the fact that God would not mislead him, 
one could deduce a complete account of the world).  Kant thus disagreed with both 
the empiricist notion that all knowledge arrives a posteriori (after experience) and 
with the notion that all knowledge could be derived a priori (before experience). 
Rather, his suggestion was that it is a combination of the two: certain faculties of the 
mind are required a priori for an a posteriori account of experience to be possible 
(Copleston, 1960)—and in the physical act of writing the Critique, it follows that 
some sort of a posteriori understanding was required to articulate an understanding 
of the nature of that which was a priori.
The point of the Critique was that it is our mind that is ultimately responsible 
for our understanding of the nature of objects within the world rather than the nature 
of objects within the world as being responsible for the nature of our understanding 
of those objects.  The latter statement represented the essence of both the arguments 
of the empiricists and the deductive philosophers during Kant’s time. 
In an attempt to prove his argument, Kant pulled his reader through an 
eminently complicated exploration of the nature of the mind—a journey into which 
Kant permits few definitions of his terms.  On this account, Kant (1784/1890) 
explained
…I very soon became aware of the magnitude of my task, and the numerous 
problems with which I should be engaged; and, as I perceived that this 
critical investigation would, even if delivered in the driest scholastic manner, 
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be far from being brief, I found it unadvisable to enlarge it still more with 
examples and explanations, which are necessary only from a popular point 
of view.  I was induced to take this course from the consideration also, that 
the present work is not intended for popular use[—] … we may say [that] 
… many a book would have been much clearer, if it had not been intended 
to be clear.  For explanations and examples, and other helps to intelligibility, 
aid us in the comprehension of parts, but they distract the attention, dissipate 
the mental power of the reader, and stand in the way of his forming a clear 
conception of the whole… (pp. xxii ff, emphasis in original; [A xviii])
Yet, it can be argued in Kant’s defence, that articulating one’s thinking about the 
manner in which one thinks is an undoubtedly complicated task.  The existence 
of the Critique in any form might, on this account, be regarded as a feat of human 
ingenuity for which presentation is of understandably secondary concern.  For my 
own interpretation of his work, however, I attempt to illustrate those concepts that I 
believe enlighten the current larger discussion—both in terms of (a) my own answer 
to the question: What is? (and by extension: What can I know?) and (b) that will be 
useful as the dissertation progresses beyond the current chapter.
While some accounts (Copleston, 1960; Durrant, 1943; Mahaffy & Bernard, 
1889) of the Critique begin with details of Kant’s separation of knowledge into its 
four subtypes (the permutations of a priori or a posteriori, and analytic or synthetic), 
I will resist the temptation to do so lest I lose the reader in what I view as insignificant 
for my purpose.  I suggest that for Kant, one’s mind is constructed in such a fashion 
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as to permit one’s knowledge of the world in a certain way.  While the world as it 
actually is may exist according to certain rules or may maintain a certain nature, 
we are quite simply unable to account for the world in its actual state.  The reason 
for this account lies within the natural fashioning of our minds.  Kant believed that 
one’s mind limits one’s view of the world.  One can only view the world in a certain 
way, and that way does not permit a view of the world’s actual state.  
In Kant’s terms, the world as it actually exists is the noumenon: the realm 
of things-in-themselves.  Because of these limits, our view of the noumenon is 
as phenomena; an initial account of this relationship is shown in Figure 3.3.  In 
essence, the nature of our minds does not permit us to view things-in-themselves, 
we only see and experience phenomena.  On this view, which is Kant’s, {α} the 
noumenon is radically unknowable31—we can and will never know the noumenon. 
As foreshadowing of the discussion in Section 2., all possible human knowledge is 
limited by the noumenon, and all of my current knowledge is limited by those parts 
of the noumenon that have been revealed to me as phenomena. 
While the above account is easily understood, it must be followed by an 
important caveat.  It would be wrong, on Kant’s view, to hold that phenomena 
are real in any independent sense.  Phenomena are only real in terms of one’s 
mind.  Without the employment of one’s mind, phenomena do not really exist.  To 
this end, Figure 3.4 shows a slight alteration of Figure 3.3 wherein the place of 
phenomena is adjusted and that which fills the former place of phenomena is the 
transcendental object. {β} The transcendental object, therefore, is the expression of 
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the noumenon prior to experience (and within one’s mind) from which phenomena 
are represented within one’s mind.  So, the transcendental object is the object of 
one’s imagination that creates phenomena from the things-in-themselves.  In this 
way, the ubiquitousness and omnipotence of the noumenon (even within one’s own 
mind) is demonstrated.  For Kant (1784/1890) explained, in a rather long passage, 
that, 
Transcendental idealism[32] allows that the objects of external intuition—as 
intuited in space, and all changes in time—as represented by the internal 
sense, are real. … But time and space, with all phænomena therein, are not 
in themselves things. They are nothing but representations and cannot exist 
out of and apart from the mind. … The objects of experience then are not 
things in themselves (Dinge an sich), but are given only in experience, and 
Phenomena
Noumenon
Figure 3.3 Phenomena and Noumenon
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have no existence apart from and independently of experience.
… The non-sensuous cause of these representations is completely 
unknown to us and hence cannot be intuited as an object. For such an 
object could not be represented either in space or in time; and without these 
conditions intuition or representation is impossible. We may, at the same time, 
Phenomena
(sensible
representations)
Noumenon
Transcendental
Object
Noumenon
where:
Figure 3.4 Phenomena, Noumenon and the Transcendental Object
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term the non-sensuous cause of phænomena the transcendental object—but 
merely as a mental correlate to sensibility, considered as a receptivity. To 
this transcendental object we may attribute the whole connection and extent 
of our possible perceptions, and say that it is given and exists in itself prior 
to all experience. But the phænomena, corresponding to it, are not given as 
things in themselves, but in experience alone. (Kant, 1784/1890, pp. 307-309 
[A 491/B 520-A494/B 522])
I would here caution that neither Figure 3.4 nor the above passage implies 
that humans are merely brains in vats.33  Rather, it reveals how {γ} human are all 
(minds, bodies, perceptions, assumptions, representations) part of nature.  But if such 
a natural and fluid relationship among noumenon, phenomena, and transcendental 
objects exists, does this not reasonably beg the questions: (a) Are the nature of 
such relationships determined? and (b) How does the answer to this question 
affect the nature of the product of their relationship?  My view, which I posit as 
reasonably consistent with Peterson’s (1992) work in this area, is that {δ} while 
the relationship among noumenon, phenomena, and transcendental objects is most 
certainly determined in nature, the product of their relationships—an eminently 
epistemological issue—is temporally subject to some form of natural temporal 
(developmental) mechanism of cogitation, but is itself not determined.
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1.3.  direct (naïve) and transcendental object realisms
At the beginning of Section 1.2. I made the comment that Searle’s (2004) 
contention that Kant’s transcendental idealism was akin to Hegel’s absolute idealism. 
The doctrine of perception that Searle posited suggested: (a) “[w]e assume that 
people actually communicate with each other in a public language about public 
objects and states of affairs in the world”; (b) “I have to assume that you understand 
the expression[s of our public language] in the same way that I intend it”; and (c) 
“that I have to presuppose that you and I are both seeing or otherwise perceiving the 
same public object” (Searle, 2004, pp. 275ff).  On Searle’s view, such an argument 
provides for a type of realism that is contrary to the sense-data based idealism of the 
body-as-epiphenomenal monism shown in Figure 3.2.  
I do not wish to engage in a serious dispute of Searle’s argument. Rather, 
I present a straw man for explanatory purposes. As a result of my reading of 
Kant, I intend to show that although I believe Searle to be wrong in his strict 
categorization of Kant’s idealism as being akin to Hegel’s, I do not contend that 
Kant is a materialist.  My contention is that Kant’s doctrine is more in line with 
Searle’s and suffers only from what Searle’s does not: a missing conception of 
an evolutionary perspective, and a fully functional account of the linguistic turn 
found in contemporary philosophy (Habermas, 1976/1998, 1981/1998, 1984, 1987, 
1988/1998, 1990/2001a, 1990/2001b, 1992, 1996, 1996/1998; Williams, 1993).
In Figure 3.5 I present an account of Searle’s (2004) conception of direct 
(naïve) realism.  In this diagram two individuals A and B see, in Searle’s own terms, 
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the same public object.  On Searle’s account, since they both speak the same public 
language and see the same public object, they are able to confirm the existence of 
the same “real” nature of that public object.  Alternatively, Figure 3.6 presents an 
account of a pure idealism (similar to Hegel’s).  Again, I present two individuals A 
and B who ultimately need not see an object, since their perception is basically Idea-
referential in that it exists exclusively through the internal dialectic construction 
of the Idea (Copleston, 1962b; Fuller, 1945)—through the process of abandoning 
antitheses of self and objects.  In this sense, communication supports the construction 
of the Idea and the absorption of the external world, since communication is itself 
a potentially reflective process.  These accounts (the naïve realist and the pure 
idealist) are different from one another.  My question was: To which idea is my own 
Real “Public” Object
BA
Communication
Figure 3.5 Searle’s Direct (Naïve) Realism
92
interpretation of Kant’s more closely linked?
In Figures 3.7 and 3.8 I have depicted my interpretation of Kant’s basic 
position.  In Figure 3.7 I show that little difference exists between Kant’s position 
and naïve realism as depicted in Figure 3.5.  The difference that is demonstrated, 
however, must be understood in terms of Figure 3.8.  I recall earlier indicated 
premises {β} and {γ}—that the transcendental object is the expression of the 
noumenon prior to experience (and within our minds) from which phenomena are 
represented within one’s mind, and that humans are all (minds, bodies, perceptions, 
assumptions, representations) part of nature—and agree that the “real” nature of the 
public object is, in neither Searle’s account nor my own, an objectively real public 
BA
Communication
Figure 3.6 Hegelian Idealism
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object.  Rather, it is real, but only intersubjectively real.  The intersubjective nature 
of the public object’s reality is neither socially constructed nor Idea-referential, but is 
naturally as real as the functions of one’s cognition are natural functions, and as real 
as brains are natural organs in which such functions take place. Searle (1984) stated 
“[m]ental phenomena, all mental phenomena … are caused by processes going on 
in the brain. … [But] are just features of the brain (and perhaps the rest of the central 
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Figure 3.7 Kantian Transcendental Object (Limited) Realism
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nervous system)” (pp. 18ff).  These processes (both Searle’s and Kant’s) are natural 
and intersubjectively real—they are neither mind- nor body-epiphenomonological, 
nor are they dualistic or monistic.
1.4.  a return to the Problem of spontaneous Generation of and aptitude 
for the Justification of the Organisational Form
I now address an important matter presented in Chapter One.  The 
issue arose in the concern over what was at that time called the assumption of 
spontaneous generation of and aptitude for the justification of the organisational 
Form.  The context of this assumption focused, at that time, around Etzioni’s (1967; 
1986; 1989) model of mixed-scanning as a technique of decision-making, and the 
BA
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Figure 3.8 Noumenal Intersubjectivity
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transformational leadership model.  These were only two examples of what I argue 
is a problem of greater depth.
The assumption may be simply described as follows: models of social 
interaction pre-suppose that individuals have a clear and immediate understanding 
of what they know to be true, and further pre-suppose that these individuals can 
explain and justify this knowledge at any instant in which they are called upon 
to do so.  Alternatively, I reconstitute this assumption in terms of the discussion 
found in the previous section.  The assumption is: models of public discourse about 
reality pre-suppose that individual A has a clear and immediate understanding of 
nature and is able to explain and justify to individual B through public language the 
processes and functions of nature—and with the roles of A and B reversed, vice-
versa.  A resulting question is of key ontological importance: Does one in fact know 
the nature of a public object, and can one justify his or her knowledge of it?  The 
assumption neglects the question of how it is that this understanding is present within 
oneself.  The simple answer might be that the presence of these understandings 
is natural—noumenal.  Yet this simple answer, as shall be shown in the sections 
that follow, would be wrong. For one must not, in answering this question, neglect 
earlier presented arguments—specifically premise δ: that the relationship among 
noumenon, phenomena, and transcendental objects is determined in nature.  The 
product of their relationships is temporally subject to some form of natural temporal 
(developmental) mechanism of cogitation, but is itself not determined.  Thus, I 
address epistemology at this stage.
96
2.  Epistemology: How Can I Know It?
I base my epistemology on Kant.  The nature of my deviation from an orthodox 
Kantian position might be understood as an addendum rather than as a significant 
derivation.  In Section 2.1., I resume the discussion that closed the previous section 
by expanding Kant’s (1784/1982) account of perception.  I further expand upon the 
account (Section 2.2.) as a demonstration of my own conceptualisation, in light of 
two important contributions to philosophy of mind since Kant’s publication: (a) 
a developmental and evolutionary description of natural phenomena, and (b) the 
linguistic turn.
2.1.  the apperceptive system and Its epistemic Importance
At this time, recall the four premises described in Section 1.2.: 
α:  The noumenon is radically unknowable. 
β: The transcendental object is the expression of the noumenon prior 
to experience (and within human minds) from which phenomena are 
represented within human minds.
γ:  Humans are all (minds, bodies, perceptions, assumptions, 
representations) part of nature.
δ:  While the relationship among noumenon, phenomena and 
transcendental objects is determined in nature, the product of 
their relationships is subject to some form of natural temporal 
(developmental) mechanism of cogitation, but is itself not 
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determined.
While these premises help to describe the Kantian ontological position regarding 
the question: What is?, they are as yet insufficient to shed light upon the epistemic 
question: How can I know it?  At best, one might assume that a natural relationship 
exists between what I can know and how I can know it—an assumption that is 
grounded in γ and solidified in δ.  For these ontological premises to be understood 
as foundations of an epistemological system, one must first understand their location 
within Kant’s broader argument. 
2.1.a.  The understanding°
In premise β the transcendental object is the expression of the noumenon 
prior to experience (and within one’s mind) from which phenomena are represented 
within one’s mind.  While this statement appears somewhat idealist and therefore 
incoherent with the limited realist arguments in previous sections it highlights 
an important concept of which I have previously made mention but consciously 
neglected to adequately define until now: the understanding°.  I have elected to 
append the word “understanding” with the ° mark in an attempt to make  my meaning 
clearer in its usage, separate from its commonplace English definition.  Kant 
(1784/1890) described the understanding°, perhaps most succinctly, throughout his 
account of the Transcendental Doctrine of Elements. 
We apply the term sensibility to the receptivity of the mind for impressions, 
in so far as it is in some way affected; and, on the other hand, we call the 
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faculty of spontaneously producing representations, or the spontaneity of 
cognition, understanding. Our nature is so constituted that intuition with 
us never can be other than sensuous, that is, it contains only the mode in 
which we are affected by objects [Gegenständen34]. On the other hand, the 
faculty of thinking the object [Gegenstand] of sensuous intuition is the 
understanding[°]. Neither of these faculties has a preference over the other. 
Without the sensuous faculty no object [Gegenstand] would be given to us, 
and without the understanding[°] no object [Gegenstand] would be thought. 
Thoughts without content are void; intuitions without conceptions, blind. 
(pp. 45ff, emphasis in original; [A 51/B 75])
Kant’s view, denoted as {ε}35 the understanding° is the faculty of cognition that 
permits thought to take place.  Further, his argument holds that the understanding° 
exists naturally within humans, and its existence is prior to experience.  Brains36 
are naturally constructed in such a way that permits thought to take place when 
bombarded by sensuous objects [Gegenstände].37
Kant’s depiction of the understanding° is as the precondition for one’s 
understanding of the world—a faculty that requires several tools for understanding 
to take place.  Kant names these tools the categories of the understanding°—
categories of sub-tools without which human understanding of the world would not 
be possible.  The categories include: (a) quantity, (b) quality, (c) relation and (d) 
modality.38
This, then, is a catalogue of all the originally pure conceptions of the synthesis 
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which [sic] the understanding[°] contains à priori, and these conceptions 
alone entitle it to be called a pure understanding[°]; inasmuch as only by 
them it can render the manifold of intuition conceivable, in other words, 
think an object [Objekt39—meaning an object of cognition, not a physical 
or sensible object {Gegenstand}] of intuition. (Kant, 1784/1890, p. 64; [A 
80/B 106])
But the understanding° and its categories do not, in themselves, provide the epistemic 
answer to the question: How can I know it?  Rather, the understanding° merely 
represents the locus of cogitation; the channel through which the transcendental 
object is the object° of the understanding° requires one further apparatus: the 
transcendental apperception—an account of which I present in Section 2.1.b.
2.1.b.  The apperception and the transcendental apperception
I found the apperception and the transcendental apperception difficult 
concepts to grasp in Kant’s (1784/1890) account of the mind.  Therefore, I claim 
the logical sense I have made from my reading of Kant’s account as it relates to 
questions of epistemology.  
2.1.b.i.  The apperception
On Kant’s view, for a cogitation to be related to a particular object (an 
intentional object), an agent of thought is required for this direction to exist.  The 
agent of thought Kant argued is found in our consciousness of self, which he calls 
apperception.
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The consciousness of self (apperception) is the simple representation of the 
“Ego”; … If the faculty of self-consciousness is to apprehend what lies in 
the mind, it must all act that and can in this way alone produce an intuition 
of self. (Kant, 1784/1890, p. 41; [B 68])
Yet, regarding the apperception’s apprehension of what lies in the mind, “we may 
especially remark, that all in our cognition that belongs to intuition contains nothing 
more than mere relations” (p. 40; [B 67]).  {ζ} The ordering of these relations of the 
objects° of thought into a single unity for their presentation to the understanding° 
is the primary concern of the apperception.  For without an ability to order the 
relations of the objects°, the function of the understanding° is not possible—there 
would be nothing to present to the understanding° and therefore no thought would 
exist.  In this way, the apperception is natural and is a priori of experience. 
Understanding is, to speak generally, the faculty of Cognitions. These consist 
in the determined relation of given representation to an object[°]. But an 
object[°] is that, in the conception of which the manifold in a given intuition 
is united. Now all union of representations requires unity of consciousness 
in the synthesis of them. Consequently, it is the unity of consciousness alone 
that constitutes the possibility of representations relating to an object, and 
therefore of their objective validity, and of their becoming cognitions, and 
consequently, the possibility of the existence of the understanding[°] itself. 
(Kant, 1784/1890, pp. 84ff, emphasis in original; [B 137])
The argument to this point is that one’s mind orders the representations of 
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objects of one’s experience in such a way that permits the understanding of them. 
Yet, Kant continued in his account of the apperception to say that only certain 
conditions of the apperception permit universally and necessarily valid conceptions 
to exist. 
[T]he empirical unity of consciousness by means of association of 
representations, itself relates to a phenomenal world and is wholly 
contingent. On the contrary, the pure form of intuition in time, merely as an 
intuition, which contains a given manifold, is subject to the original unity 
of consciousness, and that solely by means of the necessary relation of the 
manifold in intuition to the “I think,” consequently by means of the pure 
synthesis of the understanding[°], which lies à priori at the foundation of 
all empirical synthesis. The transcendental unity of apperception is alone 
objectively valid; the empirical which we do not consider in this essay, and 
which is merely a unity deduced from the former under given conditions 
in concreto, possesses only subjective validity. One person connects the 
notion conveyed in a word with one thing, another with another thing; and 
the unity of consciousness in that which is empirical, is, in relation to that 
which is given by experience, not necessarily and universally valid. (Kant, 
1784/1890, p. 86, emphasis in original; [B 140])
Kant argued that two levels of apperception exist.  The first is that which I 
have above discussed and is required a priori to the understanding°.  The second is 
the meta-level apperception—the apperception that orders one’s view of the work 
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of the first apperception.   Thus, the meta-level apperception, which Kant called 
transcendental, is that function of the understanding° that permits one the ability to 
examine the functioning of one’s  understanding°.  
From this point, I presuppositionally argue that since the transcendental 
apperception permits one’s self-reflection upon one’s self-consciousness, it must 
be a priori to the apperception.  It is therefore more natural, or of a greater natural 
purity.  The transcendental apperception is more closely akin—or perhaps identical 
to—an original apperception.40  The only logical reason for this, I submit as premise 
{η}, is that the apperception is in some way prone to dysfunctions that limit the 
products of the function of the understanding° to be eternally subjective.  This point 
was, in essence, the impetus for which Kant wrote the Critique—to show that what 
is often thought to be empirical is merely subjective.
2.1.b.ii.  The transcendental apperception and schema
The transcendental apperception is a loose Kantian equivalent in function 
to the Cartesian Cogito (Bermúdez, 1994).  It is the statement of reflective self-
consciousness—meta-thought is ordered by the transcendental apperception for 
presentation to the understanding°.  It is through the transcendental apperception 
that one’s understanding of the apperception and its derived nature (a posteriori) 
is possible.  Kant (1784/1890) argued that the apperception orders the objects° of 
cognition for the understanding° following patterns—which he named schemata. 
Kant suggested that
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the categories in their pure signification, free from all conditions of 
sensibility, ought to be valid of things as they are, and not, as the schemata 
represent them, merely as they appear; and consequently the categories 
must have a significance far more extended, and wholly independent of all 
schemata. ...[T]he categories, without schemata are merely functions of the 
understanding[°] for the production of conceptions, but do not represent 
any object. This significance they derive from sensibility, which at the same 
time realizes the understanding[°] and restricts it. (Kant, 1784/1890, p. 113, 
emphasis in original; [A 147/B 186-B 187])
The importance of this statement is its suggestion that the apperception 
develops over time.  Its schemata are manipulated through experience, from its 
original nature into something that limits one’s mind’s ability to be objective. 
Therefore, the development of the apperception increases subjectivity.  Thus the 
earlier premise η is explained.
Kant (1784/1890) suggested that the human mind is a tool for and against 
self-regulation of Being.  His contention was that while humans are natural objects, 
they present themselves to themselves as both phenomena and as objects of their 
own pure understanding. One is able to mentally treat one’s self as phenomena. One 
is able to construct one’s understandings of one’s self in the world according to a 
schemata-developed apperception. The schemata-developed apperception is thus a 
tool in use against one’s self-regulation of Being. Alternatively, one may employ 
one’s transcendental apperception to evaluate the current state of one’s schema-
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developed apperceptive presentation of one’s self. The transcendental apperception 
is thus a tool in use for one’s self-regulation of Being.  In the former instance, one 
tends, over time, to drift from our natural Being.41  In the latter, we are able to see 
the distance from which we have drifted—and if so inclined make adjustments that 
correct our drifting tendencies.
Epistemologically, it is through the transcendental apperception that one 
recognizes the existence of one’s schemata.  Furthermore, as premise {θ}, the 
schemata are the socially constructed and conservative manner in which one tends 
to think.  I use “conservative” in a biological conservation sense (Musso et al., 1999; 
Taub, Uswatte & Pidikiti, 1999; Weiller & Rijntjes, 1999) where the conservative 
behaviour of a muscle, for example, is linked to an adapted preference for movement 
patterns based upon the experience of commonplace and repetitive movements. 
These patterns are then used complacently under anomalous circumstances, despite 
the absence of any biomechanical advantage in doing so. 
The transcendental apperception is exemplified through critical thinking, 
whereas the apperception is a sedentary or complacent manner of cogitation. 
When ill-aligned, one’s apperception misrepresents the truth of objects to the 
understanding°—a truth that is universally accessible via a transcendentally 
apperceptive regimentation.  I depict these notions in Figure 3.9.
Figure 3.9 presents a transcendental apperceptive articulation of the 
apperception.  It is the transcendental apperception that permits such a figure to 
be constructed.  In the diagram, the understanding° (denoted as U°) is shown to 
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accept a transcendental object (the dotted cup) via the schematic construction of 
the apperceptive system (shown in the central portion).42  When the transcendental 
object becomes the intentional object, it is perceived—although the accuracy of 
one’s perception juxtaposed against the object’s Form is only realized through 
a transcendental apperceptive account.  By way of analogy, one might consider 
the apperception to be not unlike the muscle described earlier.  When exercised 
in a particular fashion or according to a particular regime, the muscle takes on a 
particular predilection toward actions consistent with that regime (Hadders-Algra, 
2000; Harris, 2004; Jones, Rutherford, & Parker, 1989; Spencer & Thelen, 2000). 
My contention is that as does the muscle under its regime, so does the apperceptive 
system when placed under its own regime.  I explore the apperceptive system and 
its regimes in the next section.
2.2.  Language° as a schematizing agent of apperception
I define the schematizing agent of apperception, that agent (shown in Figure 
3.9) by which deviations among one’s apperception and transcendental apperception 
may be accounted.  I return to an earlier discussion of the nature of the understanding° 
as expressed in the categories.  Kant explained that the understanding°, as a 
priori of experience, required certain features through which spatial and temporal 
representations (sensuous experience) are understood.  These features Kant called 
the categories of the understanding°; he included quantity, quality, relation, and 
modality; and he argued that without these categories  experience was not possible. 
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Yet, while Kant argued that the categories were vital to his Transcendental 
Philosophy, he was reluctant to provide clear definitions of them beyond his own 
requirements:
The categories combined with the modes of pure sensibility [space and time], 
or with one another, afford a great number of deduced à priori conceptions; 
a complete enumeration of which would be a useful and not unpleasant, 
but in this place a perfectly dispensable, occupation.  I purposely omit the 
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Figure 3.9 The Apperceptive System of Perception
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definitions of the categories in this treatise. (Kant, 1784/1890, p. 66; [A 82/B 
108])
I structure my understanding of the categories more broadly in terms employed 
within the earlier discussion of syntax and semantics in Section 1.2.a.ii. of Chapter 
Two.  
Semantics provides the meaning of any particular element of syntax. 
Without semantics, a syntactic element has no particular meaning in speech among 
individuals.  Semantics, in Kantian terms, must develop within the understanding° 
as syntactic elements are made into public objects (in writing, drawing, or other 
vocal linguistic representations) through their interaction with schemata of the 
apperceptive system.43  At the heart of the matter is: {ι} the need for a medium 
through which public objects might be publicly contemplated, yet which does not 
require the presence of a transcendental object.  For this medium, all that is required 
is a syntactic referent of the transcendental object upon which the categories of the 
understanding° might act. The syntactic referent becomes the intentional object. 
The question of interest, therefore, is: How is the connection between syntax and 
semantics naturally possible?—or, How is the product of the operation of the 
categories of the understanding° connected to the intentional object?
Until the publication of Chomsky’s (1959) review of the book Verbal 
Behavior, the predominant view regarding this question was one of behaviourist 
psychology—most notably found in the work of B. F. Skinner.  Skinner had attempted 
to explain semantic development through operant behaviour in accordance with 
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his studies of animal-conditioning.44  As Chomsky (1966b) explained of the mind-
epiphenomonalistic position from the 1800s, 
[t]he problem of accounting for the acquisition of language, so conceived, 
disappears.  ‘…the acquisition of language by children does not seem to us 
any mystery at all.’  It is not at all astonishing ‘that a child, after hearing a 
certain word used some scores or hundreds of times comes to understand 
what it means, and then, a little later, to pronounce and use it.’ (p. 22)
Chomsky’s own view, out of which his universal grammar emerges, is more Kantian 
in nature (Williams, 1993).  
At the heart of Chomsky’s theory of universal or generative grammar is the 
underlying recognition that certain elements of language are universally present in 
humanity— a priori structures that permit the linkage of syntax to semantic content. 
The contention is not that syntax exists separate from semantics, but that both are 
required for competent communication (Chomsky, 1993); they are both part of the 
natural system of thought.  If syntax is the stimuli, and semantics the product of the 
understanding°’s function upon it, then the creative nature of language use must 
be in some way operationally linked to the Kantian categories.  The reason for 
this is found in the contention that imaginative thought—which Kant argued was 
equivalent to synthesis and required for cognition to take place45—is similar to its 
imaginative representation in language.  That I can imagine a situation and describe 
that situation (its semantic referent) through a linguistic account (its syntactic 
referent) requires a priori the ability to synthesize two disparate stimuli presented 
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to the understanding°.  My creative account is the product of synthesis, and to this 
end, synthesis is the operation of the understanding° through the categories.  
If Chomsky’s contention is correct that creative language is a universal trait 
of humanity, then it is only reasonable to conclude that {κ} one’s natural ability to 
produce creative language must be formulated according to particular rules or an 
ordering of thought, or a particular linguistic or grammatical apperceptive output 
of the understanding°.  Furthermore, if it can be concluded that outbound syntactic 
structure is articulated via an apperceptive ordering of universal and natural 
grammatical principles emanating from the categories, and ι syntactic referents 
are absent transcendental objects (or experiences of objects), then certainly it is 
reasonable to conclude that the reverse is also true: syntactic referents are presented 
to the understanding° via the apperception.  Having established earlier through 
premise θ in Section 2.1.b.ii. that the apperception is deviated from its natural 
Form through socially constructed schemata, it is further reasonable to conclude 
that {λ} language appears to provide an equally present and accessible master of 
dysfunctional development within the apperception.  This language, however, is not 
a language specific to any one society or group (it is neither English, nor Magyar, 
nor Hangul, for example).  Rather, it is a universally and naturally present meta-
language of cognition and I therefore refer to it as language°.  We do not speak this 
language°, but we visualize (through the transcendental apperception) its affect on 
the apperception via its construction of schemata.  Synthesis is only viable within 
the understanding° if a language of pure semantics exists.  This is the language° and 
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it is a priori to both experience and language.
3.  Summary and Reconciliation
What is the point in all of my discussion hitherto and how does the discussion 
permit me to reach an answer to the questions: What is? and How can I know it?
Through the collected premises α through λ, six important conclusions may 
be drawn that answer the questions presented: (a) that my ontological position 
suggests a natural relation of all objects of experience with processes of the mind—
that is, my ontology is neither mind- nor body-epiphenomenal and is neither monistic 
nor dualistic;  (b) that my mind is a natural feature of my naturally developing 
brain—both of which are limited by i) the point in evolution at which I currently 
exist, and ii) the point in the schematic development of my apperception at which I 
currently exist; (c) my understanding of the world is limited by these limitations in 
b; (d) the limits of my understanding of the world are transcendentally observable 
via the transcendental apperception; (e) understanding the deviational limits of my 
understanding of the world cause me to seek correction of my apperception through 
its focus upon a natural construction; (f) a singular, natural and universally accessible 
apperception is, at least, possible—although to achieve this universal remains only 
a potential so long as human apperception is complacently schematized.
What is?  Only that which I am developmentally and evolutionarily capable 
of knowing.
How can I know it?  I can know it complacently (apperceptively) or critically 
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(transcendentally)—but  always  as  an  ontological  being,  via  the  understanding° 
and language°.
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Part II
a concePtualIsatIon of 
InterorganIsatIonal relatIonshIPs
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chaPter four
the roots oF a crItIque
In this chapter, I begin to establish a critique of modern and post-modern 
perspectives of contemporary institutional interaction.  The roots of the critique that 
results from this chapter are then more concretely articulated in Chapter Five where 
I develop an hypothesis of social interactions in general.  
Drawing upon a modern view of evolutionary theory, based primarily in 
the work of Dawkins and his predecessors, Fisher (1930), Hamilton (1964a; 
1964b), Williams (1966), and Maynard Smith (1982), work on what has been 
dubbed the gene’s perspective—an alternative to Mayr’s (1942) or Wynne-
Edwards’ (1962), and others work on the ecologically centred view—I intend to 
show how the contemporary social/political/institutional perspectives in which 
education operates and, furthermore, in which interorganisational relationships 
exist, is largely inconsistent with certain scientific accounts of humanity. The 
discussion of the contemporary perspectives will be extended in Chapter Five to 
encompass a discussion of how inconsistency may ultimately cause the distortion 
of those institutional environments in which a truer expression of the individual’s 
and organisation’s teleos may be manifested.  Since in doing so I engage in the 
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task of establishing what appears to be a new hypothesis of social and institutional 
relationships within the field of educational administration, I am compelled to 
meet the demands of a standard of explanatory precision. The precision I seek will 
serve to more methodically construct the argument than simply provide references 
to previously established texts commonly known among my colleagues.  For this 
reason, in the opening section of the chapter, I pay attention to an area of study that 
may, under most other circumstances within the field, be relegated to irrelevance. 
Its relevance, I contend, is found in its strength of stature as an evidence-based 
hypothesis of foundational antecedents of human interaction.  Though there are 
many hypotheses in both the physical and social sciences, all hypotheses are not of 
equal weight nor are they equally able to maintain their justification over time. 
A.  Dawkins’ “Rhizobium’s Tale”
In 2004, Richard Dawkins published one of the most fascinating books I 
have ever read.  Inspired by the style of Chaucer’s 14th century Canterbury Tales, 
Dawkins’ Ancestor’s Tale depicts the history of life on Earth as a great journey 
backward over 900 million years.  For Dawkins, Canterbury was represented by the 
origin of life on the planet and the roles of Chaucer’s adjoining pilgrims are taken 
by the various species—or more appropriately, ancestral species—that merged with 
humanity along the way.  The stylistic analogue between Chaucer’s and Dawkins’ 
works extended into the pilgrims’ tales, as well.  Yet where Chaucer’s Miller’s, 
Friar’s, Shipman’s, Manciple’s, et al., tales depicted a variety of human interests 
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in a variety of social contexts interspersed with a variety of bodily functions, 
Dawkins’ Bonobo’s, Platypus’, Lungfish’s, Cauliflower’s, et al., tales depicted the 
remarkable and peculiar adaptations and bodily functions of adjoining species as 
an accommodation to specific environmental contexts.  I highlight these (differing) 
contexts for an important reason that I shall explore later in Section B. and in Chapter 
Five.  In the meantime and as a vehicle toward a larger end, however, I recount a 
small portion of one of Dawkins’ character’s tales—that of a microscopic bacterium 
that inhabits the root nodules of legumes.  
I intend to reveal how it is that relevant segments of the tale exemplify a 
foundational hypothesis that will repeatedly arise within the remainder of this chapter 
and those that follow. A hypothesis, but one grounded in an account of history that 
surpasses the rigor of all previous socio-historical philosophical accounts.
The Rhizobium’s Tale is the tale of an evolved wheel.  It is, I think, reasonable 
to let one’s mind wander when disengaged by daily routine.  On more than one 
occasion I have contemplated why it is that humans have legs as opposed to some 
other form of locomotive device—wheels, perhaps.  Why is it so likely that no 
species one has ever seen has developed a “wheel”, axle and all, as locomotive 
appendage, organ, or other anatomical structure?  The reason is surprisingly 
simple (Dawkins, 2004), although some have suggested that it is demonstrative of 
irreducible complexity (Behe, 1996, 1998)—the mantra of the intelligent design 
movement in the United States, and of some contemporary significance for the 
practice of educational administration, if not only in the American theatre.46
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Berg’s (2003) paper in the Annual Review of Biochemistry, and Macnab’s 
(2003) paper in the Annual Review of Microbiology are particularly helpful in 
understanding the nature of the circumstances that Dawkins (2004) highlighted in 
his Rhizobium’s Tale.  It is in this tale that one example of an evolved “wheel” is 
discussed.  
Why has one likely never seen such a thing?  The reason is found in the 
requirements of molecular level construction for such an anatomical peculiarity 
to exist, and rhizobia provide just such an appropriate host.  A wheel has found 
its place exclusively within micro-anatomy because at any other level it is either 
impractical, assumes a pre-existent and naturally constructed “road”, or both.  I 
discuss each of these in turn, the second case being the more important of the two 
for the underlying critique proposed in this chapter.
Micro-anatomy (that of viruses, prokaryotes [less complex single-celled 
organisms], and single-cell eukaryotes [more complex but microscopic organisms]) 
differs from macro-anatomy (that of multi-eukaryotic-celled organisms) in both 
degrees of complexity and, a fortiori, function.47 This rubicon (see Figure 4.1) 
is important because it distinguishes the point at which the strict evolutionary 
practicality of a wheel ceases, and the point where the existence of such evolutionary 
constructs are ultimately dependent upon environmental features that assume 
consciousness and foresight on the part of the species involved.  
Rhizobia are nitrogen-fixing bacteria found in the roots of legumes (Skerman, 
McGowan, & Sneath, 1980; Young & Haukka, 1996).  As naturally occurring 
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bacteria, rhizobia are prokaryotes that fulfil a specialized role within the husbandry 
of legumes, symbiotically breaking down nitrogen in plant hosts into ammonia 
(Guillén-Navarro, Encarnación, & Dunn, 2005). The structure of the rhizobium’s 
cell is similarly intriguing since it includes a bacterial flagellum—ultimately, the 
evolved wheel to which I am specifically referring.
Flagella in general may be characterized as microscopic filaments the purpose 
of which are to propel bacteria and other cells (Berg, 2003; Macnab, 2003; Platzer, 
Sterr, Hausmann, & Schmitt, 1997).  Among rhizobia, the rotary movement of their 
bacterial flagella enable the organism to propel itself; although the locomotion of 
rhizobia are of less importance here than the mere fact that a free (but controlled) 
moving filament (read axle) has naturally developed among these microscopic 
species.
The rotary “motor” (Berg, 2003; Macnab, 2003) of the bacterial flagella is 
controlled by the flow of chemical and electrical protons through the membrane 
between the body of the rhizobium and its flagellum.  The flow of these protons 
drives the motor at rates as high as 300 hertz (Berg & Turner, 1993; Lowe, Meister, 
& Berg, 1987). It is the microscopic size of rhizobia, and by extension their bacterial 
flagella, that permit this peculiarity of evolution to exist.  
Larger organisms, certainly those that we might see in our lifetimes without 
the aid of microscopes, would be denied such an evolved wheel because any large-
scale filament (read appendage or other anatomical structure) would require some 
mechanism for the supply of nutrients.  This requirement presupposes a relatively 
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large-scale circulatory system, and therefore connective vessels—the fate of which 
would be entanglement and presumably constrictions upon flow.  It is therefore safe 
to say that any large-scale rotational filament (certainly if it were composed of living 
tissue) would die of nutrient occlusion.  Since evolutionary processes do not tend 
to favour the maintenance of such impractical manifestations, it is not surprising 
that one does not find wheels (axles or other long-axis rotational filaments that are 
physically coherent with wheel systems) common in nature (Dawkins, 2004).
The above discussion dealt with only one of the two earlier mentioned 
objections to the existence of wheels in large-scale organisms, but represents only 
part of Dawkins’ Rhizobium’s Tale.  The second objection, resting upon the large-
scale side of the rubicon in Figure 4.1, is more important and somewhat more 
complex in terms of my argument.
B.  Roads as “Contra”-Evolutionary Artefacts of Social Systems?
As Dawkins’ (2004) argument in the Rhizobium’s Tale wanders away from 
the details of the microscopic organisms for which the tale is named, he articulated 
an important characteristic that appears to make humans human.  “Whenever 
humans have a good idea,” Dawkins wrote, “zoologists have grown accustomed to 
finding it anticipated in the animal kingdom” (p. 545).  Dawkins then went on to 
list those examples that he referred to in other chapters of his book: echo-ranging 
in bats, electro-location in platypuses, harpoons in cnidarians and jet-propulsion 
found in use by squid, among others.  The invention of these processes by humans 
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(for specific human purposes), in every case, occurred after the phenomenon was 
observed in nature.48  This is true in all cases mentioned but one: the wheel, likely 
invented in Mesopotamia (Harrison, 1937) over six thousand years ago (Dawkins, 
2004; Littauer & Crouwel, 1996), yet nearly six thousand years before the first 
observation of the bacterial flagellum (Macnab, 1999).  What is so particularly 
special about the wheel as a human invention?
In one sense, the wheel is special because its invention is an example of a 
radically new idea at its earliest conception, and on more than one level.  MacIntyre 
(1984), to whom I shall return in Chapter Five, highlighted the apropos Popperian 
discussion of the Stone Age futurist and his friend.  As MacIntyre described it, the 
first individual (the futurist) predicts “that within the next ten years someone will 
invent the wheel. ‘Wheel?’ [the friend asks]. ‘What is that?’”  The first describes the 
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Figure 4.1 Micro- and Macro-Anatomy and the Rubicon that Divides
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wheel, “finding words, doubtless with difficulty, for the very first time to say what 
a rim, spokes, a hub and perhaps an axle will be” (p. 93).  
The obvious conclusion of the discussion is that the futurist has himself 
at that particular point in history done what he predicted would happen—to wit, 
the prediction of the invention of such a thing can simply not be made.  For the 
act of predictively describing such a radically new phenomenon assumes its 
contemporaneous invention.  In this, MacIntyre separated the conception of that 
which is simply new from that which is radically new; and while not placed 
specifically in MacIntyre’s Popperian story line, the point is largely similarly derived 
through Dawkins’ (2004) tale.  Radically new ideas, like the axle-based wheel, 
appear to us only at a point when we are capable of thought processes beyond the 
purely experiential. Simply new ideas, like the human mechanization of flight (in 
MacIntyre’s description of the case) or echo-ranging (and human invention of the 
others in Dawkins’), are “merely … additive construction[s] from the existing stock 
of concepts—new, if you like, but not radically new” (MacIntyre, 1984, p. 94), and 
certainly more commonplace.  
The point to be taken from the above discussion is that there exists something 
within our natural development that has permitted us to escape the confines of a 
new-idea world and possess the capability of defining a radically new-idea world. 
Indeed the ability of humans to capitalize on both the new and radically new 
seems eminently distinguishing if contrasted with the majority of contemporary 
species on the planet, and the vast majority, if not all, of those ancestrally present.49 
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Similarly distinguishing is the second feature of humanity to be drawn from the 
Rhizobium’s Tale: forethought and altruism as markers of our “contra”-evolutionary 
development.
Dawkins’ (2004) second answer to the question regarding the absence of 
an evolved wheel in larger organisms highlighted an interesting point at which 
the worlds of evolutionary biology and social systems intermingle.  The wheel, 
Dawkins wrote, 
is dependent for maximum efficiency on a prior invention—the road (or 
other smooth, hard surface).  A car’s powerful engine enables it to beat a 
horse or a dog or a cheetah on a hard, flat road.  But run the race over wild 
country or ploughed fields, perhaps with hedges or ditches in the way, and it 
is a rout: the horse will leave the car wallowing. (pp. 545-546)
Thus the question must be reframed, “[w]hy haven’t animals developed the 
road?  There is no great technical difficulty” (p. 546).  Placing to one side the 
anticipated objections of civil engineers on this account, the problem is seemingly 
one of evolutionary proportions: of what evolutionary advantage is a road if one’s 
labour in constructing it would neglect defending one’s territory or young, finding 
food, or otherwise engaging in the cause of perpetuating one’s species?  For the 
constructed road, unless somehow omni-presently defended by individuals or some 
other mechanical means (both of which similarly distract the individual from pure 
survival), will surely benefit others at one’s expense.  Indeed, building a road is an 
endeavour too “dangerously altruistic” for the selfish evolutionary game (Dawkins, 
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1976/2006); or as Matt Ridley (1998) stated, organisms “consistently do things that 
benefit their genes, because they are all inevitably descended from those that did the 
same.  None of your ancestors died celibate” (p. 17).  There is, therefore, no benefit 
in altruism … or is there?
It is at this point that I explore commonplace and considerably old 
misinterpretations of Darwinian natural selection. Doing so preemptively defends 
my argument from those who might root their critique under such provisions. 
Some may take from the statement attributed to the political philosopher Spencer 
(a reader of Darwin, and a statement all too frequently mistakenly attributed to 
Darwin) that evolutionary processes are manifest in the “survival of the fittest” 
(Spencer, 1864/1900, vol. 1, p. 444) but to do so is at best problematic and at worst 
naïve.  Once again, I must return to the anatomical-size rubicon employed earlier in 
Figure 4.1—and I must return to the work of those more specialized in applicable 
areas of study.  
1.  Genetic Foundations and Debates
This time, my examination of the rubicon of size separates conceptualisations 
found within the present discussion in two ways.  Figure 4.2 is similar to Figure 
4.1 in that it demonstrates my so-called rubicon, but it differs slightly in the region 
of the spectrum (to the left) that represents far smaller entities than the viruses, 
prokaryotes, and single-cell eukaryotes presented earlier.  I refer to the “building 
blocks of life”: DNA, RNA and the bonded pairs of nucleobases of which these 
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are made.  Comparing Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2, one will note how I have shifted 
the rubicon left-ward, this time to demonstrate the demarcation of replication from 
its hosting.  In order to proceed, it is important to understand a few foundational 
concepts of, and historical debates within, genetics.  
rubicon
DNA, RNA
bonded pairs of 
nucleobases
some viruses, prokaryotes
single-celled eukaryotes
multi-celled eukaryotes
early
evolutionary theory
contemporary
evolutionary theory
”gene’s” perspective “host’s” perspective
replication hosting
DNA, RNA
bonded pairs of 
nucleobases
some viruses, prokaryotes
single-celled eukaryotes
multi-celled eukaryotes
Figure 4.2  The Gene’s and Host’s Perspectives and the Rubicon  
that Divides
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1.1.  the host and Its Genes
Before Watson and Crick’s (1953) famous publication of Molecular Structure 
of Nucleic Acids, and before the work of Fisher (1930) on population genetics and 
the modern evolutionary synthesis, evolutionary biologists saw the organism (or 
host of genes) as the appropriate level to which evolutionary processes might be 
attributed (Dawkins, 1976/2006).  A population of organism with trait x appears 
to thrive within the fossil record, whereas another population lacking trait x does 
not thrive as well and eventually becomes extinct.  From a host perspective the 
suggestion above leads to the conclusion that the x-population is more fit to survive, 
as compared to the not x-population.  But this suggestion is broad, and a more 
concretely constructed example would likely prove helpful.
In or around 1857, Charles Darwin wrote a posthumously published chapter 
on species that provides an example fitting the current discussion.  In his work, 
Darwin (c.1857/1997) asked his reader to imagine an island on which a canine 
animal sought after rabbits as its chief source of food.  The species upon which 
Darwin focused was the canine rather than the rodent, and—supposing that since 
the island is a confined space where a confined population of both canines and 
rodents would be affected by environment and season—at certain times during the 
year or more drastically during certain years, the environmental conditions or over-
population of canines caused a decrease in the population of rodents.  During such 
times, some canines would go without food and would ultimately perish.  Among 
those who did survive, Darwin reasoned, certain traits would likely be dominant: 
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better (nocturnal, longevous, hyperopic) eyesight, longer leg length, etc.; traits that 
ultimately contributed to their fitness for survival over the long run. Those canines 
without these traits would tend to die off and the replication of their faulty traits (in 
terms of the island’s environment) would largely cease, except in unexpected and 
statistically chance occurrences. 
Placing statistical anomalies aside and returning now to the origin of this 
discussion, the question of deconstructing Spencer’s (1864/1900) oft quoted “survival 
of the fittest,” a host perspective implies that those canines (read x-population) that 
bare the traits required of an environment survive, while those who do not have 
the trait do not survive.  At this level, Spencer’s quotation has been interpreted 
in a number of important ways among a number of social scientists. What might 
be characterized as a variety of what I have dubbed the host perspective, while 
retrospectively situated within the Enlightenment, is the Fichtian dialectic notion of 
thesis/antithesis/synthesis.  Marxist material dialectics, only predating Darwinian 
evolutionary theory by a decade but following Spencer’s social and scientific 
writings by twenty years, followed Fichte’s work via Hegel’s dialectics.  
Along a similar vein, although philosophically antithetical to Marxist 
economic theory, Mill’s free market liberalism and utilitarianism was arguably 
grounded in a variety of Spencerian social-evolutionary theory (Patterson, 2005).   It 
seems, then, that European philosophy at the time of Darwin’s (1869) publication of 
On the Origin of Species was ripe with theory for which Darwin appeared to provide 
cutting-edge scientific evidence.  So it is no surprise that before and following its 
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publication, the social, economic, and political theories that evidenced themselves 
in varieties of evolutionary theory appeared to dominate social, economic, and 
political environments.  Indeed, Darwin’s particular brand of evolutionary account 
was new, but certainly buttressed by other varieties that informed the sociological 
and philosophical writings of many individuals.  Even Immanuel Kant employed 
evolutionary ideas as conceptual frameworks in many of his papers (for a more 
detailed description, see Lovejoy, 1911). 
In the fifth edition of his most famous work, Darwin (1869), after reading 
at least Spencer’s (1864/1900) Principles of Biology, renamed his fourth chapter 
from “Natural Selection” to “Natural Selection, or the Survival of the Fittest.” 
Interesting is the case, however, that Darwin later rejected the linking of the 
two notions in his (1874) second edition of the Descent of Man and Selection 
in Relation to Sex.  Herein, he claimed that natural selection was limited to the 
biological realm.50 While the origin of Spencer’s identification with the meaning 
behind the phrase is found in Social Statics (1851)—a clearly written use of 
evolutionary biology51 to justify social and economic systems wherein individuality 
is seen as the height of progress—Darwin’s usage of Spencer’s terminology was 
rather less social Darwinian.  Despite the difference in usage, the two notions have 
been historically intertwined.  From their entanglement a certain dominant view of 
social interaction developed, one that derives more from Spencer’s than Darwin’s 
usage.52  
The conflated and erroneous view of Darwinism has been found at the 
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heart of race and politico-economic competitive social dynamics manifest in 
technologically advanced societies around the world since the beginning of the 
modern era.  It has similarly and more recently been perpetuated in accounts of the 
new world order following the collapse of the socialist system in the Soviet Union 
by political economists, such as Fukuyama (1992), who have declared that the end 
of history was achieved when the fittest ideology (on his particular view, liberalism) 
survived the dialectically competitive cold war.  Such a statement highlights the 
pervasive nature of the social Darwinian influence over the contemporary view 
of social and political relationships.  It suggests that despite the great number of 
principles that are in dispute among right and left, liberal and Marxist, one single 
and shared ontological perspective drives their causes.  
The ontological perspective I refer to is social Darwinism—as derived 
through Spencer’s usage and employing the representation of social and institutional 
relationships in terms of the presence of certain traits (perspectives, lexicons, and 
philosophical and/or economic frameworks or hierarchies) that must, in the end, 
unquestionably prevail.  This notion is logically extended in the political realm to 
encompass a dualism of us versus them, but has been equally engaged as a hallmark 
for debates related to social desirability and eugenics.  Indeed, as Mouffe (2005) 
stated, the heavily politicized dualism of us versus them was very recently exploited 
in the former Yugoslavia, with dire consequences played out daily in the western 
media. Similarly fashioned humiliations of humanity were a too frequent lament 
of the twentieth century: e.g., the Armenian genocide, the Holocaust, Democratic 
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Kampuchea, Rwanda, East Timor, and Darfur.  Yet, not all questions of difference 
and desirability have been settled by the machete, bayonet, or bullet.  Eugenics 
movements have been fed by social Darwinism.  Interventions visible in the 
sterilization or outright culling of the most vulnerable in a particular population 
has had its share of otherwise heroic, culturally and politically powerful advocates, 
among them Winston Churchill, H. G. Wells, and Bernard Shaw (Lewis, 1952; 
Spektorowski, 2004; Spektorowski & Mizrachi, 2004).  Such interventions hold a 
place as a Canadian historical artefact found in Alberta’s Sexual Sterilization Act of 
1928 (McWhirter & Weijer, 1969).
More generally speaking, social Darwinist constructs are used to justify the 
place of liberalism (in its laissez-faire economic manifestation) as the epitome of 
evolved human interactions.  The Marxist argues that class-struggle is an historically 
scientific manifestation of evolving human interactions around the means of 
production that ends, indisputably for the Marxist, with the individual worker as 
master of his own means of production.  Add to the mixture the contemporary 
and historical manifestations of theocratic (neo-) conservatism and the ontology 
described above is equally present. For the theocrat, to which I ascribe the title all 
political organisations or groups that seek to establish religious supremacy over 
public institutions and policy—equally the former Taliban regime in Afghanistan, 
segments of the Republican Party in the United States and the so-called ultra-
orthodox parties in Israel, Shas and Hazit Yehudit Leumit, among others—a variety 
of social Darwinism is ironically found in a mantra that only those enlightened by 
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God’s will are entitled to contribute to the direction of the state.  
So does the pervasiveness of this view of social relations merit its ascribed 
link to Darwin’s theory of natural selection, and furthermore is it in fact an accurate 
social or institutional manifestation of evolutionary processes?  These are important 
questions dealt with in Figure 4.2, and Chapter Five.
1.2.  the Genes and their hosts
There is, depicted in Figure 4.2, a second unit of analysis through which 
evolutionary processes may be characterized.  Whereas the above discussion 
focused on the so-called hosting agent and the survival of the host being dependent 
upon a certain genre of fitness, contemporary evolutionary theory sees this level 
of analysis as problematic for both biological and ontological reasons.  I alluded 
to the ontological reasons for this in the previous subsection.  The biologist would 
contend that the sophisticated view of evolution permitted by the current depth of 
understanding afforded by post-Mendelian genetics does not advocate nor provide 
scientific basis for social Darwinism (Dawkins, 1976/2006, 2004; Depew & Weber, 
1995).  To understand the biological reasoning that underscores problems with the 
exclusivity of a host perspective and for the purposes of my argument, the dominance 
of a social Darwinian perspective in social and institutional relations, I provide a 
review of elemental modern genetic notions.
DNA is widely discussed in the media and present as a topic in most high 
school-level biology curricula. DNA (deoxyribose nucleic acid) may be understood 
130
as long chains of chemical instructions for the structuring of life.  DNA are strands 
of nucleotides—created through the regimented hydrogen bonding of purine and 
pyrimidine nucleobases (adenine, cytosine, guanine and thymine).  All known living 
cells and some viruses contain DNA; the cell being the basic unit of life.  Single- and 
multi-celled organisms (with the exception of viruses) can be said to live because the 
cells of which they are made divide, passing the DNA instructions for the variously 
required cellular structures of that organism on through replication.  When a cell 
divides the units of information that are passed on through the replication process we 
know as genes. Cell division ensures that, but for occasional mutations, hereditary 
genes are passed from one cell to its daughter cells, and ultimately from parent 
organism to child (Alberts, 2003; Dawkins, 1976/2006; Hood & Galas, 2003).
A contemporary view of the radically new concepts that we may attribute 
to Darwin—natural selection and the vast time frame required for transmutation of 
species—when placed within the modern genetic framework, have less to do with 
the host’s predicament and more to do with that of its genes.  Thus the rubicon 
in Figure 4.2 highlights the modern solution to the altruism problem.  Modern 
evolutionary thinking proposes that the unit of analysis in evolutionary processes 
is the gene.  It is the fittest genes that survive, not the fittest species or hosts, and 
the fittest genes appear to be those, at least in terms of social relationships, that 
represent altruistic behaviours. 
The gene’s perspective, as modern evolutionary theory suggests, escapes 
the ontological problem found in the host’s perspective that the world is somehow 
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ruthless and belligerently competitive.  An escape, so to speak, is necessary since 
our primate social world is clearly neither of these (Warneken, Hare, Melis, Hanus 
& Tomasello, 2007).  This point is demonstrable in the emotional states of human 
compassion, concern, empathy, and devotion, not to mention the general democratic 
principles that guide so many of the world’s nations—and which is even found 
underlying the social systems of less democratic one’s.  Earlier I described many 
political elements that may be less democratic as characterized by social Darwinian 
ontologies.  I sustain my earlier suggestion that such political movements maintain 
social Darwinian ontologies, I only point out their practices that, until recently, 
have proven that all is not ruthless and competitive in certain aspects of their 
governance. 
The gene’s perspective is based upon two elementary biological principles: 
(a) that a gene’s sole function is to replicate itself—a job for which it is ideally 
suited, as is shown in the processes of mitosis where the bonded pairs that make up 
the DNA chains divide and are chemically reassembled in their daughter cells (or in 
a new offspring cell through meiosis and fertilization)—and (b) that those genes that 
are most successful are those that are most widely reproduced and therefore present 
in the population (Alberts, 2003; Dawkins, 1976/2006; Hood & Galas, 2003).  On 
this account, it is unreasonable to suggest that overt competitiveness is a dominant 
trait of any host population, for such a situation would undoubtedly result in reduced 
numbers of particular genes coding for competitive behaviour within that population 
(Axelrod, 1984/2006; Axelrod & Dion, 1988; Dawkins, 1976/2006; Matt Ridley, 
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1998).  Thus, it is the genes themselves that are competitive, not their hosts (Mark 
Ridley, 2000).  With the crucial difference found between genes and hosts in mind, 
it is clear that the ruthlessness of environments over evolutionary timeframes have 
built up genes within humanity that seek to ensure the survival of the most fit genes. 
Fit genes that apparently code their hosts to enable the survival of others as a means 
of protecting their own survival, as well.  The key concept is that the replication 
of genes drives the process of evolution, not the environmental context (although 
the environment is a crucial catalyst).  As such, the gene’s perspective describes a 
species that is antithetical to those described by the host perspective.
I contend that a guiding belief about human nature53 for social—and therefore 
institutional—relations that most closely matches the actual nature of the human 
species is one that does not deny the importance of altruistic endeavours, and 
social systems that ensure the increased survival and success of greater numbers 
of individuals.  It is not surprising that while humans have not evolved a wheel, 
they have invented one.  For by inventing the wheel, and employing it as they do, 
they have taken the time to altruistically contradict the nature of their species that 
the host’s perspective attributes to them.  Humans have, in fact, done exactly as the 
gene’s perspective predicts54 that they ought to do: for human genes had developed 
sufficiently by at least some six thousand years ago to the point at which altruistic 
behaviour was at least plausible.  With the understanding provided in the discussion 
of the gene’s perspective as a backdrop, one can assume the plausibility of human 
ancient (in terms of written history) altruistic nature for two reasons: (a) the 
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employment of the wheel by humans spread rather rapidly among the inhabitants of 
the known world at that time,55 and (b) it would not have done so if the establishing 
of road systems were not seen as a reasonable alternative to the neglecting of young, 
finding food or otherwise engaging in the cause of perpetuating the species.56 
It is at this point that I address the concerns of the liberal, the Marxist and 
the theocrat. These individuals will argue that my brandishing of the disputable 
contentions above does nothing more than provide evidence for the causes they 
promote.  In their models of governance, it may be argued, they do not impede the 
production of roads, and in fact they actively encourage it.   Furthermore, they will 
undoubtedly claim that the whipping boy that seems to be developing within this 
chapter is one of my own construction and is too stereotypical in its manifestation 
to be accurate, since a number of contra-examples might be called upon in their 
defence.  But thankfully my task is not to debate these political and social elements 
on the micro-level.  My task is rather to establish the macro-level prevalence of 
a particular philosophical position within political, economic, and social (and 
therefore institutional) contexts that is largely based upon and perpetuated by a 
false understanding of the nature of our species—despite its so-called successes 
in a number of spheres.  To respond to the objections of those mentioned above, 
then, I would highlight the important consideration of power and how it is most 
efficiently achieved and maintained: through the exclusion of potentially viable 
alternate arguments.  A point clearly articulated in Machiavelli (1532/1977), and 
more recently in the growing body of work in the area of critical theory.  
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The liberal, Marxist and theocrat will point to the enshrinement of certain 
foundational concepts within their constitutions that promote the questioning of 
alternatives through educated debates.  But the debates in which they engage are 
typically flawed.  For, in endgame scenarios, they inevitably revolve around what 
emerge as forgone conclusions and appeal to these on simplistic logics (Harris, 
2004; Sarkar, 2007).  For the liberal and Marxist alike, the conclusion is that human 
nature is at its root Hobbesian, brutish and requisite of an equally brutish response 
to ensure survival—so those most fit (in accordance with the respective ideological 
tenets) survive.  For the theocrat, the argument is only marginally more complex, 
but equally black and white.  
1.  “And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness: 
and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl 
of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every 
creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth” (Genesis 1:26, KJV); a 
foundational concept of the Hebrew Testament and therefore present 
in each of the Abrahamic religions.  
2. Those over which God granted humanity dominion are distinguished 
as not being made in His image.  
3. Man’s nature is therefore distinguishable in terms of its closeness to 
the image of God.  
4. If an individual strays from the image of God, he is to be held under 
the dominion of those whose image reflects that of God’s own.  This 
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has been extended to imply that only those who maintain a specific 
fitness of piety represent God’s people (and hence, in the Roman 
Catholic tradition, extra Ecclesiam nulla salus), or represent people 
at all (see the Talmudic [c. 200-500] accounts of Rabbi Simeon bar 
Yochai’s arguments against the inclusion of gentiles, idolaters and 
heathens as human [Yebamoth, 61a]).  
Thus a hierarchy of dominance develops with God at its zenith and the 
pious above those unfortunate souls who have been created as a digression of, or 
have strayed from, God.  It is important for western educators to remember that 
infants and unbaptized children are wedded to the lower echelons of this ladder 
through the Augustinian abomination that is original sin (Dawkins, 2006b; 
deMause, 1974; Denzinger, 1854/1954; Harris, 2004).  Furthermore, the hierarchy 
is clearly analogous to that espoused by subjugative racist dogma from at least the 
time of Linnaeus onward where those not of God’s image (read non-Caucasian) 
were considered sub-human (Graves, 2001).  Lest we believe that the latter-day 
twentieth century world escapes these religiously incited dualisms, Tamarin’s (1966) 
fascinating study of Israeli children’s inability to place the Biblical story of Joshua 
and the fall of Jericho into an enlightened moral position that does not actively 
advocate genocide underscores the point that the half-life of such hierarchical in- 
and out-group classification is very long, indeed.  And so the social Darwinian us 
versus them dualism described earlier is again entrenched with historic social and 
institutional relations (Harris, 2004).
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Am I not similarly appealing to a simplistic logic based upon a foregone 
conclusion?  In concentrating my attack on macro-level questions while neglecting 
micro-level examples have I not in doing so strengthened their point?  My answer 
to the latter objection is to suggest that it is the liberal, the Marxist, and the theocrat 
who, in their protests, have in fact proven my argument rather than I who have 
proven theirs.  If the world were as brutish and competitive as they ultimately reduce 
it to being, why would they bother with roads or communal projects of any type? 
To the former protest, however, I will, perhaps peculiarly but with one caveat, agree 
with them.  If the world were as rooted in altruism as I have claimed, the above 
discussion would be self-evidently moot.  I explore and develop the implications of 
this position in Chapter Five.
c.  summary
In the current chapter, I have attempted to show the error in the contemporary 
conception of human nature.  I employed an example from the field of socio-biology 
to point to the inconsistencies upon which arguments are made.  As I develop the 
argument beyond this early contextual stage, the perhaps contrived strict dualism 
established between gene’s and host’s perspectives is repeatedly invoked.  My 
reasons for doing so are a reminder (a) that simple arguments guiding many 
organisational representations of the nature of interorganisational relationships 
are problematic; and (b) that such problematic representations are pervasive, and 
often opportunistically so—whether a host’s (or, indeed, non-host’s) organisation 
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recognizes this state of affairs or does not.
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chaPter fIve
an hyPothesIs reGardInG the FoundatIons oF 
InstItutIonaL reLatIonshIPs In the  
Modern and Post-Modern eras
In this chapter, my task is to explore the implications of the exposed host 
perspective as it pertains to the Zeitgeist embedded within Western institutional 
relationships since the Enlightenment. I  demonstrate the privileged nature of the host 
perspective, the conflation of science and technology into a singular construct, neo-
science, that is solidified in the social Darwinist fallacy. Furthermore, I expose the 
over-arching flaw in post-modern responses to modernity, and I expose a hypothesis 
of social and political relationships that under-gird my discussions in following 
chapters.  In the following chapters, I present a clearer view of interorganisational 
relationships, and the fallacious circumstance within which educators involved in 
such relationships must contemporarily operate. 
a.  reviewing the argument
The argument advanced in Chapter Four is simple.  It is my contention that 
social relationships since at least the middle of the nineteenth century have been 
misguided by a collection of socio-political philosophies that span the political 
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spectrum from right to left, yet when reduced to foundational arguments, maintain 
themselves via tenets that are social Darwinian in nature.  I proposed that Spencerian 
social evolution theory, captured within popular social and economic interpretations 
as Darwinian evolutionary theory, provided a scientific basis for these philosophies 
since at least the mid-nineteenth century (Marciano, 2005).  
In the present chapter, I suggest that only by removing oneself from a modern 
and post-modern view can one appreciate that the irony of the above-mentioned 
politico-economic philosophies, and the foundational strength they seek in science 
to which they commonly appeal, is one of ignorance of the foundations upon which 
their foundations are based.  I maintain that the advocates of these philosophical 
positions neglect to learn the first thing about science generally, and the historical 
exemplar embedded within Darwin’s experience as the advocate of a radically new 
idea.  In so doing, I link the social Darwinist’s view with the popular account of 
modernity.  Furthermore, I argue that the post-modernist, who critiques the modernist 
science within social science without asking whether the heart of a modernist view 
of science in social science is an accurate one, does nothing more than perpetuate 
the fallacious nature of social Darwinist modernity.  The post-modernist does so by 
permitting the modernist such an easy escape from any meaningful opposition.  
Since at least Aristotle’s (320 BCE/1938) Organon there has existed a method 
for scientific epistemology, a method that has admittedly developed over time 
(Bryson, 2003; Dawkins, 2006b; McClellan & Dorn, 1999). Social Darwinism’s 
great claim is that through evolution the fittest survive, and these fittest are therefore 
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the product of an evolutionary process. If evidence were shown that the social 
Darwinist’s view of human nature were inaccurate, then their view should develop 
or fall aside.  Yet, so unscientifically, it does not.
In Chapter Four, however, I argued that the very approach I just employed to 
prove the lack of genuine scientism to be found in the pervasive social and political 
relationships ætiologically based upon scientific justifications was outdated. 
Orthodox Darwinism is not the generally accepted opinion of developmentalism 
in species.  The fact is, neither is the gene’s perspective orthodoxy. Yet, the gene’s 
perspective is certainly more evolved, in terms of its place within a more educated 
scientific conceptualisation of the world, as an hypothesis of human interaction 
than is the host’s.  Science simply does not operate in absolutes or so called grand 
narratives.  Rather it expects to evolve, and champions evolution in any field, based 
upon evidence (Bryson, 2003; Dawkins, 2006b).  In Chapter Four, I showed how 
the evidence supporting the social Darwinist was largely dated.  Peculiar is the 
position maintained by the social Darwinist that at the heart of his world view is 
a scientific argument.  More peculiar still is the at times aggressive promotion of 
the social Darwinist of the “scientific view” of the world.38 I suggest that the social 
Darwinist is more accurately viewed as opportunist than scientist.
But what of those who advocate a gene’s perspective in the social sciences? 
There are a few socio-biologists who maintain that virtue and morality are evolved 
genetic features of humanity (Kropotkin, 1902/2006; Matt Ridley, 1998; Mark 
Ridley, 2000).  Peculiar, however, is the absence of those who have taken up this 
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cause, for it is the only position that diametrically opposes the social Darwinist 
position.  It seems that the post-modernist has missed the opportunity presented 
in a gene’s perspective?  It may be that the post-modernist may be viewed as 
misunderstanding science and therefore the basis of his own critique.  Perhaps the 
post-modernist is no different than his modernist adversary.  I address these issues 
below.  
I equate the modernist and the social Darwinist.  I similarly equated the 
post-modernist with the modernist and therefore social Darwinist, as well.  At this 
point, my meaning may appear mired in Ezekielian wheels within wheels: am I 
advocating the gene’s perspective, or am I not; and is the gene’s perspective not the 
post-modernists’?
B. Modernity, Post-Modernity and an hypothesis
In previous chapters of this dissertation, I touched upon the contemporary 
context of political and social relationships.  In this section, I elaborate upon what 
I have concluded to be the nature of such contextualized relationships.  In the 
following four chapters, I extend the hypothesis established at the conclusion of 
this chapter into contemporary institutional relationships within Western education. 
In this sub-section, I discuss these types of relations on a more macro level.
I suggest that the failings of modernity in social and political relationships 
have been met by little more than an anaemic response from post-modernist social 
scientists.   A counter argument may be made that such a statement represents 
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an example of the close-minded arrogance of the hegemonic [read: patriarchal / 
positivistic / scientistic / modernistic / nineteenth-century] ontology and 
epistemology, because it describes post-modernity in objective absolutes, is 
grounded in a metaphysics of objective truth, ascribes a binary result that is 
impossible to substantiate in all cases and in all contexts, and it comes without 
citations of support (see for example Deleuze & Guattari, 1984; Denzin & Lincoln, 
2000; Derrida, 1986; Lyotard, 1979, 1988).  In the following section, I analyse these 
critiques.  At the conclusion of this section, I  articulate my hypothesis.  
1. The Host and Modernity
  While one might expect that a definition of modernity is not fully necessary, 
I will endeavour to clarify issues that might have been implied in my employment 
of it hitherto and in previous chapters, but have not yet been made explicit.  I review 
the historical buildup to the point of departure for the host’s perspective.
1.1. Pre-Modernity
A merger of several key movements appeared in Europe in the three 
centuries from 1600–1900.  Habermas (1962/2001) detailed the development of 
public-borne political, social, and mercantile consciousness from relative obscurity 
through authenticity to eventual exploitation.  Contemporaneously, the political-
economist philosophically grounded his theories of behaviour and governance in 
conceptions of human nature.  Philosophers continued their debates around the 
nature of the mind and its relation to the world, and “natural historians”—those who 
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would eventually be assigned the profession of “scientist”—began the process of 
the separation of science from religion (Charlesworth, 1982) and the distinguishing 
of specialized societies of scientists in a manner similar to the established medieval 
guilds (McClellan & Dorn, 1999).  It is probable that any one individual involved 
within any one of these endeavours would have been influenced by the work of his 
contemporaries.  Of note then was how the mutuality of these movements evolved 
into the dominant aspiration for societies around the globe, sharing greater and 
lesser socio-historical likeness with Europe.
Because the host’s perspective is, foundationally, based upon the merger 
of science and socio-political and economic theory, a reminder of pre-Spencerian 
Europe is of some utility.  Coincidentally, the operative notion feeding Spencer’s 
time was, in fact, utility.  In Science and Technology in World History, McClellan 
and Dorn (1999) repeatedly return to socio-political and economic interaction with 
science beginning in around the time humans began governing themselves, and still 
characteristic today.  Their point is similarly made in Goran’s (1974) work: utility 
almost exclusively drives the relationship between politics and science.  
Of what utility might we gain from scientific advancement? So asked the 
political leaders of history.  The rather patent response to this political question from 
scientists seeking the patronage of government officials—but more realistically, the 
enormity of their treasuries—was defence.  The practical application of science is 
so simply demonstrated in warfare.  All the more so to those who control (and wish 
to maintain control of) the nation’s finances.  The response was patent because 
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throughout the Scientific Revolution of sixteenth and seventeenth century Europe 
(what McClellan and Dorn referred to as the first Scientific Revolution [c. 1500–c. 
1760]), with its advancements of mathematics and pure science attributed to Galileo, 
Mercator, Cassini, Copernicus, Newton, Kepler, Halley et al., little “technology” 
emerged.  Little demonstrable, practical or utility-bearing science made a tangible 
impact on society—with the possible exception of cannonry, ballistics, and 
cartography.  Society gained generally little; it remained as agricultural as it had 
been for millennia, that is, until human existence was transformed in the eighteenth 
century.
Industrialization represented critical point in the establishment of a peculiar 
conceptualisation of science within the psyche of post-Enlightenment society, but 
one commonly overlooked.  McClellan and Dorn (1999) succinctly made this very 
point.
The myth that the theoretical innovations of the Scientific Revolution account 
for the technical inventions of the Industrial Revolution finds reinforcement 
in the common [but false] belief … that technology is inherently applied 
science….  In the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries [this] was almost 
never true.  This is not to say that science played no social or ideological role 
in promoting industrialization.  … Science raised the status of the reasoned 
life and was honored as a cultural and intellectual enterprise. … In this 
sense, scientific culture was important and perhaps essential to the Industrial 
Revolution.  But the scientific enterprise itself continued to be … largely 
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divorced from the practical affairs of society, except where patronized by 
the state; technologists and engineers proceeded without tapping bodies of 
scientific knowledge. (pp. 288-289)
There was a distinction to be drawn between science (a method of discovery) and 
technology (the demonstrable utility of science).  Neo-science is discovery fed by 
the requirements of utility, rather than the study of phenomena.  It is during the 
second Scientific Revolution that the distinction becomes muddled for a growing 
public perception of science as technology: what is the useful law that might be 
utilized?  McClellan and Dorn (1999) stated,
As the Second Scientific Revolution unfolded and these processes of 
mathematization and unification [—“physics”—] proceeded, a single set of 
universal laws and a powerfully coherent scientific world picture began to 
emerge.  That world picture, known as the Classical World View, seemed 
at once to integrate all the domains of the physical sciences and, by the last 
decades of the nineteenth century, to promise a complete understanding of 
the physical world and thereby the end of physics itself. (pp. 299-300)
Thus, the so named Classical World View may be seen as wrapped in a 
perspective that assumes, not unlike Fukayama’s social Darwinian end of history, 
a utility endowed end of physics as indeed expressed in a grand narrative that must 
prevail.   Interesting is the case that this very same contention remained within popular 
accounts of physics, even among physicists themselves, until the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries.  By way of example, Bryson (2003) described the 
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advice given to Max Planck, an eminent physicist of the twentieth century, at the 
beginning of his entry into graduate studies. The advice was to study mathematics 
instead of physics, because physics was clearly nearing the end of its available 
and exciting discoveries.  Such commentary was, it would seem, indicative of an 
unclear perception growing ever-more dominant within Western scientific circles. 
If the elite of a field hold a fallacious accounting of its nature, what hope have the 
public?  The socio-politico-economic implications of the popular conflation of neo-
science as science are demonstrated in the social movement that followed on the 
heels of the Classical World View: Modernity.
1.2.  Modernity
Superficially, modernity refers to that which is modern or most recent, yet 
the simplicity of the linkage among modernity and “modern” rests at the heart of the 
matter.  To be modern is to be current and advanced, and remarks related to human 
natural desire for advancement are more clearly understood in terms of social 
organisation since at least McGregor’s (1960/2006) “Theory Y”.  It is reasonable to 
assume that societies prefer to feel better about themselves than the alternative, and 
to this end it is likewise reasonable within human relations theory for a society to 
seek after a characterization that denotes the same.  A dialectic seems sociologically 
present, and to be modern—rich with the connotation of currency and advancement 
embedded—or to achieve modernity seems an outwardly wise synthetic social 
goal. 
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To define modernity beyond such a characterization is difficult. Recent 
and less-recent works, in a variety of fields, do not identify a singular historical 
or geographic point from which modernity might be demarcated: a date, an event, 
an individual, a discovery, an institution (Benko & Strohmayer, 1997; Brinker-
Gabler, 1995; Cooper, 2005; Dudley, 2002; Portes, 1973; Roald, 2001).  Earlier, I 
stated that modernity appeared sometime after the year 1750, and was the product 
of the merger of a variety of movements emerging around the Enlightenment, as 
depicted in Figure 5.1.  Three characteristics appear to overshadow all others.  The 
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first two reflect a definition of modernity as (a) geographically based in the North 
and Western (European) world and (b) indicative of a certain perceived cultural 
greatness and, as a result, cultural dominance (Brinker-Gabler, 1995). 
Evidence of these first two characteristics is presented in a variety of historical 
examples—among them, perhaps the most interesting was found in the 1868 
Meiji Restoration in Japan (although post-Edo [Tokugawa] period modernization 
was more selective than submissive) (Ong, 1999). The Japanese example is most 
interesting because it underscores the third defining characteristic of modernity: (c) 
the rise of a culture of social Darwinian science. This case provides an example of 
the product of a perpetuated perception surrounding a particular domain. The case 
is one where a major flaw in the contemporary view of modernity appears. Yet it is 
also one where those beyond of the flawed view were, while likely unknowingly, 
attuned to and struggling to limit the implications of the flaw. I momentarily digress 
to briefly explore some particulars of Japanese modernism.
I detail a Japanese case study in greater depth later in the chapter, but briefly 
and by way of introduction, in Meiji Japan, selective modernization is demonstrated 
in a popularized four-character idiom of the time  [wakonyosai – “Western 
technique, Japanese spirit”]. The influence was meant to be one of scientific 
advancement (or more accurately, scientific appropriation) without the inclusion of 
attractive and popular cultural elements (Ota, 2004; Warner, 1994). While the Meiji 
Restoration opened Japan to the representation of Occidental dominance (technology 
cum capital) in its early period, intellectuals sought to protectively decouple it from 
149
what binds it together (a culture that advocates a particular dominant but contextuo-
historically absent philosophy).  Questions related to the effectiveness of wakonyosai 
as a guiding social policy in post-World War II Japan arise for any traveller to Japan 
in recent years.  The Japanese example of modernity can be applied analogously to 
interorganisational relations in education.  
1.2.a.  Pre-Meiji Tradition and Post-Meiji Scientific Management
The relationship between Japan and the “non-Japanese outside world” is 
notable.  Few cities in Japan have been the seat of particular relational firsts between 
Japan and the outside world as Yokosuka, a small city roughly 40 km south of Tokyo 
where all ships entering Tokyo Harbour pass its shores.
 The first first that places Yokosuka on the historical map of Japanese-
foreign relations took place in 1600 when William Adams (1564-1620) arrived, 
aboard a pre-Dutch East India Company expeditionary ship to the Far East, on the 
Yokosuka shores at Uraga.  He was the first British citizen to step on Japanese soil.57 
Adams’ influence was significant.  He was employed as advisor to the first shogun 
of the Tokugawa shogunate (a military-government super-ordinate to the rule of 
the Emperor), designed the first western-style ships built in Japan, and engaged 
the Japanese in some of the first ever trading arrangements with England and the 
Netherlands (Milton, 2003; Tames, 1987).
Japanese relations with the West were strained during the Edo period 
(1641-1868) that followed Adam’s investiture as a Japanese peer.   In 1635, 
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Tokugawa Iemitsu, grandson of the first Tokugawa shogun and the shogun at 
that time, seeking to limit European influence within Japan (most especially the 
spread of Christianity), issued the Closed Country Edict.  The Exclusion of the 
Portuguese Edict followed in 1639.  In essence, these edicts served to forbid all 
foreign travel by Japanese, and all landing of “Southern Barbarian” (read: foreign, 
and specifically Western) vessels in Japan.  His edicts were punishable by death and 
stood, largely unchallenged, for more than 200 years; longer than any single ruler 
or ruling class capable of compelling adherence consistent with the Edicts’ original 
intent.  Although introspection and seclusion had indeed repaired the “traditions” of 
Japan, traditions of these types were no match for technological temptations.
The next first for Yokosuka city took place in 1853, when the United States 
military envoy Commodore Perry anchored four “Blackships” under his command 
and demanded in the name of US President Fillmore that Japan open itself to trade 
with American partners.   The letter carried by Perry bore an ultimatum of military 
force lest the Japanese refuse—because the US wanted accesses to trade and trade 
routes in East Asia in an attempt to counter European monopolization and demonstrate 
American strength as an emerging world power.  Borthwick (1998) argued that 
Western traders in Asia during this period unapologetically believed that they were 
bringing “progress” and “modernity” to less-than-advanced civilizations.58  The US 
doctrine of Manifest Destiny clearly spread beyond the shores of North America.
Most Asian governors of the time saw a domestic technological disadvantage 
when juxtaposed against the naval cannonry, ballistics and cartography exemplars 
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at their shores.  The Convention of Kanagawa was signed between the United States 
and Japan in 1854, and effectively ended the Japanese period of seclusion.  
Ports were opened to American traders, and once again foreign influences 
began to infiltrate traditional Japanese society.  In the century that followed, Japan, 
too, would follow the path exhibited by the United States—demonstrating to the 
world its “modernity” and “progress,” euphemisms of competitive (military) might, 
in the Chinese (1894) Russian (1904), Korean (1910), Manchurian (1931), and 
French Indochinese, Dutch East Indies, Filipino and Pacific (1941) theatres.
The beginning of the Meiji era (  [enlightened rule]) is linked with the 
arrival of Perry and marked the first sign of substantial political weakness in the 
military junta that was the shogunate system.  The Restoration is so named because 
it denoted the time when the Emperor (specifically Emperor Mutsuhito [1852-1912], 
posthumously named Emperor Meiji) was restored as Japanese sovereign in 
1868.  The timing, in terms of my use for this example, could not have been more 
significant.  First, the birth of the period was based on a display of technological (and 
specifically military) weakness on the part of Japan.  Second, those Westerners who 
held a technological advantage proselytized a view of relations that was intriguing 
for a state whose introspective assessment of the past two centuries was as other 
than modern or progressive.  
The challenge for the Meiji era was to modernize the state in a way that 
would not limit the new regime’s power, and the power of those whose finances 
had provided the successful military might that had domestically overthrown the 
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shogunate system.  Roberts (1998) pointed to the apparent solution:  
[kokueki shiso, loosely translated as “theory of national interest”], an ideology based 
upon a common belief in the supremacy of nationally organised political-economy. 
But exactly how common was this belief among Japanese?
Based on the theory proposed by social historian Eric Hobsbawm that much 
of modern tradition was invented to suit the purposes of elites, accounts that detailed 
a critical analysis of Japanese modern traditions were fashioned into an edited book. 
Some chapters provide key insights into what the book’s editor, Stephen Vlastos 
(1998), described as 
[g]roup harmony, aversion to litigation, … industrial paternalism: these and 
other “traditional” values and practices are assumed both to predate Japan’s 
modernization and to have contributed to its unparalleled success. It was 
not that long ago, in fact, that Japan specialists ascribed Japan’s successful 
modernization to the utility of its premodern values and institutions, on the 
assumption “traditions” were direct cultural legacies. (p. 1)
What Vlastos’ contributors described was an account of the Japanese modernity 
project.  But unlike the modernity project of Habermas, the Japanese variety 
bares the hallmarks of one contrived in technologically derived wontedness and 
competition.
Blacker’s (1964) study of Japanese intellectual history points to an attempt 
on the part of some Japanese philosophers of the early Meiji period, most notably 
Yukichi Fukuzawa (1835-1901), to initiate a Japanese Enlightenment similar to that 
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experienced in Europe and predating the Modern period.  The popularized, and 
earlier mentioned,  [wakonyosai – “Western technique, Japanese spirit”], 
was an example of Fukuzawa’s contemporaries’ intent. Western influence was meant 
to encompass the scientific method but not attractive and popular cultural elements 
(Ota, 2004; Warner, 1994) similar to those that had perpetuated a necessity for 
the Edo edicts of the 1630s.  It is clear on this account that the Japanese shogun 
dictatorship was simply replaced by imperial dictatorship during the Restoration.  
Vlastos’ (1998) contributors, among others, pointed to the short-lived nature 
of the Japanese Enlightenment, where a theory of national interest tipped government 
interests toward the technology of warfare, while even outright contributing to the 
reinventing of Japanese traditions to better suit the needs of industrialists (Gordon, 
1998; Roberts, 1998).  These needs included, among other social Darwinist motifs, 
the traditional place in industrial relations for the “‘beautiful custom of master-
servant relations’” (Gordon, 1998, p. 34).  Science (really, neo-science), as 
TsuTsui (1998; 2001) explained, became entrenched in Taylorism and Scientific 
Management—and remain so today.  
Modernity provided the Japanese not with the Enlightenment but with 
technological/techno-cratic and competitive governance, social, and industrial 
models; yet little historical similarity is shared among Japanese and Western 
societies. 
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1.3  a More distilled View
What can educational administration learn from this example?  I selected the 
historical Japanese example as a case because it demonstrates the three characteristics 
of modernity noted above, but also because it does so as a non-Western and 
culturally dissimilar agent influenced by the byproducts of a falsified manifestation 
of modernity’s promise.  In the Japanese example, one sees the strength of which 
each characteristic is bound together; further, one sees the nineteenth century 
decoupling effort of the Japanese intelligentsia slowly eroded by the emergence of 
the twentieth century and industry driven neo-scientific conceptions illustrated in 
Taylorism; ultimately, one sees the impossibility of a decoupling effort, despite the 
absence of longevous modern culture.  
McClellan and Dorn (1999) indirectly provided an insightful answer to why 
the Japanese case is indicative of the fallacy of modernity.  As I have presented 
earlier, a conflation of science and technology into neo-science appeared in the 
West around the middle to end of the 1800s and has grown into the dominant global 
understanding of science.  The issue is the linking of science to competition—
hence, neo-science—that is, the coupling of the simple definition of what it means 
to be modern and that which is demonstrative of being modern (technology) with 
an institutionalization of political relations theories based upon “scientific” social 
Darwinism.  As such, it is likely no surprise that social Darwinist social/economic/
political theories have sublimated technological advancement as the definition of 
modernity, for doing so invents a new science—demonstrably competitive—and 
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consistent with the Spencerian account of human relations and human nature.  In 
this light, the contemporary manifestation of the linkage between government and 
neo-science (rather than science) is demonstrated in the manipulation and corruption 
of science and knowledge for the purposes of particular political ends by, among 
others, US (and most particularly the incumbent at the time of writing) and Soviet 
administrations (Orr, 2004; Rapoport, 1989; Sarkar, 2007; Union of Concerned 
Scientists, 2004).  
Despite the attempts of the Japanese intelligentsia to decouple a social 
relations schema (culture) that is antithetical to that traditionally present from the 
science (technology)59 or a social relations schema from the capital-market (product 
of technology), one can conclude that the Japanese and other Asian societies will 
continue to be wholly incapable of decoupling such elements within the context of 
what has become the popular definition of modernity.  Why can modern society not 
be decoupled from neo-science?  The answer is rooted in a modern fallacy embedded 
within public consciousness, which skews any attempt to mend the products of the 
fallacy.  The key is found in the host’s perspective and its influence on modernity. 
In the following subsection, I explore this fallacy and the nature of its overlooked 
embedment.
1.4. Modernity and Post-Modernity
I subscribe to the definition of modernity that is advocated by Jürgen 
Habermas (1981/1997), but I will not widely employ his nomenclature within this 
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dissertation.  Rather I explain the manner in which the terms that I use are linked to 
Habermas’ corpus.  
For Habermas (1981/1997; Passerin d’Entrèves, 1997), a conflation of 
the elements of modernity exists—both, it seems, in terms of epoch and guiding 
principle.  On the one side rests the issue of conflating a single temporal notion of 
modernity, which is arguably problematic yet commonly practiced among those 
whose organisational position is grounded in a host perspective when viewed in 
terms of the second notion of guiding principle.  Habermas’ distinction of two 
guiding principles within modernity rests in (a) the specialization of domains of 
expertise within society—owing much to the rationalist work of Kant, Fichte and 
Weber (to which I will likewise add Dewey)—and (b) a radical subjectivism at the 
heart of Nietzsche, then Foucault and Derrida.  
Modernity is conceived as the point at which pure reason emerges (historically 
for society, rather than developmentally for the individual) (Habermas, 1975).  We 
owe to Kant the birth of the modern era (Howe, 2000).  That a metaphysical truth 
might be universally grounded in human reason is central to the work of both Kant 
and Habermas, though Habermas’ contribution in this arena is his accommodation 
of an instrument by which truth might be concretely expressed in human interaction. 
Hence, the application of speech act theory as the arena for universalizable human 
truth, the intersubjectivity provided in language and therefore the linguistic turn in 
philosophy, the recursive justification of validity claims, discourse ethics and the 
ideal speech situation—each of which represent, at times, cliché axioms of critical 
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theory and the late Frankfurt School in their widest reading.  Of concern here, 
however, is the analysis that Habermas drew (a) from those whom he characterized 
as the Enlightenment fathers of modernity, Kant and Weber, and then (b) the reaction 
to the skewed product of these thinkers as principally found in Nietzsche, then 
extended by Foucault and Derrida.  
On the Kantian-Weberian side reside the roots of an intersubjective articulation 
of pure rationalist enlightenment, and the maintenance of universal benchmarks 
(truths) to guide human interaction, and on the Nietzschean-Foucauldian-Derridian 
side the radical subjectivism conflated into the rational, or the abandonment of 
universals and the birth of what MacIntyre (1984) called emotivism. For Habermas, 
the result of the latter is the popularly understood notion of modernity and, by 
extension, post-modernity; but it is to the former that Habermas is appealing in his 
so-called unfinished project of modernity. 
In Kant and Weber, then, Habermas (1981/1997) found the birth and 
institutionalization of modernity, because their work represents an important change 
in human relations.  What one now considers social dualisms in the Western tradition 
were pulled from their historical subservience to the Church.  Right and wrong, true 
and false, are placed into the domain of the specialist in a particular area of social or 
institutional relations.  Debates among these specializations and “societies” begin 
to fulfil the growing promise of modernity and liberal democracy.  The liberation 
of the individual and rational conceptualisation and governance of the world 
occur through science and pure reason (Habermas, 1962/2001; Weber, 1914/2006, 
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1922/1978, 1924/2006; see also Dewey, 1902/1964).  As such, the system-world 
emerges from the lifeworld—the specialized domains of macro-human relations 
emerge from the familial and communal.  With increased specialization, a crevasse 
between the professional and the layman grows.  It is at this point that the path of 
modernity begins to stray from its promise.  Unchecked, rationalization becomes 
hyperrationalization: reason becomes exclusionary (Wise, 1977).  
In an earlier subsection of this chapter, I explained the specialization 
of natural histories or sciences into societies.  In the case of the sciences, these 
societies defined the foundations of their areas of expertise around questions vis-à-
vis the pursuit of study; exclusionary to a degree, but foundationally based upon a 
developing, unifying, and universally accessible method for that study.  Initially, a 
similar specialization was to be drawn by the social sciences, the domains of human 
interaction.  This initial promise of modernity was, on Habermas’ (1962/2001; 
1971/1990; 1981/1997) view, subjugated by what I have called the social Darwinist 
cooptation of science, subjugated by neo-science.  When social science became 
instrumentalized and techno-cratic, reason became exclusionary and competitive. 
The result was modern social science embedded with social Darwinist method—
consequently, unscientific and, as I demonstrate in the chapter that follows, 
dysfunctional and pathological.
Social critiques of exclusionary social reason were also addressed by modern 
scholars. The result was a radical reaction to this new hyperrationalized  modernity. 
The perceived culprit for these reactionaries (e.g., Nietzscheans, Heideggerians, 
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relativists, feminists, and post-modernists) was, in fact, all that was right about the 
Enlightenment—science, development, specialization, justification, and the reason 
that under-girds each of these—seen as that which relentlessly permits exclusionary 
reason.  For the post-modernists, then, blame is placed squarely on the shoulders of 
science and, especially, its employment in human relationships.  I suggest that the 
post-modernists are both right and wrong.
They are right in that their critique is well-placed in its dedication to a 
cataloguing of details of problems besetting a system too self-referentially construed. 
Yet, I believe that the critique fails to find the central kernel of the problems within 
modernity.  It takes for granted that hyperrationalization is the inborn and compulsory 
by-product of the Enlightenment when institutionalized, and this is a most grim 
problem for the post-modern argument.  Why does it do so? An important question, 
because this very why is, in fact, the very real and contemporarily present problem 
with modernity that any reaction other than the gene’s perspective in social science 
will fail to address. 
The Habermasian notion of modernity, then, applies not to the sum of the 
intellectual production of the epoch since 1848, but applies to the kernel of Kantian-
Weberian intersubjective rationalist enlightenment before its subversion into, first, 
neo-science, and then second, radical subjectivism.  In this dissertation, for reasons 
of simplicity noted above, I have and will equate this conception of modernity with 
the institutional Enlightenment, and modernity will therefore refer to the subjectified 
institutional Enlightenment.  Post-modernity, as a consequence of the subjectified 
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institutional Enlightenment, on this account defines the social pattern that seeks to 
more radically subjectify and deinstitutionalize modernity. 
Figure 5.2 depicts the broad landscape of relationships among institutional 
enlightenment, modernity, post-modernity and religious structures.  For Habermas 
(1981/1997), the institutional Enlightenment represented a guiding principle found 
in the act, whereas modernity represented a guiding principle found in the other. 
The act/other antagonism (the antagonism found among the metaphysical truth 
associated with a discursively validated act and the radical subjective absence of 
truth found within the relationship to the other) was not properly accounted for in 
the response to modernity.  Post-modernity failed to account for the foundational 
questions of modernity in any real way.  Post-modernity assumed the same milieu 
as modernity, and was a more strongly worded articulation of the same.  In the 
remainder of this chapter, I discuss how the ideas ascertained through the Japanese 
example relate to the Habermasian definition.
The Japanese case highlighted the early years of the Western conflation of 
science and technology.  Over time, the conflation became more entrenched and 
less outwardly apparent as a conflation. In any event, popular culture continued to 
employ science as trope of technology.  Neo-science was assumed to be science 
and the practice seemed to have taken on mimetic (and memetic) proportions. But 
neo-science is antithetical to science and requires social Darwinist motivations 
for any reasonable justification of its pursuit. Goran’s (1974) endeavour to correct 
what he rightly viewed to be the prevailing misunderstanding of science in neo-
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science spoke to the accuracy of a central feature of my current argument. I explore 
the embedded social Darwinist characteristics of modernity in more depth in the 
following section.
1.5  emotivism as Modernist escape
One may approach Habermas’ definitions of institutional enlightenment, 
modernity, and post-modernity with some degree of skepticism. MacIntyre (1984), 
however, helped me to understand why, if post-modernity is nothing more than more 
of the same, do I maintain the peculiar intuition that it nevertheless does appear 
to challenge modernity.  The answer, for MacIntyre was rooted in the characters 
that take the place of a metaphysical truth when none is permitted to exist in the 
first place.  Returning our discussion to Japanese traditions, MacIntyre likened his 
characters of modernity to the characters found in the Japanese fourteenth century 
theatrical style of nougaku [ ]. In nougaku, four categories of characters existed, 
each performing a specific, well-known, and prescribed function within the play.  For 
patrons of nougaku, this collection of formulaic characters interacted in the world 
and spirit-world according to what might be seen as tacitly agreed upon roles—so 
formulaic and assumed that they were never questioned.  Similarly, for each actor 
playing these characters certain assumptions about their deportment predefined their 
very nature.  For MacIntyre, three such characters were representative of modernity: 
the aesthete, the manager, and the therapist.  I first contextualize MacIntyre’s 
perspective on modernity.
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Of primary concern for MacIntyre (1984) was a critique of contemporary 
moral philosophy, and the misunderstood ancient foundations upon which it claims 
a basis.  Arguing that the span of time and intellectual interest separating the ancients 
from the Renaissance resulted in a misinterpretation of the original achievements 
of moral philosophy, MacIntyre suggested that this misinterpretation has permeated 
contemporary moral philosophy.  It has ultimately led it astray.  
His evidentiary claim was presented in what he described as a denial of 
“an objective and impersonal moral standard [that] can in some way or other be 
rationally justified, even if in some cultures at some stages the possibility of such 
rational justification is no longer available” (p. 19).  Those individuals who deny 
such claims MacIntyre named Emotivist, because in the making of their moral 
arguments they mask their personal preferences.  They emote personal beliefs as 
valid and worthy of inclusion in public and private discourse.  
MacIntyre (1984) believed that social and institutional relationships are 
subjectified by a philosophical position that, on the one hand, destroys objectively 
present standards, and on the other, sublimates the standards emoted by three 
particular characters.  The result of this analysis is a view of the contemporary milieu 
as ironically governed by the unquestioned characteristics of social characters, while 
these characters promote the counterfactual tenets of emotivism. 
His argument is as follows: 
1.  The emotivist character represents an assumed place of authority 
within society. The authority of this character is the product of 
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what Habermas argued was the moment when rationality became 
hyperrationality, when knowledge became specialized beyond 
the grasp of the layman, and when the system emerged from the 
lifeworld.60
2. The emotivist character sees individuals as means to an end, rather 
than as ends in themselves.  The behaviour of the character is thus 
consistent with the host’s perspective because it is largely informed 
by a social Darwinism.
3. Owing to the privileged authority of the character, that character’s 
use of individuals as means to a host’s end is unquestioned.
4. The appeal of the character to the scientific or neo-scientific nature 
of his authority further solidifies the place of the host’s perspective 
within modernity.
5. When confronted by the subjective argument of the post-modernist, 
the character simply appeals to the post-modernist’s own argument as 
further justification for the maintenance of the character’s position.
Why would individuals consistently conform to a particular perspective 
on social interaction, especially one in which their liberty of thought is so clearly 
undermined?  Habermas’ (1975) answer to this question drew upon a combination 
of educational psychology, sociology, and organisational theory. 
[W]ith Freud, Durkheim, and Mead, I start from the position that motivations 
are shaped through the internalization of symbolically represented structures 
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of expectation.  The sociological concept of internalization (Parsons) 
raises a series of problems at the psychological level.  ... [M]otivational 
development, in Piaget’s sense, is tied to a cognitively relevant development 
of moral consciousness, the stages of which can be reconstructed logically, 
that is, by concepts of a systematically ordered sequence of norm systems 
and behavioral controls.  To the highest stage of moral consciousness there 
corresponds a universal morality, which can be traced back to fundamental 
norms of rational speech.
Max Weber’s concept of legitimate authority directs our attention to 
the connection between belief in the legitimacy of orders [Ordnungen] and 
their potential for justification, on the one hand, and to their factual validity 
on the other. (p. 95)
To this end, society accepts the status quo, the host’s perspective, and characters 
because society tacitly accepts that the characters’ legitimacy is factually valid. It 
is, however, not valid, despite our tacit acceptance of its legitimacy founded in the 
specialization of knowledge and the separation of the character from the layman.61 
This situation is, ultimately, a matter of trust gone awry. As Habermas (1975) 
explained,
The fundamental question of the continued existence of a truth-dependent 
mode of socialization constitutive of society is, as one can see, not easy 
to answer.  This could lead one to think that it is not at all a theoretically 
reasonable question, but a practical question: should we rationally desire that 
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social identity be formed through the minds of socially related individuals 
or should it be sacrificed to the problem—real or imagined—of complexity? 
… As partisanship, however, this partiality can be justified only so long as 
alternatives are posed within an already accustomed, shared communicative 
form of life.  As soon as an alternative appears that breaks this circuit of 
predecided intersubjectivity, the only universalizable partiality—the interest 
in reason itself—becomes particular.  Luhmann poses such an alternative: 
he subordinates, at the methodological level, all areas of interaction steered 
through discursively redeemable validity claims to systems-rational claims 
to power and increasing power.  Such monopolistic claims of an eccentric 
administration permit no possibility of appeal; that is, they may not be 
measured against standards of practical rationality, as was the case even in 
the Leviathan. (p. 142) 
MacIntyre presented a line of thought similar to Habermas’; and in the spirit of 
their shared position in this regard, I come to the point at which I can concretely 
articulate my hypothesis of contemporary interorganisational relationships in the 
modern and post-modern eras.
2. An Hypothesis
Interorganisational relationships suffer, on the one hand, because their 
participants unknowingly perpetuate the dysfunctions of the system in which they 
are engaged.  On the other hand, when seeking to genuinely correct the system, 
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participants are led farther astray by a growing dominant critique of the system 
that does not account for the central flaw of its dysfunction.  The nature of that 
dysfunction is not the presence of science, rather it is the falsified dominance of 
neo-science perpetuated by a weak conceptualisation of human nature.  In the end, 
the science of social science has become entangled within its own faults.  The 
contemporary remedy proposed by the post-modernist is similarly entangled.
It is my position that interorganisational relationships, until returned to the 
promise of modernity before its coupling with social Darwinism, will continue to 
unknowingly suffer.  Until discursive rationality in decision-making is based upon a 
more true picture of human nature, interorganisational decision-making will remain 
the domain of the character most adept at social Darwinism’s game.
c. concluding remarks
MacIntyre and Habermas, though in very different ways, argue for the nature 
of the individual as the centre of her teleos, whether interpreted as the universalized 
locus of pure reason (der Verstand [the understanding°]) or as the universalized 
locus of the ancient virtue (δικαιοσύνη [dikaiosunē – the cardinal virtue]). Herein, 
a most important and foundational question is answered: is humanity as a species 
more the same than it is different, or more different than it is the same? 
Humanity is, as contemporary geneticists (Cargill et al., 1999; CSAC, 2005; 
Syvänen, 2001; Wang et al., 1998) and cultural anthropologists (Collard, Shennan, 
& Tehrani, 2006) continue to provide evidence, more the same than it is different. 
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Yet, in the social, political, economic, and institutional absence of a metaphysical 
truth that grounds praxis, humanity has devised a substitute for metaphysical 
truth through antagonism.  This antagonistic truth may be wholly antithetical to 
humanity’s shared nature.  Within the case of modernity, the Fichtian synthesis of 
this dialectic is the accepted subversion of rationally constituted validity into the host 
perspective.  It is the subversion of the gene’s perspective by the host’s.  The cause 
of post-modernity, rather than seeking the missing metaphysical truth grounded in 
the more the same answer, abandons questions of truth to the more different answer. 
Doing so, post-modernists abdicate all linkages with the gene’s perspective that 
antagonistically (and as I demonstrate in Chapter Eight, agonistically) and actually 
oppose the host’s perspective on the host’s own terms.  The debate among modernist 
(host) and post-modernist becomes meaningless, since both are ultimately grounded 
upon fallacy.
d. summary
Beginning from the contextual questions surrounding the host’s perspective 
as an organisational representation of interorganisational relationships established 
in the previous chapter, I have articulated several contentions that move my larger 
argument forward.  These contentions include, (a) that a link exists between 
the period of modernity and the perpetuation of the host’s perspective; (b) that 
modernity did not originate from within the host’s perspective, but, as demonstrated 
in the otherwise unbiased (as much as this might be possible) exemplar found in 
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a non-Western/European historical case with few historic predilections or ties to 
a host’s conception of science cum technology—Japan—that such a perspective 
is easily and successfully contrived through the perpetuation of traditions; and (c) 
that post-modernity’s apparent and demonstrable failure to concretely dissuade 
modernity does not serve its own purposes, purposes that upon examination permit 
modernity’s escape from meaningful criticism.  In chapters to follow, I extend my 
examination of modern, post-modern and institutional enlightenment relationships 
through contemporary game theoretic analysis.
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chaPter sIX
the unIVerses oF conteMPorary  
InterorGanIsatIonaL reLatIonshIPs
In the present chapter, I extend the argument presented in Chapter Five 
within the context of interorganisational relationships forged among organisations 
endowed with various organisational representations.  Following an analysis of 
game theoretic situations employed in decision-making, I specify this argument to 
the case of educational organisations and their interactions with non-educational 
organisations.  In the chapters that follow, a further assessment of these relations and 
their implications for leadership is drawn from the work of Mouffe and Habermas.
In the previous chapters, I sought to construct the background principles of 
this theoretical study.  Doing so, my intent was to examine the context in which 
the relationships of interest exist.  I now apply the hypothesis that I used to close 
Chapter Five.   
a.  amalgamation and Plan of study
I present a summary of Chapters Four and Five. 
1. The foundational arguments of predominant political ideologies 
are based upon a specific form of scientism that is frequently 
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unscientific. 
(a) Human social relationships are not manifest in social-
Darwinian (Spencerian) terms.
(b) Appeals to Darwinism demonstrate a fallacy of the underlying 
arguments of these ideologies.
2. The pathology of this scientism is demonstrable as an elevation of 
technology, the tangible product of science, over science, the method 
of discovery.
(a) Technological advancement is a tangible measure of modernity 
when made quantifiable as a product or instrument of power.
(b) The elevation of quantifiable product further embeds 
competitive principles into political and economic relations.
(c) With political and economic relations thus aligned, social 
relations take on social-Darwinist archetypes.
(d) Social archetypes are represented in political, economic, and 
social relations by certain characters.
3. Reactions to the social-Darwinist manifestation of modernity have 
generally been anaemic.
(a) Despite the appearance of a post-modernist challenge to 
modernity, characters of modernity are able to employ post-
modernist arguments to sustain their archetypal place.
(b) The post-modern argument results in a strengthening of the 
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modernist position. This result is demonstrable in the continued 
strength of the modern position, ideologically, economically, 
and socially, since theories of difference gained ground in the 
1970s (Martin & Frost, 1996).
(c) Critiques of the tangible product of science within the context 
of theories of difference misunderstand the central flaw in 
modernity.
In Chapter Six, I apply these presuppositions to theoretical organisations, 
which I shall call “A” and “B,” and to more concrete examples.  I am particularly 
interested in the relationships between organisations, and I focus my initial discussion 
on the nature of relationships.  
B. Organisations “A” and “B”
The theoretical organisations A and B hold (or have emerged from) different 
world views or organisational representations.  In an attempt to delimit this theoretical 
discussion, I am at this time not interested in the size of these organisations, nor 
am I interested in their age.  Furthermore, I am not interested in the turn over of 
membership, nor am I interested in their organisational structure or decision-making 
apparati (although some may assume certain structures based upon there ontological 
persuasions).  The organisations may have as many leaders as one cares to count, 
or as few, these are of little importance for my purposes.  These organisations may 
deal with other individuals, who themselves may realize their place within the 
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organisation; or they may not, on both or either account.  I reify these organisations 
as a means of generalizing their organisational idiosyncrasies, purposes, and goals. 
Simply put, therefore, these organisations merely see the world in a particular way; 
in doing so, they believe their view is justified (although exactly how is of tangential 
interest, for the time being). The basic purpose for the relationship among A and B 
requires that a decision related to some common interest be made. 
1. Game Theoretical Relationships
One way of examining the interrelationships between organisations is 
through the use of game theory.  Game theory is used in mathematical, political, 
and economic literature, but has some, albeit very small, purchase in educational 
administration.  Evers and Lakomski (2000) discussed its merits as a foundation 
of their coherentist and naturalistic method of decision-making analysis.62  Their 
definition of game theory was taken from the work of Heap, Hollis, Lyons, Sugden 
and Weale (1992), and since mine is an extended juxtaposition of Evers and 
Lakomski’s employment, I use Heap et al.’s definition, as well.
A game is defined as a situation in which the actions of one [organisation] 
perceptibly affect the welfare of another and vice versa.  These effects can be 
classified according to the degree to which there are motives for cooperation 
and for rivalry.  …Whatever the case, the basic method of game theory is 
to argue that [individual organisations] try to predict what others will do in 
reply to their own actions, and then to optimize on the understanding that 
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others are thinking in the same way. (p. 94)
As noted earlier, strict game theory has not been widely employed within 
educational administration,63 which raises questions that I examine later in this 
chapter and in Chapter Seven.  Where game theory has been used, some interesting 
characteristics have appeared.  
In 1970, Brown provided an evaluation of risk propensity in decision-making, 
comparing the administrators of businesses and the administrators of public schools. 
He argued that a large body of work in organisational theory64 independently 
concluded that game theoretic analysis was appropriate for comparisons of 
organisational behaviour.  The internal structures of these two types of organisations, 
it was argued, were the same.  Brown concluded that business leaders were more 
likely to take decision-based risks than were educational administrators.
More recently, Evers and Lakomski (2000) employed game theory as a 
naturalistic method of analysing decision-making within educational management. 
In fact, it is precisely because Evers and Lakomski have chosen this method, the 
weight of their view within recent theoretic educational administrative literature, 
in addition to its use in doctoral programs in Educational Administration where I 
am not convinced that it is fully appreciated by students, that I too will employ it. 
Game theory provides an idealized way of understanding basic decision-making 
practices.  Furthermore, the irony of game theoretic analysis is that those who 
scientistically employ it do not realize the extent to which it demonstrates inherent 
problems rooted in their particular organisational representation positions. 
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It is not my present concern to deeply elaborate upon the general thesis argued 
in Doing Educational Administration (Evers & Lakomski, 2000; hereafter, Doing). 
Briefly, however, their thesis is constructed upon a basis in a particular school of 
cognitive science65 whose basic underlying theory of mind is simply described as 
follows: your brain is a computer, or several computers working in parallel, that 
implements your mind as a computer would software.  It is for this reason that the 
first chapter of Doing focuses on parallel processing66—since parallel processing, 
Evers and Lakomski implied, is the current state of thinking in cognitive science. 
They offered no critique.  
Searle (1984; 2004), however, did offer a critique.67  He explained how 
parallel processing is, in fact, nothing more than the implementation of syntax on 
a series of powerful Turing machines.  Alternatively said, this branch of cognitive 
science employs 1940s technology as its scientific view of the brain and mind.68 
As was discussed in Chapter Three, syntax is, quite literally, nothing without a 
semantic referent.  
A transcendental object does not exist for a computer-mind and, as a result, 
neither does a form of intentionality.  Machines, contrary to the implication in Evers 
and Lakomski’s work, clearly do not think.  Nevertheless, Evers and Lakomski 
(2000) employed this scientistic framework as an extension of game theory in 
decision-making models and argue that educational administration has much to 
learn from it.  For my purposes, however, I focus on the examples of games between 
my organisations A and B to Evers and Lakomski’s early conceptions, before they 
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are naturalized or coherentified. 
I present an example from Evers and Lakomski (2000) of game theory.  First, 
one must confine one’s self to a small universe in which a normative view of rational 
behaviour is assumed to dominate.  All parties to this universe seek to behave in 
such a way that their expected value for the result of their behaviour is maximized 
(Davis, 1970).  The reason for such a confined universe is one of practicality, as 
Nash (1951) explained: “the complexity of the mathematical work needed for a 
complete investigation increases rather rapidly … with increasing complexity of 
the game” (p. 295).
The specific example that was drawn by Evers and Lakomski (2000) examined 
the decision-making process employed by an individual within this universe where 
one of two weather outcomes is equally likely (a 50% chance of rain, and a 50% 
chance of no rain).  A decision must be made as to whether or not the individual 
should bring an umbrella to work.  Figure 6.1 shows the basic elements of the 
decision table as demonstrated in Doing. 
The value of carrying an umbrella, or not, will vary depending on whether it 
rains or not.  There are four possibilities.  To bring it, with rain eventuating, 
has high value (+6) because of the advantages associated with staying dry. 
If it does not rain [sic] there is a small disadvantage (–2) caused by the 
inconvenience of carrying an unneeded umbrella.  The decision not to bring 
it, and rain occurs, is disastrous (–8), while if it does not rain there is the 
modest advantage (+2) of not carrying around something unnecessary.  As 
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the theory of reason counsels maximizing expected value, we can put all 
this into a calculation of expected value for each alternative and make the 
appropriate choice as follows:
Expected value of bringing the umbrella: 0.5 × 6 + 0.5 × (–2) = 2
Expected value of not bringing the umbrella:  0.5 × (–8) + 0.5 × 2 = 3 [sic]
Therefore, one ought to carry an umbrella. (Evers & Lakomski, 2000, pp. 
90-91)
The answer provided for the second equation is indeed –3 rather than 3, but this 
appears to be a mistake in the printing for their logical written conclusion remains 
valid.  This situation is one where a decision is made based upon specific likely events 
that are, in a more substantial universe, more complex.  Yet Evers and Lakomski 
suggested that despite the complexity of weather, one does have some means of 
ascribing probability based upon an ever-growing body of data for a particular 
Leave Umbrella –8, 0.5 +2, 0.5
–2, 0.5Bring Umbrella +6, 0.5
No RainRain
Figure 6.1 Decision-Making Under Risk 
Adapted from Evers and Lakomski (2000, p. 90)
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environment.  So the game’s logic can be extended beyond the original universe 
(assuming that maximization of value remains a determinant of rationality).  This 
example remains one of the simplest one-person games (Davis, 1970).
The next stage of Evers and Lakomski’s (2000) analysis addressed what 
Goldstein and Weber (1997) described as framing effects.  The irony of this 
inclusion is found in the basis of framing effects as related to an intentionality of 
participants.  This concept is, within the epistemological view to which Evers and 
Lakomski attached themselves, by logical necessity, in absentia.  In any event, I use 
framing effects later to help to illustrate my broader point. Ultimately, the point of 
their inclusion permits the gradual growth of the universe in which the games are 
manifest.  Growth beyond one governed by mere probability of outcomes, and into 
one where more independent individual or organisational thinking takes place.  
Evers and Lakomski (2000) acknowledged that original game theory, 
developed by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944/1953) was meant to examine 
cooperative games.  Though I return to cooperative games later and argue that 
cooperative games where education is involved are frequently non-cooperative 
games in disguise, I will now continue, as they did, and examine their example of 
a non-cooperative game. “[N]on-cooperative games model the most frequent social 
situations for decision [sic]”  (Evers & Lakomski, 2000, p. 92).   The example they 
selected was helpful, included a scenario, and focused on a most commonplace 
two-person, non-zero-sum game, the Prisoner’s Dilemma.
The prisoners of this example are a principal and a union leader and the 
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scenario relates to “pseudo-bargaining in a school” around “a deterioration in 
teachers’ work conditions” due to government budgetary practices; the teachers’ 
union has imposed a work-to-rule practice, the principal is concerned with public 
image and consequences for enrollments.  Evers and Lakomski (2000) explained 
the strategies of the principal and the union leader if one or the other compromised 
or resisted.  The specifics were outlined in the table shown in Figure 6.2.  As with all 
similar manifestations of a prisoner’s dilemma in which the universe is so construed, 
Evers and Lakomski explained that the result is a so-called Nash-equilibrium (Davis, 
1970; Eichberger, 1992; Ross, 1996; Samuelson, 1992), where strategic decisions 
typically fall into the resist/resist (–8,–8), or defect/defect, category—despite the 
disadvantage over compromise/compromise (–1,–1), or cooperate/cooperate.
In a brief passage that followed this example, Evers and Lakomski (2000) 
Resist +2, –10 –8, –8
–10, +2Compromise –1, –1
ResistCompromise
Principal
Union Leader
Figure 6.2  Pseudo-Bargaining in a School 
Adapted from Evers and Lakomski (2000, p. 93)
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launch what can only be considered a moderate challenge of Ross (1996), on whose 
work theirs is partially based.  They preferred, alternatively, to move the discussion 
toward the exploitation of game theoretic concepts in distributed cognitive/decision-
making networks.  Others, including Axelrod and Hamilton (1981), Axelrod 
(1984), Axelrod and Dion (1988), Matt Ridley (1998) and Robson (1992), have 
provided a more substantial challenge to the ideas established in Ross (1996), and 
accepted by Evers and Lakomski.  By leaving their discussion of game theory at 
the point they do, Evers and Lakomski (2000) neglected more than thirty years of 
discussion among political scientists (and, as chance would have it, sociobiologists) 
around such games.  It must be underscored that I do not consider this a failing on 
the part of Evers and Lakomski.  They had, as I have, a specific purpose for the 
examples included.  What, for my purpose, is missing from their discussion is (a) an 
examination of recent advances in game theory, and (b) how, contrary to Brown’s 
(1970) conclusion that organisations are similar enough that games requisite of 
simple universes are adequate for generalizations, the universe of any particular 
game in interorganisational contexts is made up of two universes.   What gives 
my thinking in this area some merit rests in the attention it draws to an absence in 
current literature within educational administration.
1.1. a two-Person, non-Zero-sum Game
The second example provided by Evers and Lakomski (2000) was referred 
to as a two-person, non-zero-sum game.  
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Games in which the interest of the players are diametrically opposed are 
called zero-sum games. … After the game is over, the sum of the winnings 
is always zero (a loss is a negative win).  This game is distinguished from 
a non-zero-sum, union-management bargaining game, for example, in that, 
there, both players may lose simultaneously if there is no agreement.  That 
is, one man’s loss may not be another’s gain. (Davis, 1970, p. 9)
It makes no difference whether the game is about the competing interests of two 
groups rather than those of two individuals.  The point is to examine strategy in 
decision-making.
[L]et us regard all two-person games as lying in a continuum, with the zero-
sum games at one extreme.  In a two-person game, there are generally both 
competitive and cooperative elements: the interest of the players are opposed 
in some respects and complementary in others.  In the zero-sum game, the 
players have no common interest.  In the completely cooperative game at 
the other extreme, the players have nothing but common interests. (Davis, 
1970, pp. 65-66)
Davis provided a number of examples of two-person, non-zero-sum games.  Below, 
I have adapted one of his examples.
1.1.a.  A simple partnership game
In this game, we suppose that two organisations, “A” and “B,” have been 
offered an opportunity to collaborate on an initiative.  For this initiative, the 
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government of the area will pay a sum of $1,000,000 to an organisation or partnership. 
Organisations A and B independently understand that their combined labour ideally 
suits the initiative; furthermore, they both realize that without the other partner, 
they would be unable to complete the initiative.  For both A and B, the prospect of 
sharing such a large sum of money is extremely tempting.  Organisations A and B 
write a joint proposal regarding the initiative and their proposal is accepted.  At this 
point, A writes to B that they agree to go ahead with the initiative if and only if they 
receive $700,000 for their work and they will not discuss the matter further, either 
with A or with the funding government.  Organisation B is clear that A will only 
perform 50% of the work required and feels that they are being exploited by A, but 
$300,000 is a great deal of money that would otherwise not be available to B.  In 
this case, Organisation A has no further options, B must solely make the decision. 
Figure 6.3 shows the payoff matrix for this example.
1.1.b.  Preliminary analysis of the simple partnership game
Several key issues emerge from the partnership game articulated in Section 
1.1.a.  First, defect/defect is no longer available.  The only options are cooperate/
cooperate (at a gain for A but a loss for B) or cooperate/defect (where both A and B 
lose).  The situation is forced into this position by a specific strategy embarked upon 
by A: taking advantage of a first-strike and then refusing to communicate.  
Seen in this way, one may take the reasonable view (under the circumstances 
of a maximization universe) of Organisation A, arguing that they saw an opportunity 
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to maximize their “personal” benefits within the situation and jumped on it in a way 
that forced B’s hand—the assumption being that B would not contemplate defecting, 
because the stakes were simply too high, even as distorted as they may be.  Further, 
the assumption of this universe would be that B should have behaved as A, but was 
simply too slow to force A’s hand.  
This assumption demonstrated the common, perhaps even exclusive, view 
in game theoretic analysis until the 1990s.  One can only presume that Evers 
and Lakomski would argue the same strategy.  The reason why this strategy can 
be assumed was expressed in the requirement of a games universe where the 
maximization of benefit predominate—but greater analysis of what this precisely 
means is of some significance considering the arguments made in chapters Four and 
Five and in that Evers and Lakomski (2000) did not choose that option.
Reject Offer 0, 0
Accept Offer 30%, 70%
Organisation B
Organisation A
Figure 6.3 Decision-Making Matrix of Organisations “A” and “B” 
Adapted from Davis (1970, p. 73)
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There are many definitions of terms in game theory literature.  Indeed, this 
was the principle purpose of von Neumann and Morgenstern’s (1944/1953) Theory of 
Games and Economic Behavior.  Of particular interest here was the definition given 
for “rational” behaviour in the universe of games. Von Neumann and Morgenstern 
employed the definition found commonplace within economics.  Principally, their 
definition suggested that no matter the circumstances of the economy or game, the 
participants 
desire to obtain a maximum of utility or satisfaction. … We shall … assume 
that the aim of all participants in the economic system, … is money, or 
equivalently a single monetary commodity.  This is supposed to be 
unrestrictedly divisible and substitutable, freely transferable and identical, 
even in the quantitative sense, with whatever “satisfaction” or “utility” is 
desired by each participant. (p. 8)
I take no particular issue, beyond recognizing its simplicity (Scheerens, 2000), 
with the definition of satisfaction as some representation of money or even with 
the particular ascription of rationality to those who wish to increase what utility 
or satisfaction they have. What concerns me more is the context in which such 
rationality is expressed and considered.  A context in which money is understood 
as the quantifier of satisfaction predominates, rather than a context based on other 
possible tangible (technological/non-cognitive) or intangible (scientific/pedagogic/
cognitive [Scheerens, 2000]; although questions of quantified intangibles are 
problems that I cannot address here) referents.  In this way, money, expenditure, and 
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capital are directly linked to technology.  The dominant host’s perspective draws 
such a conclusion (Marciano, 2005; Patterson, 2005) and, on this view, tangibles 
are unquestionably meant to dominate intangibles (Scheerens, 2000).  
Ironically, while sublimating tangibles, the neoclassical economic model for 
human behaviour, the homo economicus, is based upon the Cartesian sublimation 
of subjectivity qua objectivity.  I recall the Cartesian dualism discussed in Chapter 
Three:
[Descartes’] solution offered a new conception of the human self, one that, 
in the centuries that followed, permeated, defined and structured intellectual 
pursuits including philosophy, social theory and economics, and, through 
these, shaped the thinking of the general populations of Western societies. 
By conceiving himself as disembodied, Descartes not only found the 
metaphysical certainty that he desired, but also initiated the idea of a thinker/
observer who is completely detached, existing independently of time, 
place and other human beings, and therefore, like God, totally objective. 
(Fullbrook, 2004, p. 404)
Fullbrook’s analysis showed that economics, as a socialized science of mathematics, 
had no choice in its neoclassical manifestation than to choose a Cartesian perspective, 
the only alternative at the time being Hegel’s radical idealism—utterly and 
unapologetically intangible.  Sensibly for the time, the study of observable human 
relations needed to rely upon a foundation in objectivity (even one subjectively, with 
the aid of an honest and forthright God that clearly would not deceive, inspired).   In 
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this way, individuals were not to be viewed as separate entities.  This point would 
become particularly important to mathematicians and game theoreticians.   I can 
only deduce that it is for this reason that nowhere have I found games in which 
simultaneities of universes exist.  In economic analysis an utterly problematic 
situation for educational organisations developed, as I will demonstrate.
1.1.c.  Tit for Tat
A study of game theoretic strategy, the guiding principle behind a particular 
manifestation of rational behaviour within a particular game, emerged in 1979. 
Ridley (1998) told the story of a young political scientist who challenged his field 
to participate in a game of game theory.  For several years before, computers had 
been engaged by economists and political scientists to play prisoner’s dilemmas, 
with some rather unexpected results. 
What was interesting about the strategies arrived at in computational players 
(a notion that I employ very loosely), was the frequency with which they cooperated. 
While it is not surprising that rational behaviour might sometimes be achieved through 
cooperation, it seemed statistically improbable that it should be frequently achieved 
this way: “Alarm bells rang throughout mathematics” (p. 60).  To solve the matter, 
Robert Axelrod, the young political scientist in question, devised a tournament in 
which teams could submit programs to play, according to whatever strategy the 
team chose or as complicated a strategy as might be algorithmically invested within 
a computer program, the classic prisoner’s dilemma against each other, and against 
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itself, 200 times.  Scores would be calculated at the tournament’s completion and 
an analysis of the dominant and failing strategies would be disseminated through 
scholarly publication.  For the final analysis, two additional tournaments were 
conducted.  The results of the tournaments were published in an article by Axelrod 
and Hamilton (1981), and in a book by the same name—Evolution of Cooperation 
(Axelrod, 1984/2006).
From the title of Axelrod’s article (1981) and book (1984/2006), one might 
assume an elemental understanding of the tournaments’ results.  The first tournament 
included program submissions by 14 participant teams of economists, sociologists, 
political scientists, and mathematicians.  The highest score went to  the most simple 
program, written by a University of Toronto mathematical psychologist interested 
in nuclear confrontation working at the Vienna Institute for Advanced Study, Anatol 
Rapoport, called Tit for Tat.  The guiding strategy embedded within Tit for Tat 
was one, as the name suggests, of reciprocity: its “strategy [was] simply one of 
cooperating on the first move and then doing whatever the other player did on the 
preceding move” (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981, p. 1393).  This very rudimentary 
and strictly held strategy was able, in the long-run, to overcome more complicated 
(parallel) computational strategies, even “one which [sic] on each move model[ed] 
the behavior of the other player as a Markov process, and then use[d] Bayesian 
inferences to select what seem[ed] the best choice for the long run” (p. 1393).  
A second tournament was fashioned, similar to the first, but where 62 
participant teams submitted challengers.  Tit for Tat was again submitted by 
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Rapoport and again won.  After analyzing the three million interactions among 
the participating team programs, Axelrod and Hamilton reported that Tit for Tat’s 
success was due to three observable factors: “it was never the first to defect, it was 
provocable [sic] into retaliation by a defection by the other, and it was forgiving 
after just one act of retaliation” (p. 1393).  
Axelrod conducted a third tournament setting each program against one 
another in a “sort of survival-of-the-fittest war” (Matt Ridley, 1998, p. 61).  The 
progress of the tournament came in phases.  In the first, the most brute strategies 
overtook the more naïve (Ridley’s word, not mine) with little difficulty; in phase 
two, only brutes and Tit for Tat remained.  As phase two progressed, the numbers of 
brutes began to rapidly dwindle.  Tit for Tat remained the sole competitor in phase 
three and won.
Though differently purposed, Axelrod and Hamilton (1981) and Ridley (1998) 
explored the conclusions that might be drawn from Axelrod’s tournaments for real 
organisms.  Axelrod and Hamilton’s article was published in the journal Science, an 
ironically odd place for a political scientist to publish, but Hamilton was a biologist 
and familiar with the work of his predecessors and contemporaries—including 
Fisher, Williams, Maynard Smith (whose work in the early 1970s that hypothesized 
the conclusions Axelrod’s tournaments provided had been largely ignored beyond 
genetics) and Dawkins—on what was becoming known as the gene’s eye-view, or 
gene’s perspective as the dominant view in evolutionary biology.  The audience was 
principally natural scientists.  Ridley’s book was written for a popular audience, and 
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focused upon establishing the legitimacy among social science readers the new field 
of sociobiology.  In both cases, the point one may derive is largely the same, the 
antiquated view maintained by orthodox and social-Darwinists was served with a 
refutation, and from within the context of game theory, nonetheless.  
Axelrod and Hamilton (1981) highlighted the implications of their work 
in terms of evolutionary biology and the important role played by cooperation 
and altruistic behaviours among members of a particular species, or even among 
species—because they examined such behaviours in ecological terms, particularly 
implications for symbioses: mutualism, commensalism, parasitism, and amensalism. 
Ridley’s (1998) work focused on social implications for humans.  Of great 
importance here was the attention he paid to examples where human strategies were 
based on mistaken assumptions, imperfect information, and faulty communication. 
The various balances of power and alliance systems engineered in the build-up to 
the First World War provided an apt example: initial defections (from the macro-
perspective) caused a spiral of similar defections, ending in 46 million dead or 
injured (Harrington, 2002). 
1.1.d.  Strategy and manner
I now consider the matter of manner; an issue at the heart of judgments made 
by game players.  Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944/1953) argued that players 
will consider certain strategies.  These strategies are representations of the image 
that a particular player has of his opponent.  Pinker (1997) articulated, “you had 
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better think about what he is thinking about what you are thinking he is thinking” 
(p. 193).  But strategies are more than the adjusting of a behaviour based upon an 
image of an expected, as in von Neumann and Morgenstern’s words, “standard of 
behavior” (p. 40ff).  As von Neumann and Morgenstern conceded, “standards of 
behavior” exist, since each player will choose his own strategy, subject to “rational” 
behaviour.  The point is that games may be rationally played in a variety of ways, 
depending upon the nature of the game and the nature of the opponent’s behaviour. 
Hence, standards of behaviour rather than a standard of rational behaviour.  In any 
event, I wish to distinguish a strategy from a manner. 
Strategy is rational, but developmental, behaviour extended a priori a 
player’s behaviour (not a priori the individual, however)  and succeeding possible 
cooperative or retaliatory opponent’s actions.  Manner, I believe, is more basic than 
strategy.  It provides the justifications for judgments upon which judgments are 
made.  In essence, manner is ontology employed in strategy. That manner is manifest 
in rational behaviour is more likely than its manifestation in irrational behaviour, 
even by standards of homo economicus design.  What remains missing in homo 
economicus is the rationale under-pinning behaviours of maximization.  That I want 
to maximize satisfaction or utility is clear.  Why I want to maximize satisfaction or 
utility, and how I will maximize, however, is not clear; but it is assumed to be the 
dominant manner in which such maximizations are manifest.  Dominant manners, 
are linked, I believe, to dominant representations (Fullbrook, 2004).
I have found notions that I believe are akin to manner.  Larson (1987) provided 
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a glimpse of philosophical manner in his examination of Hindu philosophical 
systems, claiming that “hard,” “tight” and “soft” varieties of manners exist.  For 
example, like Kant (1790/1952) in The Critique of Judgment, Larson described 
heuristic reasoning as a soft manner where “a set of regulative ideas that are 
pragmatically and empirically employed for the purposes of getting a useful heuristic 
grasp on the complexities of the natural world” (p. 251).  A second example came 
from Krause and Béziau’s (1997) discussion of principles of identity in logic. They 
quote Leibniz’s dictum that eadem sunt quorum unum potest substitui alteri salva 
veritate [those things are identical of which one can be substituted for the other 
without loss].  “‘[A]greement with respect to attributes’ or … all that can be said 
of one thing can also be said of an ‘identical’ one” (p. 2) showing that substitution 
of rationality may be possible.  But manner in this sense relates to certain veiled 
attributes of philosophical positioning that provide their unique description of self, 
despite deeper (unveiled) substitution likeliness.  I am here eluding to the notion 
explored in Chapter Three related to the ways in which one might epistemically 
encounter the world: schematized or transcendental.  Manners may be schematized 
(veiled by custom, habit, or association).  Alternatively, it may be transcendentally 
substitutable, if combinations of volition and means are intrinsically (or with less 
weight, extrinsically) inspired to do so.  Manner governs the meaning of strategy 
in game theory, and specifically a transcendentally substitutable one, but are we so 
diligent?
Chicken or egg questions immediately arise for the organisational theorist: 
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Do individuals of particular philosophical manners enter into certain organisations or 
do certain organisations favour individuals of particular maximizing manners?  The 
answer is both. One enters organisations for many different reasons; occasionally 
manner will be manifest in a strategy for entering such relations.  We remain in 
organisations when our manners prove to provide increased satisfaction and utility, 
and it is in this way that organisations favour certain manners.
2.  Exploratory Analysis of Games Discussed
My broader point for the entire discussion of game theory in terms of 
interorganisational relations has been to consider some peculiarities of such analysis 
that emerge as questions rooted in the discussion presented in the previous two 
chapters.  If contemporary ideological positions spanning the modern spectrum are 
based upon fallacies, how do some positions come to dominate while other positions 
do not?  Has this dominance something to do with the ways in which humanity has 
permitted a false understanding of its predispositions to come to dominate its systems 
of enlightenment? How do these dominances manifest themselves in contemporary 
and historic interorganisational relationships?  How do these dominances exploit the 
game theoretic means commonly used in their self-analysis?  In this section, I will 
not fully answer these important and large questions.  Rather, I raise an emerging 
critique launched at the complacency with which fallacy has been accepted as 
rational.  I return to the implications of the games discussed above.  I do so in 
reverse order in which they were presented, applying the above premises as minor 
193
critiques and purposeful imbalances.  
I endeavour to maintain balance between their storylines and each premise—
(a) that game theory cannot presuppose a singular universe of behaviour, (b) that the 
behaviour of players is not advanced by maximization of value via social Darwinist 
means, and (c) that substrata of manners guide strategy in ways that demonstrate 
different ways in which even universal rationality may be exhibited.  I suggest 
that a constructive discussion can develop through a reexamination of their general 
properties by a variety of observers and juxtaposed against the three premises 
outlined above.
In consideration of the game between organisations A and B, where A wrote 
to B, forcing the hand of B to accept an unfair reward for their potential work, the 
situation might be thought of differently.  One can alternatively suppose that the 
remuneration was meaningless, viewed as relatively microscopic in comparison to 
the organisation’s income from public donations.  This view would, likely, adjust 
one’s evaluation of the situation.  Organisation B, in this case, could (if rational) 
easily defect.  It seems then that the value of remuneration is, in this light, of some 
great significance, because it may be used for or against an opponent as a rational 
strategy.  Furthermore, from an external observer’s viewpoint, this situation does 
not seem so unfair.  To this end it could be argued that the situation provides an 
example of mistaken assumptions that can be claimed against A, especially if B 
were to defect.  Indeed, as the Pinker (1997) quote articulated, knowing one’s 
opponent’s understanding of the relative value of remuneration can make or break 
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the performance of one’s own strategy.  This analysis is not, however, provocative.
Alternatively, consider the following illustrative scenario.  Perhaps five 
years ago, in 2002, one were to suppose again (but it would in fact be the first 
time) that, as above, Organisation B saw the value of remuneration as microscopic. 
This time, however, let us assume that A’s strategy is not perceived as a mistake, 
neither by A nor by you nor by myself as observer.  Now suppose that twenty years 
from now, in 2027, perhaps after catching some drift of the game theory examples 
outlined herein, some individual would like to return to the moment in 2002 at 
which this peculiarly understood “rational” strategy was appropriately applied in 
this game.   This future individual, whom I will call Ms. 2027, as a meta-observer 
of the 2002-Organisation A, 2002-Dave and 2002-[insert your name here], would 
clearly question our faculties.  For, to Ms. 2027, such an understood game between 
A and B would appear odd, and our 2002 perceptions of it would likely seem 
distorted.  “How could we possibly believe that B’s strategy was not irrational?” 
Ms. 2027 would surely ask.  
Impatiently watching as the game progresses, Ms. 2027 eagerly awaits 
B’s rational defection to right the situation—and more impatiently waiting for 
the debriefing discussion between 2002-B, 2002-Dave and 2002-you.  But these 
discussions will never be, for in the end Ms. 2027 is confounded by B’s response, to 
accept the situation as if forced by A to do so.   What does Ms. 2027 recognize that 
the rest do not and why do the rest not recognize it?
I now turn to the second example presented in Evers and Lakomski (2000), 
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where a principal and teachers’ union leader were engaged in a “discussion” around 
the deterioration of working conditions.  Recall that in this game it was postulated 
that a defect/defect result was likely.  If analysed through the dominant rational 
universe model, both sides will behave in a way that increases their satisfaction.  I 
provide a slight amendment to the original scenario, adding what may more clearly 
define the notion of working conditions, which seems to be the operative issue.  
I assume that the context for this game is enveloped by the notion of 
school effectiveness.  A detailed discussion of school effectiveness rests beyond 
this dissertation.  Nevertheless, let us look to an international perspective on this 
subject—since generality remains an optimistic goal—and Scheerens’ (2000) work 
is revealing and helpful.  He argued that in the area of school effectiveness the 
meaning attributed by various parties to effectiveness, coupled with specific and 
underlying conceptions of organisational theory (economic rationality, organic, 
human relations, bureaucratic and political views), frequently results in conflicted 
positions.  
In accordance with each organisational theory, a particular criterion 
of effectiveness is dominant (both in a particular theoretical assumption of its 
dominance and as an expectation that others share this view).  For the economic 
view, the criterion is productivity; for the organic, it is adaptability; human relations, 
involvement; bureaucratic, continuity; and political, responsiveness to external 
stakeholders.  Furthermore,
[w]ith regard to the economic rational and organic system models, the 
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management of the organisation is the main ‘actor’ posing the effectiveness 
question.  As far as the other models are concerned, department heads 
and individual workers are the actors that seek to achieve certain effects. 
(Scheerens, 2000, p. 26) 
I further assume that in the specification of working conditions, in terms of school 
effectiveness, both sides in Evers and Lakomski’s example remain true to the 
economic rational model of both organisational theoretic criteria and game theoretic 
universes.  Interestingly, with the addition of even a simple context (one where the 
same universe applies to both players of the game), the manners rooting the strategies 
employed do not align.  Consider the economic rational position maintained by a 
principal in such a situation, based upon productivity: the organisation must maintain 
or increase productivity, with the result of maintained or increased enrollments. 
Now, consider the economic rational position maintained by a union leader in 
such a situation, based, again, on productivity as criterion: the organisation must 
increase productivity, with the result of reducing enrollments.  For the principal 
in this contrived situation, productivity is seen in increased numbers of student 
enrollments regardless of the mean quality of education provided.  For the union 
leader, productivity is seen in increased mean quality of education regardless of the 
student enrollment numbers.
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2.1.  Weather Games and a universes theory
These peculiar stories of future observers and past participants, and publicly 
influenced principals and student influenced union leaders demonstrate the power 
of a dominant manner.  These examples show behaviours that are potentially 
understood as irrational being played as rational.  They explore contested notions 
of rationality even within singular universes, and provide the foundation for the 
simplest pronouncement of my critique.  I return to Evers and Lakomski’s (2000) 
first example: the individual versus weather.
I recall that the first game examined by Evers and Lakomski (2000) provided 
what von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944/1953) described as a one person, zero-
sum game.  In that game, an individual lived within a universe where one of two 
weather outcomes was equally likely (a 50% chance of rain, and a 50% chance 
of no rain).  A decision had to be made as to whether or not the individual should 
bring an umbrella to work.  I recall also that within my initial discussion of this 
game, I pointed to the notion of framing effect as valuable, but did little to develop 
the application to the game in any substantive way—limiting my description to the 
implication that it was rooted in intentionality.
Frames, in organisational theory, psychology, and sociology refer to the 
ways in which individuals conceptualize, or are taught to conceptualize (Gordon, 
1998; Roberts, 1998; Schein, 1993), through organisational or social structures 
(Giddens, 1979).  By organisational or social structures I mean to say the  semantic 
referents of syntax.  But what has this matter to do with weather?  Is rain not the 
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same everywhere and to everyone?  One might suppose that the trite, but utterly 
false (Pullum, 1991), aphorism about Inuit words for snow will next emerge from 
my argument.  Rather, I frame the issue in an educated context.
In the paragraph that followed their description of the school-based scenario, 
Evers and Lakomski (2000) articulated their belief that a frame comes into play for 
determining the numerical valuing of each alternative outcome.  
Being known as ‘the most academically successful school in the state’ and 
being known as ‘school number 1131’ will lead parents to make strikingly 
different estimates about their children’s potential school success, even 
though the expressions refer to the same school. Once estimates of described 
states of affairs are seen to depend, not on referential properties of those 
descriptions but on intensional, or meaning-related properties, a person’s 
global theory comes into play, as meaning is partly dependent on the 
conceptual role of an expression. (p. 91)
On my own view, this is correct and stands to reason.  The question that remains, 
however, relates to the degree to which (if at all) one permits these values to be 
disputable.  Should weight not be given to those who “understand” the situation 
more clearly on account of greater study of the subject that is in question?  
To better illustrate my point, I will modify the weather example Evers and 
Lakomski presented.  While their example was intended to display one person, 
zero-sum games, I assume this time that two individuals—a dog trainer and a 
meteorologist—attempt to work together to decide on the value of bringing an 
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umbrella.  Each individual plays his or her own game, and plays it rationally. 
Knowing little more about weather than having been an occasional observer of the 
Weather Network and the weather segment on the nightly news, the dog trainer 
arrived at the values for each potential scenario as represented in part A of Figure 
6.4.  Alternatively, the meteorologist provided what I argue are the educated odds 
represented in part B of Figure 6.4.  In Figure 6.5 I summarize the calculations 
resulting from the odds ascribed by each of the two participants.
Though this rewritten example is simple, if a dominant representation of a 
dominant universe holds a particular place in its heart for the cause of dog trainers 
over meteorologists, it is probable that the dog trainer’s calculation will be followed, 
perhaps even regarded as more accurate or educated.   In my adjusted example, 
I further assume that dog trainers and meteorologists agree upon the categorical 
nature of the scenario.  My assumption is that the principle binaries are rain or no 
rain, and bring an umbrella or do not bring an umbrella.  Should my assumptions 
be false, however, the dog trainer might devise the scenario odds shown in Figure 
6.6.  
Calculating the odds ascribed in Figure 6.6, the resulting decision would 
be that (under the presented circumstances) one ought to combine getting a haircut 
while eating lunch.  This conclusion is clearly a ridiculous prospect for anyone even 
slightly educated in the area of meteorology.
Admittedly, these recastings are provocative.  Yet the scenario that I believe 
they illustrate, in connection with the critiques and theme of this chapter and those 
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it follows, is denoted in the following theory of representations of truth in various 
universes of interpersonal (and interorganisational) relationships.  The theory is 
simple in principle, but convoluted in description: 
Leave Umbrella –8, 0.5 +2, 0.5
–2, 0.5Bring Umbrella +6, 0.5
No RainRainMeteorologist
Leave Umbrella –4, 0.5 +16, 0.5
+2, 0.5Bring Umbrella +1, 0.5
No RainRainDog Trainer
A
B
Figure 6.4 Decision-Making Matrices of a Dog Trainer and a 
Meteorologist  
(Part B was adapted from Evers and Lakomski (2000, p. 90)
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1.  In a fallacious and dominant universe, objectively understood 
fallacious behaviour or strategy is viewed as true by individuals/
organisations whose frames are constructed in schematized manners 
that conform to the fallacious nature of the universe, or,
Therefore, one ought to leave the umbrella at home.
Leave Value: (0.5 x [–4]) + (0.5 x 16) = 6
Bring Value: (0.5 x 1) + (0.5 x 2) = 1.5
Dog Trainer
Therefore, one ought to bring the umbrella with.
Leave Value: (0.5 x [–8]) + (0.5 x 2) = –3
Bring Value: (0.5 x 6) + (0.5 x [–2]) = 2
Meteorologist
Figure 6.5 Calculation Summary for Decisions of a Dog Trainer and 
a Meteorologist
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Ff  = i(F)t
 2.  in a fallacious and dominant universe, objectively understood true 
behaviour or strategy is viewed as false by individuals/organisations 
whose frames are constructed in schematized manners that conform 
to the fallacious nature of the universe, or, 
Ft  = i(F)f
3.  in a true and dominant universe, objectively understood fallacious 
behaviour or strategy is viewed as false by individuals/organisations 
whose frames are constructed in schematized (but likely transcendental) 
manners that conform to the true nature of the universe, or, 
Tf  = i(T)f
4.  in a true and dominant universe, objectively understood true behaviour 
Get Hair Cut –4, 0.5 +16, 0.5
+2, 0.5Bring Umbrella +1, 0.5
Eat LunchRain
Figure 6.6 Decision-Making Matrix for a Dog Trainer
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or strategy is viewed as true by individuals/organisations whose 
frames are constructed in schematized (but likely transcendental) 
manners that conform to the true nature of the universe, or, 
Tt  = i(T)t
I will hereafter refer to these four constituents by the symbolic representations 
denoted, where F is a false universe; T is a true universe; f is an objectively false 
behaviour; t is an objectively true behaviour; i(F) is an individual/organisation 
whose representation is of the false universe kind; i(T) is an individual/organisation 
whose representation is of a true universe kind; f is a judgment by the individual/
organisation i of fallacy; t is a judgment by the individual/organisation i of truth.
3.  Employing the Universes Theory in  
Interorganisational Relationships
Organisations A and B will engage in a relationship.  Organisation A is of the 
i(F) kind, and B is of the i(T) kind; the universe of their relationship is dominantly F.  The 
relationship revolves around determining the best interests of a third group, those 
who will, according to B, bring an umbrella or not bring an umbrella; but according 
to A, the best interests of the third group revolve around bring an umbrella or get 
a hair cut.  I contend that in the universe as it was assumed, of a dominant F kind, 
the dominant view of the behaviour of A will be as true (i(F)t) despite the objective 
fact that the behaviour is fallacious (f ; since Ff  = i(F)t).  Similarly, the dominant view 
of the behaviour of B will be as fallacious (i(F)f) despite the objective fact that the 
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behaviour is true (t ; since Ft  = i(F)f).  
This scenario is not a theoretical assumption of relationships among 
organisations.  It is a real manifestation of contemporary relationships among 
organisations.  Owing to the dominance of the social Darwinist fallacy in the 
relational universe, the behaviours of organisations whose manner is not committed 
to schematized representations of human nature, are judged as fallacious.  I do not 
view educational organisations’ representations as strictly transcendentally defined, 
however.   Rather, I define educational organisations’ representations as internally 
oscillatory.  They are engaged in internal dialectical relations among theoretical 
foundations on one side, and externally engaging administrative practice.  I 
explore the implications of this internal oscillation for educational leadership and 
interorganisational relationships involving educational organisations and non-
educational organisations in Chapter Seven.
c.  summary
In this chapter, I explored key elements of game theory as it pertains to 
the contemporary context of interorganisational relationships.  The primary point 
constructed within the discussion of game theory, in terms of these relations, was 
meant to initiate a process for re-conceptualizing peculiarities of game analysis in the 
light of the arguments presented in Chapters Four and Five.  Through the exploration 
of examples juxtaposed against those presented in Evers and Lakomski’s (2000) 
work in the area of decision-making in educational administration, I derived the 
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initial elements of a basic theory of the universes of interorganisational relationships. 
I develop this theory in the chapters that follow.
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chaPter seven
the IrratIonaL qUA ratIonaL
I here extend the universes theory presented in Chapter Six within the context 
of interorganisational relationships forged among educational and non-educational 
organisations.  In the chapters that follow, I assess these relations through an adapted 
model of sedimentation, taken from Giddens (1979), and discuss implications 
for leadership, in their initial form, from the work of Mouffe (1999; 2005) and 
Habermas (1979).
a.  Irrationality
Shapiro (2002) argued that irrationality is a confounding problem in the 
social sciences: “[i]rrational people create problems not only for themselves and 
those around them, but also for those who study them” (p. 157).  The title of 
Shapiro’s work, Ulysses Rebound, refers to two separate issues.  First, the title is 
a direct reference to Elster’s (2000) book Ulysses Unbound, a critical examination 
of constraints in relationships, where Elster claimed, with respect to freedom and 
knowledge within relationship, negotiation, and agreement, that less is more. 
Second, both titles refer to the Homeric passage in the Odyssey recounting Ulysses 
207
and his men passing the shores of the western most land of the ancient Greek known-
world, the Land of the Sirens.
To the Sirens first shalt thou come, who bewitch all men, whosoever shall 
come to them. Whoso draws nigh them unwittingly and hears the sound of 
the Sirens’ voice, never doth he see wife or babes stand by him on his return, 
nor have they joy at his coming; but the Sirens enchant him with their clear 
song, sitting in the meadow, and all about is a great heap of bones of men, 
corrupt in death, and round the bones the skin is wasting. But do thou drive 
thy ship past, and knead honey-sweet wax, and anoint therewith the ears of 
thy company, lest any of the rest hear the song; but if thou myself art minded 
to hear, let them bind thee in the swift ship hand and foot, upright in the 
mast-stead, and from the mast let rope-ends be tied, that with delight thou 
mayest hear the voice of the Sirens. And if thou shalt beseech thy company 
and bid them to loose thee, then let bind thee with yet more bonds. (Homer, 
c. 850 BCE/1909, Book XII, § 6)
Ulysses, being tied to the mast of his ship, and his men’s ears being filled with wax, 
thus constrained his own freedom and the knowledge of his men in, for Elster’s 
purposes, a symbolic attempt to advantage himself over the Sirens he encounters. 
The story represents an example of what Elster described as an essential constraint, 
one of two types of relationship constraints (the other being incidental).  For Elster, 
an essential constraint is one where the individual binds him- or herself for the 
purpose of some expected benefit.  Alternatively, an incidental constraint is one 
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where bindings are serendipitous, but likewise beneficial.
There is a link between Elster’s (2000) notion of an incidental (serendipitous) 
constraint and the broader topic of this dissertation.  It relates to questions of 
rationality and irrationality, yet yields insight beyond that provided in Shapiro’s 
(2002) admonition to researchers.  I briefly return to game theory and the second game 
highlighted in Chapter Six, and to the discussion of Ms. 2027’s observations.
1.  Reflections on Organisations “A” and “B”, Circa 2002
Regarding the situation presented in the discussion of Ms. 2027, she 
has returned to 2002 to observe a particular game theoretic relationship among 
Organisations “A” and “B”.  A, it can now be revealed in light of Elster’s (2000) 
varieties of constraints, constrains their freedom and information by forwarding 
the letter indicating their strategy, and then closing all channels of possible 
communication until B’s decision is made.  Up to this point in the analysis, we do 
not yet know why this was done, essentially or incidentally.  Adding, however, Ms. 
2027’s observation that both 2002-Dave and 2002-you are neither surprised by A’s 
actions, nor by B’s response—to concede to the terms and cooperate—provides 
some clarity on this question.  We know that A’s action was incidental, but not 
on account of anything specific to A’s behaviour.   Rather, it is in the behaviour 
of 2002-Dave and 2002-you that the constraints are so denoted.   Proof is found 
in the ability of my simple universes theory to explain, and predict, the situation 
precisely.  For both 2002-Dave and 2002-you observe the behaviour of A to be t. 
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Furthermore, I will, for reasons that have been alluded to in the previous chapters, 
but which will be made more explicit in the paragraphs to follow, initially assume 
that the universe of the situation as observed by Ms. 2027 is F.  Recall that the 
only possible situation of an F universe where individuals i(F) view the result of the 
behaviour as true requires an objectively false behaviour f,  because
Ff  = i(F)t
If either 2002-Dave or 2002-you had reacted differently, the situation would render 
the postulate
Ft  = i(F)f
—where an objectively true behaviour t is required (but is illogical since B’s 
reaction was to cooperate, where an objectively true behaviour would require a 
non-host-mannered strategy, in which case the universe could not be of type F). 
There does exist, however, one other potential manifestation of this scenario.  One 
could consider this time that the universe is of type T.  From this perspective, the 
behaviour of A must be understood as f  (because it demonstrates a host-mannered 
strategy).  Thus the fourth postulate is not logically possible, and the only remaining 
explanation arrives through 
Tf  = i(T)f
—where an objectively false behaviour is understood as false.  Peculiar is the result 
that emerges from this situation, and it suggests a corollary for each of the various 
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postulates of the universes theory.  These corollaries include
1.  In a fallacious and dominant universe, objectively understood 
fallacious behaviour or strategy is viewed as false by individuals/
organisations whose frames are constructed from within a true 
universe, or,
Ff  = i(T)f
 2.  In a fallacious and dominant universe, objectively understood true 
behaviour or strategy is viewed as true by individuals/organisations 
whose frames are constructed from within a true universe, or, 
Ft  = i(T)t
3.  In a true and dominant universe, objectively understood fallacious 
behaviour or strategy is viewed as true by individuals/organisations 
whose frames are constructed from within a false universe, or, 
Tf  = i(F)t
4.  In a true and dominant universe, objectively understood true 
behaviour or strategy is viewed as false by individuals/organisations 
whose frames are constructed from within a false universe, or, 
Tt  = i(F)f
To this end, the situation in question is best described in accordance with 
the corollary 
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Ff  = i(T)f
In Figure 7.1, I have collapsed the original postulates and their corollaries into one 
list.  
Two quandaries emerge: (a) Why would an individual whose frame is of a 
true universe kind (i(T)), viewing the result of a behaviour as false (f), cooperate  and 
thus (as commonsense might suggest) perpetuate the dominance of a false universe 
(F)? and (b) If the scenario described is accounted for in the postulate noted above as 
1, why would 2002-Dave and 2002-you not react differently?  These are important 
questions, and I return to them in Subsection 2. and Section B., below.
T
t  = 
i(F)
f
T
t  = 
i(T)
t
T
f  = 
i(F)
t
T
f  = 
i(T)
f
F
t  = 
i(T)
t
F
t  = 
i(F)
f
F
f  = 
i(F)
t
F
f  = 
i(T)
f
CorollaryPostulate
Figure 7.1  Postulates and Corollaries of the Universes Theory
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2.  Paradoxes of Rationality and Paradoxes of Cooperation
In 1956, Thomas Schelling (the Nobel Prize winning American economist) 
began an exploration of the nature of tactics employed within bargaining situations. 
Perhaps hinting that the reliance of game theoretic exemplars on rationality and a 
singularity of universe was problematic, Schelling initiated an important discussion 
of psychological constraints employed by bargainers.   His analysis of the nature of 
bargaining was limited to those he called distributional aspects of bargaining where 
“more for one means less for the other” (p. 281) rather than situations where both 
may gain equally, or where more for one means more for the other.  In distributional 
scenarios, two parties will enter a relationship that emerges based upon a “range of 
alternative outcomes in which any point is better for both sides than no agreement 
at all” (p. 281).  
In Figure 7.2, I illustrate the notion of a distributional scenario presented 
in Chapter Six.  In this figure, one will observe two positions from which the 
relationship is drawn.  On the left side rests the position held by Organisation A, 
on the right side rests that of B.  Where the two positions meet, I have included a 
distributional zone to indicate the range of alternative outcomes (or, in this case, 
negotiated remunerative sums).  Schelling (1956) argued that within distributional 
bargaining, it is beneficial for a player to constrain their freedom, akin to Elster’s 
(2000) description of essential (that is, non-serendipitous) constraints.  I include 
in Figure 7.2 a dotted line representing the essential constraint self-imposed by 
A.  The constraint requires that A receive $700,000 for their work, and maintains 
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the seclusion of A from further communication.  On Schelling’s view, A’s action 
is clearly representative of an “important class” of tactical manœuvres in logically 
indeterminate games where an individual will gain certain advantages by binding 
their own freedom within, and knowledge of, the game in which they are engaged. 
These tactics are paradoxical.  The importance of Schelling’s work is his exploration 
of the tactical manœuvres within this paradoxical class of manœuvres.  Missing, 
however, was Elster’s argument that these manœuvres may be either essentially or 
incidentally enacted.  Yet, Schelling did highlight examples of both, perhaps without 
recognizing the intentionality of those who employ them as particularly significant. 
For my purposes, the framing effect and the intentionality are most important. I 
explore some of Schelling’s tactical manœuvres and exemplars of paradoxes before 
A B
A’s contrived 
minimum
bid of $700,000
distributional 
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Figure 7.2  The Distributional Scenario of Organisations “A” and “B”
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returning to intentionality and framing in Section B.
The first exemplar of tactical manœuvres that Schelling (1956) explored 
illustrates Elster’s (2000) delineation of constraints.  If one imagines that you are 
awoken in the early morning by a frenetic rapping at your back door, you rise to 
answer the commotion and are confronted by an individual who claims he has cut 
your telephone line and will stab himself in the lung right then and there if not 
given $10 or if you call out for help.  The bargain in this case refers to the outcome 
of the relationship into which you have been forced.  Your opponent in the bargain 
has constrained his actions to specific self-imposed determinism over which your 
only control is manifest in your conceding to his point and paying him the sum. 
You might, be inclined to pay the individual to end the situation outright and the 
constraint has therefore increased the power your opponent maintained within the 
distributional zone.  
This case demonstrates Elster’s essentially enacted constraint, because it is 
reasonable to assume that the individual’s behaviour is in accordance with some 
planned strategy. But power is relative, and imagine the exact same scenario, except 
that this time the eyes of the individual you meet at your door are severely bloodshot 
and the veins of his forearms display the tracks of the heroine addict.  This minor 
addition will, on Schelling’s account, increase the power your opponent wields 
within this situation, for his behaviour is not essentially enacted, but is as a result 
of perhaps contemporaneously uncontrolled ætiology.  It is incidentally enacted, 
because the addict is likely of less-than-sound mind.  Ultimately, his rationality 
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is in question and the universe in which he contemplates his strategies (if such 
intoxicant-induced pathological behaviour can be considered a strategy and not 
merely a distorted reaction to stimuli) is, at the very least, different from your own, 
and unalterable through appeals to rationality. 
Next, Schelling (1956) described a scenario in which one imagines that you 
are looking to buy a house.  The price set by the seller was US$20,000 (1956 dollars, 
variously estimated between US$116,000 and US$570,000 in 2005 dollars69).  You, 
however, publicly make a bet with a colleague for the sum of $5,000 that you will 
not pay one cent more than $16,000.  In this case, the seller is constrained by your 
self-imposed constraint; for you will not agree to pay even $16,000.01 because 
doing so will ultimately cost you $21,000.01.  
The voluntary but irreversible and publicly disclosed sacrifice of your freedom 
of choice makes it against your interests to concede.  Thus, if you consciously 
decide to tie your own hands, you improve the power of your position within the 
bargain (Pinker, 1997), just as Organisation A did.  Alternatively, buyers will tie the 
hands of their agents.  Agents are given power to engage sellers in contracts of sale, 
but not for prices above a certain ceiling.  Perhaps this point is best summarized in 
Schelling’s (1968) reminder that “in ancient times, eunuchs often got the best jobs 
because they could credibly deny themselves certain intentions” (p. 36).  
Credibility is the determining factor in such scenarios.  One’s position is 
only credible if one is able to clearly demonstrate that his or her position will not 
or, even better, cannot be otherwise.  One’s strongest position is paradoxically 
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found when one has constrained one’s self (essentially) or has been, even better, 
by virtue of some pathological unknown, constrained (incidentally) beyond any 
hope of regaining one’s freedom.  An example of this paradoxically ideal situation 
is, as Pinker (1997) highlighted, the “doomsday machine” embedded within the 
1964 refashioning of George’s (1958) novel, Red Alert—Stanley Kubrick’s film Dr. 
Strangelove, or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb.
The plot of Kubrick’s (1964) film is well known.  Of key importance is one 
particular scene midway through in which the dialogue explains both the doomsday 
machine and the constraint maintained by its use.  The doomsday machine, it is 
explained by Soviet Ambassador Desadeski in the film, “is designed to trigger itself 
automatically.”  Science Advisor to the US President, Dr. Strangelove, continued 
to explain: 
Deterrence is the art of producing in the mind of the enemy ... the fear 
to attack.  And so, because of the automated and irrevocable decision 
making process which rules out human meddling, the doomsday machine 
is terrifying.  It’s simple to understand.  And completely credible, and 
convincing. (0:47:30—0:55:55)
The cold war interstate relations portrayed within the film as paradoxical 
deterrents—mutual assured destruction—represent a manifestation of a doomsday 
machine theory.  Yet when such a paradox is subject to irrationality its power is not 
only immense, it is eminently volatile.  Harris (2004) engaged this point when he 
wrote, “[i]f history reveals any categorical truth, it is that an insufficient taste for 
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evidence regularly brings out the worst in us.  Add weapons of mass destruction to 
this diabolical clockwork, and you have found a recipe for the fall of civilization” 
(p. 26).  These are precisely the circumstances that launch the characters of Dr. 
Strangelove into their volatile and ultimately devastating scenario. 
The analogue of the situation in psychology is demonstrated in Pinker’s 
(1997) conclusion that in situations where relations are partly cooperative and 
partly competitive rationality is not an advantage.  The point to be taken is not that 
interorganisational relationships suffer the same degree of volatility as interstate 
relationships, rather human psychology suffers the same volatility—be it manifest 
in the leadership of a state, or in the governance of an organisation.  Furthermore, 
if rationality is lacking due to some incidental constraint, it is unknown that the 
irrational is present and the actor will claim rationality in their decisions.  Thus, 
in a fallacious and dominant universe, irrational (false) behaviour is viewed by 
individuals/organizations whose frames are constructed within a false universe as 
rational (true)—and this position is a very strong one, indeed, when faced by an 
individual/organization whose frames are constructed within true universes and 
who views the irrational behaviour as irrational (false).  I mean, therefore, to say 
that contemporary interorganisational relationships (within the contemporarily 
fallacious and dominant universe) among individuals/organizations whose frames 
are constructed within a false universe (i(F)) and individuals/organizations whose 
frames are constructed within a true universe (i(T)) parties will be, at best, unbalanced 
in favour of the positions maintained by i(F), and at worst, destructively so. This is a 
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claim I continue to explore in sections that follow.
3.  Freedom, Information, and Rationality in a Host’s Universe
I return now to the first of the two questions posed at the conclusion of Section 
1:  Why would an individual whose frame is of a true universe kind (i(T)), viewing 
the result of a behaviour as false (f), cooperate and thus (as commonsense might 
suggest) perpetuate the dominance of a false universe (F)?  If restated in terms of the 
discussion found above in Section 2., the query might appear as follows: Why would 
a rational individual, viewing a partner’s behaviour as patently false, cooperate with 
this partner despite the result of the partnership perpetuating the dominance of a 
climate in which false behaviours abound?  The answer, put simply, is that rational 
individuals have little power in this situation to do otherwise.  Advantage in games 
where the relations are partly cooperative and partly competitive is found in the 
limiting of one’s own freedom, information, and rationality.  This limited position 
is more powerful when constrained incidentally (serendipitously, or in accordance 
with some unknown ætiological agent), and the position is most powerful when 
appeals to an unknown agent are presumed by the partner to be justified under the 
terms of the their own representations.  Such is the case of the relationship among 
the modernist and post-modernist.  
I have shown in earlier chapters how the modernist’s position is based 
upon the representation provided by the host’s perspective, and that the universe 
of the host is of the dominant and fallacious type (F).  I have shown that the host’s 
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perspective is the dominant representation within the arena of contemporary social, 
economic and political relationships.  In this way, employing a combination of the 
Weberian concept of the authority of the eternal yesterday (Weber, 1919/1958), and 
expert power (à la French & Raven, 1959/2005), provides the manner by which 
a false universe is permitted, expected, and unquestionèdly regurgitated by social 
actors—organisations among them.  
The first great irony to be drawn from this analysis is that the expertise upon 
which the authority of the eternal yesterday is forged is utterly lacking in expertise. 
The regurgitation of false universe is contra-experience (expert, expertise, and 
experiment share a common Latin root, experiri [the verb, to try]), it is neither 
developmental nor scientific, and commonly antithetical to these.  By highlighting 
the second irony, I call attention to the peculiar circumstances that exist where those 
organisations whose foundations are both immediately and inextricably concerned 
with development and science similarly permit such dominance to persist.  How and 
why can this be so?  The conclusion I here propose is that a separation exists within 
these organisations.  The nature of this separation is difficult to clearly articulate.  
I am, of course, speaking of educational organisations. Organisations 
foundationally and teleologically forged in science with a historical litany of 
practice and research demonstrating the consistency of development (intellectually, 
physiologically, psychologically, emotionally, and socially construed) and scientific 
pedagogies (as opposed to technological or neo-scientific one’s), and touching the 
lives of almost every individual in the developed world.  Yet, organisations whose 
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conduit into the greater political and economic realm (as a reified manifestation of 
Rousseauian general will) is all-too-frequently demonstrative in behaviours indicative 
of the modernist or post-modernist.   Employing presuppositions entertained earlier 
in this and the previous chapters, I dissect this separation of foundation and political 
behaviour (administrative behaviour) below.  In so dissecting, I provide an answer 
to question (b) noted earlier that referred to why 2002-Dave and 2002-you would 
not be surprised by Organisation A’s self-constraining action within the bargain, nor 
Organisation B’s response to it.
B. contemporary Macro administration of educational organisations
I assume, in the interests of solidifying the argument, that Organisation 
A represents a non-educational organisation (of a host type) and further that 
Organisation B represents an educational organisation.  Such an assumption is well 
founded (even though I refrain from endowing educational organisations with a 
gene type moniker) since host type organisations have been shown to traditionally 
dominate host type universes.  I augment the particulars to more closely represent 
a real (I recall, however, the proviso in the introduction to Chapter Six) scenario 
manifest in interorganisational relationships of particular concern to our field. 
Suppose that an interorganisational relationship is meant to be forged among A, 
a corporation, and B, a school.  The universe of A, if it is to be successful in the 
contemporary climate, must adhere to certain predefined, expected, prescribed 
profit-maximizing (Friedman, 1970; McMurtry, 1998; Smith, 1796) behaviours 
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among its compeers and associates.  While the face of this claim may indeed be 
true, it relies upon a certain dominant view of human relations for its attachment, 
germination, and establishment (Marciano, 2005).  Faced with such dogma, a social 
construction of social reality is likely, despite the evidentiary reality for which I 
have (among others, Dawkins, 2006a, 2006b; Harris, 2004; Pinker, 1997) argued; 
but such claims are nothing new.  
The point of particular interest is the range of reactionary paths that exist for 
Organisation B.  Game theory—indeed all game theory, pre- and post-Tit for Tat—
argues that two paths are possible: defect or concede. But these simple assumptions 
about human psychology deny the challenge faced by B’s administrator, assigned 
to bargain within the confines of such a relationship and dominant view.  The 
paths are more complex than the binary suggests, but their complexity is not so 
overwhelming to be left to chance.  Similarly, the complexity of the relationship 
is not so overwhelming that it must be thrown to nihilistic epithets like “the murk 
of contingency,” “incomprehensibility” or “irreducibility” (each of which I have 
heard presented as arguments, variously appealed to, in presentations at scholarly 
conferences and among my graduate student colleagues).
Intraorganisationally, B is embedded within a foundationally present 
presumption of science (as relates to assorted developmentalisms of human existence). 
I assure my skeptical colleagues in Educational Foundations, Educational History, 
and Educational Psychology that this embodiment of pedagogy is abundantly present 
in Educational Administration, and this under-girding gives rise to coherence of 
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thought in Educational Administration with the ethics of development—hence, I 
ascribe to B a designation as an organisation whose frame is constructed in a true 
universe (i(T)).  Yet for B, faced by a fallacious and dominant universe (F), what are 
unquestionably irrational behaviours (f )—and appear to A (i(F)) as true—remain 
patently false; and applying the notions from psychology above, B’s response so 
commonly must succumb to the power of A’s position within the game.
I therefore return to the question asked earlier as (b): If the scenario described 
is accounted for in the postulate noted,† why would 2002-Dave and 2002-you not 
react differently?  We react as we do, because we too are confronted by analytical 
manners utterly irrational in formulation, that commonly appeal to information 
steeped in the fallacious eternal yesterday, reluctant to accept that freedom from 
these fallacious contentions about human nature are possible.   What did Ms. 2027 
know that we at the time did not?  The extent to which we have come to accept 
the schematized nature of our apperceptive model through psychologically based 
power dynamics to which we are susceptible. 
c.  summary
I began this chapter with a discussion of constraints in bargain-based 
relationships.  I established, through psychological conceptions that intercede within, 
how these constraints may be essentially or incidentally derived.  Further, when these 
two forms of constraints are applied to relative levels of power within bargaining 
† In a fallacious and dominant universe, objectively understood fallacious behaviour or strategy 
is viewed as false by individuals/organisations whose frames are constructed from within a true 
universe, or Ff  = i(T)f
223
games it is apparent that incidentally irrational behaviour permits the perpetuation 
of dominant but false forms of organisational representations.  Educational and 
non-educational organisational relationships were briefly examined in these terms, 
and it is from this point that I expand these notions into the strata of contemporary 
political theatre in the following chapter.
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chaPter eIght
sedIMentatIon and aGonIsM:  
dIMensIons oF the Macro adMInIstratIon oF  
educatIon WIthIn the PoLItIcaL
In the present chapter, I extend the universes theory presented in Chapters 
Six and Seven within the context of the macro administration of educational 
organisations, and through an adapted model of sedimentation, taken from Giddens 
(1979).  Furthermore, I discuss implications of sedimentation for educational 
leadership, in their initial form, through the work of Mouffe (1999; 2005) in the 
area of political relationships within macro theatres.
a.  The Political and the sedimentation of education within The Political
The recent book by Mouffe (2005) provided conceptual assistance for 
educational administrators interested in the current (macro and political) state of 
education as a player within government/political theatres.  Her topic was more 
general, focused on contemporary issues concerning the nature of liberal deliberative 
democracy.  Yet, as a backdrop upon which the philosophical antecedents of 
educational administration (specifically the contextual view of interorganisational 
relationships demonstrated in the universes theory and discussion concluding Chapter 
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Seven) may be suspended, Mouffe’s work has striking value.  Her point was simple, 
if not somewhat uncomfortable for the contemporary student of transformational 
leadership: one must accept that democracy is about the relationships among 
competing interests and abandon the notion that its purpose rests in consensus-
building, negotiation, or other forms of deliberation (Mouffe, 1999; 2005). 
Mouffe (2005) argued that agents within the political (the realm in which 
political positions are debated, distinguished from politics or the everyday way in 
which the products of political positions interact) must accept that all forms of order 
are based upon exclusions. Forms of order assign certain characteristics or definitions 
and deny others.  Relationships, which are either adherences to characteristic or 
definitional criteria or rejections of them, are by definition both intransitively and 
transitively antagonisms.  They are intransitively antagonistic in that their original 
definition requires exclusion, and they are transitively antagonistic in that their 
active distinguishing of self against others requires exclusion—
the constitution of a specific ‘we’ always depends on the type of ‘they’ from 
which it is differentiated.  This is a crucial point because it allows us to 
envisage the possibility of different types of we/they relation according to 
the way the ‘they’ is constructed. (p. 19)
As such, Mouffe admitted potential variations in definitions of the natures 
of relationships within their supra-definition as confrontational, or perhaps more 
simply put: relationships are always subsets of confrontation and can therefore never 
be genuinely consensus-driven.  What is left is the definition of the we, in our case 
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education or the herein oft employed Organisation B, vis-à-vis they, Organisation A 
or more broadly other actors within the political as engaged in theoretical games, 
but not expressly limited to these.   
On Mouffe’s (2005) view, the ideal definition of political actors is as 
agonists, derived from the Greek agōnistēs [ ] meaning a combatant 
or rival as might be found in a sporting competition.   Thus the definition she 
employed is not one of enemy, but rather of one who respects the role and voice of 
the other in the (ever-confrontational) relationship.  Mouffe saw the contemporary 
manifestation of liberal democratic power structures as based on a friend/enemy 
dualism perpetuated by a neo-liberal dominated political. In neo-liberal (those who 
have inherited modernity) discourse, “an adversary is simply a competitor[;] … 
their objective is merely to dislodge others in order to occupy their place. … It is 
merely a competition among elites” (p. 21).  
Mouffe’s (2005) agonist project, however, is different from the neo-liberal’s 
project, seeing the ideal model for liberal democratic structure as based upon 
legitimate adversary/legitimate adversary pluralities (Tully, 1999; Wenman, 2003). 
“[I]n the agonistic struggle … the antagonistic dimension is always present, it is 
a real confrontation but one which is played out under conditions regulated by a 
set of democratic procedures accepted by the adversaries” (Mouffe, 2005, p. 21). 
In this way, Mouffe removed political actors from the modernist perspective of 
all other ideas are illegitimate (evident in statements like, “If you are not with 
us you are with the terrorists”).  She similarly removed political actors from the 
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ultimate nihilist conclusion of the post-modernist perspective that all other ideas 
are equally legitimate—which, as has been earlier shown through discussion 
surrounding questions of similarity and difference, in the final analysis, means that 
on the one hand so too is the modernists’ view legitimate, and on the other, no ideas 
are legitimate at all (Wenman, 2003).
The problem for certain actors originally of the political is that they have 
ceased to actively participate within the political.  In modernist dominant scenarios, 
reduced participation is the result of an active process that seeks to elinguate 
others.  In post-modernist critiques and dominant scenarios, those who accept an 
antagonistic context actively avoid meaningful participation and occasionally react 
in neo-liberal ways.  In other cases, between modern and post-modern, when no 
longer faced with the stimulation of questions related to legitimate place within the 
political, entities turn inward.  Established and secure in their place within politics, 
entities become instrumental components of actions within the political rather than 
active participants.  They are thus sedimented in nature; a notion that I use in a way 
similar but not identical to the sociologist Giddens’ (1979) sense and that I describe 
in more detail below.70  
It is coincidental that Giddens’ (1991, 1994, 1998) work is the target of some 
critique on the part of Mouffe (2005) in that it remains focused upon friend/enemy 
relations rather than agonistic combatant one’s. Within Giddens’ (1979) theory of 
structuration is the notion of sedimentation, which he tangentially defined as a 
structural component of evolving institutional rules and practices.  It is not my 
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intent to engage in an argument concerned with Giddens’ views, I mention it here 
only to distinguish its variance from my own view of sedimentation.
In defining sedimentation, it is helpful to recognize that there exists some 
analogue among Mouffe’s notion of the political and the public sphere of Habermas 
(1962/2001): the location of the organs of public debate, such as newspapers, 
parliaments, salons, and other public spaces.  In Habermas’ historical view of the 
developmental nature of elements within the public sphere, originating in the 1700s, 
is a revealing example.  During the public sphere’s beginnings, such organs of public 
debate provided the arena for public discussion of political views on a variety of 
other topics.  But these organs were also the subject of debate. What is the purpose 
of a newspaper, a parliament and the like? How should the state/power interact with 
(or dominate) newspapers or parliaments?  Over time, such organs evolved into 
instruments of politics, rather than contestable notions within the political.  It is 
not until more recent work of individuals like McLuhan (1951; McLuhan & Fiore, 
1967), Herman and Chomsky (1988), and indeed Habermas (1962/2001) himself, 
that public debates around the nature of media have reinstalled such notions into 
their place within the political from out of their sedimented place in politics.  
In the above description, I suggest that certain previously contested notions 
within the political evolve through their own inaction (or are sedimented) into 
taken-for-granted or instrumental organs of politics—not worthy of debates in 
themselves, but merely seen as peripheral to real, and typically economic, debates 
(regarding taxes or the funding of interventions for autistic children within public 
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schools, for example) within the political.  In Figure 8.1, I depict these ideas in two 
pictographs. Part A of Figure 8.1 provides a visual representation through which one 
might understand the relationships and relative positioning of each of the political, 
politics (or political discourse and action), and the instruments of the political (upon 
which politics function). The pictograph in part B of Figure 8.1 provides a visual 
representation of how kernels of once debatable topics within the political have 
been sedimented to varying degrees as mere instruments of politics. Each level of 
successive sedimentation further obscures the original purpose and nature of each 
kernel to the outside observer active within politics.  
The specific ætiology of sedimentation is linked to the discussion presented 
at the conclusion of Chapter Seven.  For example, contested positions (positions 
that do not share a dominant and fallacious universe as the under-girding of their 
manner) succumb to the pathologies of game psychology manifest in such i(F) / i(T) 
interorganisational relationships.  The result is clear: an unwitting abandonment on 
the part of i(T)—or perhaps an eventual unqualified abdication—of teleological71 
debates over previously debatable notions within the political. In the place of 
teleological debates evolve (or suffer sedimentation) the definitions of abandoned 
notions among actors within the political who do not necessarily understand either 
the teleos of the sedimented actor or its internal function.   Debates within the actor 
remain, but rarely break free of the sedimented weight of a dominant view of the 
actor in general.  My opinion of contemporary education is that it is sedimented, 
misunderstood within the political, and seen as instrumental rather than organic and 
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having a teleos worthy of public (external cum public sphere) debate.  
It might be assumed upon review of the discussion at the end of Chapter 
Seven that I apologetically excused the educational leader from culpability in respect 
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Figure 8.1 The Political and Sedimented Instruments of Politics
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of education’s sedimentation.  I argued that the psychology of the bargain leads to 
eminently troubling ends when in a fallacious and dominant universe individuals 
whose frames are constructed in a false universe (Fi(F)) confronts individuals whose 
frames are constructed in a true universe (Fi(T)).  But this would be only a partial view. 
Psychology provides much leverage in the power of one side over the other among 
Organisations of type A and those of type B, but so too do intraorganisational debates. 
The problem in education, as an arena in which internal debate between theory and 
administration are played, emerges when so much of the debate permits arguments 
couched in difference to be taken seriously.  What do I mean by serious attention 
paid to arguments of difference?  Consider the following line of argument.  
1. Education must be divided into, at least, two sub-domains: 
administration (which has the responsibility for matters of governance 
and extraorganisational relationships) and foundation (that has the 
responsibility for matters of direction—theoretic direction, direction 
of pedagogic classroom practice, and psychological direction). 
These are not perfectly discrete subdivisions, and responsibilities 
do somewhat overlap, but such overlapping cases are less important 
than the general picture and may obscure further analysis.
2. While it has been shown that the administrative subdivision is 
extraorganisationally engaged in debates (relationships, bargains, or 
games) that pathologically sediment the place of education within 
the political, some degree of culpability rests on the part of the 
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foundation subdivision for not fully appreciating the situation into 
which the administrative conduit is thrust (and in which education is 
also generally thrust).
3. Earlier, in Chapter Seven, I argued that educational organisations are 
(on the whole) bastions of science, pedagogy and development.  “As 
such,”  a counter-claim might be made, “we must be more reserved 
in or suggestions that foundations are at fault, for it is perhaps, 
in developmental terms of pedagogic science, too early for such 
appreciations of the general (political) context of education to be 
manifestly clear.”  While this assessment might appear logical, it 
does little to rationally view the debates that exist within education, 
and which may in themselves be a root for culpability.    
4. There are, within the foundational division, advocates who profess 
rational science as pedagogy, but there are also advocates who profess 
post-modern positions, as well.  I have elsewhere demonstrated that 
post-modern claims are of little assistance in confrontations with 
modernity. If nothing more, post-modern claims often help to obscure 
the real arguments and debates.   Could it be, then, that administration 
is confronted extraorganisationally by modernity’s (or, to a lesser 
degree, post-modernity’s) fallacious universe, and the resulting 
irrationality produced in game psychology.  Similarly, administration 
is confronted intraorganisationally by post-modernity’s (and, 
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frequently modernity’s) fallacious universe.
5. The position of the educational administrator is thus objectively 
hindered both externally and internally. 
I present the result of this logical frame within Figure 8.2 where educational 
administration is commonly situated betwixt extra- and intraorganisational fallacious 
points of departure.  On this view, I contend that this problem is one of our own 
making, and rooted in the claim that I proposed at the conclusion of Chapter Six: 
educational administration is not perfectly scientific, but rather oscillatory.  We in 
education have, since at least Callahan’s (1970) insightful work, misunderstood the 
nature of liberal democracy and have chosen the wrong path.  Even when we seek 
to re-establish ourselves within the political we do so through internally dominant 
relativist constructs and, in a political that is dominated by neo-liberal (friend/
enemy) reductionism, we will inevitably lose.  The prize for our losing: perpetual 
elinguation, continued sedimentation, and relegation to the periphery in political 
debates, only to be paid lip-service as an instrument when politically advantageous 
to the governing regime or its critics.
The case I argued above is instantiated through a cursory reading of neo-liberal 
commentary—the dominant external context for the current discussion.  Apropos of 
this point, Dohrmann and Mendonca (2004) essentially made the argument that by 
reducing government waste, the funds saved would act as a buffer for detrimental 
economic effects felt as a result of an increased dependency ratio in years to come. 
Their suggestions for reducing wasteful spending in the education sector include 
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decreasing input costs for school food programs and janitorial supplies.  On this 
view, education is not seen as a human endeavour, but merely the assemblage of 
widget-like economic contributors (at best) or objects (at worst).  
Along a similar vein of misunderstanding due to sedimentation, Shearmur’s 
(2000) insistence that value in education is determined by income following 
graduation, and economic analysis shows that current salaries do not advocate for 
the argument that an individual should advance his or her education.  Perhaps the 
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ironic epitome of misunderstanding is demonstrated in the sentiments of former New 
Brunswick Education Minister Paul Duffie’s reference to students as “products” and 
suggestion that “The first mistake is assuming schools and teachers will teach our 
kids”; and from the same article, former business-education partnership coordinator 
for the New Brunswick Department of Education, David Roberts’ argument that 
education is “too important to be left to … educators” (Benteau, 1993, p. 3). Such 
commentary is not difficult to find in both the public debates (see for example 
literally anything on the subject of education produced by the Fraser Institute) and 
academic journals.  They reduce education to an instrumental and peripheral organ 
of the political, further sedimenting it.
1.  Education as a Legitimate Adversary
Mouffe (1999; 2005) argued for the shifting of contemporary liberal 
democracy from its friend/enemy structure into a legitimate adversary/legitimate 
adversary structure. Yet Mouffe’s goal is all the more difficult when legitimate 
adversaries of neo-liberalism struggle to be taken seriously.  Worse yet, is the case 
where adversaries fail to take themselves seriously (see Newton, in press).  I see 
education as one such legitimate adversary, and I suggest that others would argue 
the same.  While they do not talk in the terms I have attempted to construct above, 
their thoughts, as expressed through the documents they have written, appear 
consistent with such a goal for education.  Among those who I would place into this 
category are scholars such as McMurtry (1998), Woodhouse (2001a, 2001b), and 
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Ungerleider (2003).
How then do we legitimate education as an adversary?  In my view, the 
process is one of eventually constructing legitimate adversary/legitimate adversary 
structures out of encounters that politically (read within the political) strengthen 
the relative place of education in friend/enemy scenarios, rather than weaken 
education’s stance.  I am here not advocating the adoption of a neo-liberal friendly 
position.  Rather, I suggest a position that is difficult for neo-liberal combatants 
to dismiss.  The specific nature of the position I envision is emergent, but will 
undoubtedly require an examination of educational purpose, and an initial discussion 
of justifications based upon a utility calculus.  Put simply, I advocate a strong 
message for public consumption that is definitive in its view regarding the purpose 
of education (its teleos) and its role within society (its function), packaged in terms 
that neo-liberal combatants understand (its utility: being more foundational than 
economic or political principles and different in nature).
Walker’s (1995; 1998) work in the area of ethical decision-making provides 
an example. Walker questions justifications for decisions made by educational 
administrators and their appeal to “the best interests of children” as a platitudinous 
and trite amorphous justification for actions.  His concern is one of educational 
administrative substance in an “ethically schizophrenic society”—a society 
(political) that should not be confused with a pluralistic (perhaps even agonistic) 
one.  The result is a collection of principles upon which “the best interest of children” 
might be determined.  
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Indeed it is in the determination and unification of foundational principles 
of education that the strength of education within the political will be achieved. 
Without determining and unifying, education will continue to flounder in the face of 
political reductionism—only contributing to the ethical schizophrenia manifest in 
relativism and ultimately remaining dismissed and peripheral within the political.  
B.  education in the Future and the role for educational administration
I have elsewhere (Burgess, in press) examined a most pertinent context in 
which such an oscillatory view of education (and its administration) is eminently 
problematic—the future of education within an aging society.   How will sedimented 
education fare within a antagonistic political guided by five-year cycles of ballot-
based participation?  When it comes to the interests of political scientists, there are 
few areas of political research that surpass political participation (Gray & Caul, 
2000).  Why do some participate politically and others do not?  How do we properly 
define political participation in an age of such advanced communication technology? 
Do political campaigns really affect the voting behaviour of individuals?  Questions 
such as these are abundant within the breadth and depth of political science 
publications.  Analysis provides some interesting insight into the larger discussion 
within this chapter and into the relationships between education and other public 
and private institutions. 
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1.  Age, Interest in Education, and Political Participation
There is research in the field of political science to suggest the commonplace 
assumption that individuals become increasingly conservative as they age is 
without merit (Riggle & Johnson, 1996).  Similarly, it is problematic to pigeon-hole 
the political behaviours of individuals simply based upon their age. For example, 
Binstock (2000) presented an overview of the “Senior Power” model perpetuated by 
both the media and campaign organisers.  The model is based on classical economic 
and statistical assumptions about the nature of individual choice—that members of 
a cohort are rational, similar, self-interested, and heavily influenced by the political 
points of view attributed to vocal individuals who roughly share their age.  While 
there is little evidence to definitively accept the senior power model at face value, 
Binstock provided international evidence to suggest that the model influences the 
behaviour of political candidates that both support and deny causes thought to be of 
interest to older voters.  As an extreme, a case in Singapore is cited where high-level 
government ministers argued in favour of double franchise for tax-paying (non-
dependent) citizens in an attempt to stymie the potential weight of senior block 
voting.
The chief criticism launched against “Senior Power” as a means of 
determining campaign issues that “guarantee” higher proportions of the senior vote 
is that attributed to Foot (1998) regarding the determination of “senior citizenship”: 
there is no evidence to suggest that the differences between 25 and 45 year-olds 
are greater than those between 65 and 85 year-olds.  Furthermore, Binstock (2000) 
239
presented data that showed how differently individuals living under a variety of 
socio-economic conditions perceive self-interest.  Research by Brunner and Baldson 
(2004) indicated that seniors are indeed willing to direct politicians to spend money 
on education if a benefit to the community is presented as a justification.  Such 
political behaviour among seniors is not to be definitively understood as altruism 
(in opposition to self-interest), but it appears to have more to do with interest in the 
development of social capital—present in the political behaviour of other voting 
cohorts, as well (Fischel, 2006).  Indeed, studies that have presented findings 
related to senior support for education funding present a variety of opinions on the 
matter, and many potential influences for the results they report.  Some observers 
predicted that education specific spending will decrease (Poterba, 1988, 1997), 
while others predicted more optimistic funding scenarios for students, educators, 
and administrators (Gradstein & Kaganovich, 2004; Ladd & Murray, 2001).
A second political behavioural issue/assumption perpetuated by the media, 
which does appear to be substantiated, however, surrounds the growing trend among 
younger enfranchised populations to abstain from political participation, inasmuch 
as participation may be judged through the casting of a ballot during elections. 
Interestingly, the analysis of Gray and Caul (2000) suggested that general voter 
turnout in the 25 most industrialized countries has in fact dropped since 1950—only 
in Sweden and Denmark have turnout numbers increased—and even in Australia, 
where law requires citizens to participate in elections, turnout has fallen roughly 9%. 
Interest in participation among older voters has remained high in the countries Gray 
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and Caul studied, which has perhaps led some to suggest that political behaviour 
is habit-forming (Gerber, Green, & Shachar, 2003).  If younger voters do not vote, 
they are not likely to vote in the future.
To this end, it is difficult to definitively suggest that older individuals with 
little or no direct connection to the school systems will not support these systems, 
even under the current neo-liberal friend/enemy dominant political.  But such 
research remains tangential to the point of the line of reasoning in which I am here 
engaged.  Rather, the point is that despite likelihoods, organisations engaged within 
the political believe that senior power, among other obfuscations and inaccuracies, 
is the case—thus tailoring policies, practices, and strategies in ways that both 
work to perpetuate such beliefs, and consequently garner their survival from such 
perpetuations. Perpetuations of this variety may superficially appear to have little or 
nothing directly in common with education and its involvement in interorganisational 
relationships, but in fact they speak volumes to those who would listen.  
For educational administration, the underlying implication of the above 
discussion is that political behaviour rooted in ideology perpetuates false universes. 
Thus, with little or misguided understanding of the nature, purpose, function, and 
utility of education, how are any reasonably informed citizens (no matter their 
political stripe, or lack thereof) to legitimately direct education spending?  It 
appears, therefore, that a more substantial issue for the future is to bring an accurate 
understanding of education into the conscious of the politically active.  
Further to the point engaged above, suppose a certain (perhaps large) segment 
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of the older population is compelled to direct their attentions toward unified self-
interested ends.  Faced by such a case, would it not be helpful to promote active 
political participation among those recently graduated and enfranchised who do 
have a strong connection to school systems?  
Both increasing public understanding of education, and political participation 
among youth, are points of action that rest well within the domain of education.  As the 
extraorganisational leadership thereof, educational administration has an important 
role to play.  In the chapter that follows, I expand upon this point, drawing attention 
to both the problem of an oscillatory and a sedimented manifestation of education 
for educational administration in the pressing context of an aging electorate and a 
youth disengaged by traditional means of political participation—basic constituents 
and members of non-educational organisations.  
c. summary
I began this chapter with an overview of Mouffe’s (2005) analytic separation 
of politics from the political.  With this definition as a point of departure, I made the 
case for the contemporary assignment of education as a sedimented instrument of 
politics—hidden from public discourse and evolution and employed as an inanimate 
tool within the political rather than as a dynamic social organ worthy of macropolitical 
debate.  Thus, interorganisational relationships involving educational and non-
educational organisations are susceptible to the limitations of positioning manifest 
in such configurations: they are debatable/non-debated dualisms.  Culpability for the 
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current context, I argued, is only partly borne by the dominance F type universe of 
the current Mouffian political.  Education has much culpability for this predicament 
of its own.  In an attempt to initiate a program to rectify the current situation, I 
advocated a strong public message that is definitive in its view regarding the purpose 
of education (its teleos) and its role within society (its function), packaged in terms 
that neo-liberal combatants understand (its utility).  The point was not to exchange 
a sedimented conception of education for a neo-liberal one, but rather to establish a 
definition that (a) ceases to permit further sedimentation, and (b) moves to elevate 
education from instrument of politics to issue of the political.
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Part III
a resPonse to the concePtualIsatIon
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chaPter nIne
coMMunIcatIVe coMPetence and  
educatIonaL aPPrecIatIon 
This conceptual dissertation of the foundational social, economic, and political 
structures was embedded in contemporary relationships among educational and 
non-educational organisations.  I have sought to construct a theoretical hypothesis 
of interorganisational relationships involving educational administration generally, 
and those conditions under which educational administrators engage educational 
organisations in relationships with other organisations more specifically.  In this 
final chapter, I connect the oscillatory and sedimented manifestation of education 
established in past chapters with two important and practical tasks for educational 
administration and educational leadership. The first task, communicative competence, 
is grounded in the early communication theory of Habermas and provides an ethic 
of practice that supports the second task, which is support for the social sciences 
in school-based student experience.  Within the following discussion, I provide a 
developing position that advocates for a set of tactics for educational administrators 
when they engage in interorganisational relationships, and relationships with the 
public, parents, students and school staff.
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a. distorted communication and communicative competence
Fundamental to Habermas’ (1971; 1971/1990; 1975; 1976/1998; 1984; 1987; 
1990/2001b; 1992; 1996; 2001) project was his presupposition that all utterances of 
speech are instruments of communication. When a speaker makes a statement, be it 
the most basic of utterances or the most complex dissertation, this  speech act holds 
as its purpose both the sine qua non hearer’s comprehension of the statement and 
his or her agreement as to the speaker’s meaning. Although such a presupposition 
may appear obvious, a testament to the importance Habermas placed on this posit 
was found in his continued exploration of its significance, even after more than 
three decades following his initial theoretical exposition. His ultimate goal was to 
construct a theory of communication where genuine understanding and consensus 
between individuals, and for our purposes organisations, are both achievable and 
universally moral.  From the notion of action guided by genuine understanding, 
Habermas named this theory communicative action.  
The position advocated through Habermas’ theory of communicative 
action seems somewhat contradictory to the agonism of Mouffe advocated in 
Chapter Eight, and Mouffe (2005) articulated as much by highlighting the work 
of Habermas as focused upon consensus forming.  Furthermore, others critiqued 
Habermas’ project as being consistent with the pragmatism of Rorty (Harris, 2004). 
I take particular issue neither with Mouffe’s nor Harris’ assessment.  My purposes, 
however, are fulfilled in work that pre-dates communicative action, and which I 
believe is fundamental to the agonists seeking a viable legitimation of their very 
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existence within contemporary antagonistic liberal democracy.  Indeed, Mouffe 
(1989), herself, contended that Habermas’ unfulfilled project of modernity provides 
a necessary step in the progress of democracy.  Communicative competence, the area 
of Habermas’ corpus that I uphold as practically linked to the agonist’s formative 
cause, as I argue, provides a means of evaluating, engaging, and directing the nature 
of interorganisational relationships in general, and those relationships encountered 
by contemporary educational administration in particular.  But to remove any linkage 
Habermas drew between communicative competence and consensus-building 
would be patently disingenuous.  For this reason, I do not avoid consideration of 
consensus where necessity requires its discussion. 
1.  Mead’s Symbolic Interaction
Habermas (1987; 1992) credited the work of George Herbert Mead (1934; 
1938) for the stimulation of ideas regarding the tenets of his own work surrounding 
genuine understanding; thus an exploration of Mead’s ideas regarding the 
fundamental principles of communication are of value for grounding my broader 
discussion. For Mead, communication was interaction mediated through symbols. I 
have earlier differentiated symbols from their referents—syntax from semantics.  In 
fairness to the ideas that Habermas proposed, however, a brief examination of the 
peculiarities of Mead’s conceptualisation of these ideas is of value—for they are not 
perfectly identical to the details established earlier.  
For Mead, symbols held a particular meaning both among different 
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individuals and over a period of time.  Interaction among individuals can be said to 
have evolved to a point of where the communication of these meanings is possible 
(Blumer, 2004; Habermas, 1971, 1987).  Furthermore, Mead (1934) explained that 
the communication of meaning existed in two varieties.  The first was the instinctive 
and stimulus responsive mode, which he called the conversation of gestures. 
The second variety is more complex and known as symbolic interaction. The 
distinguishing characteristic between these two varieties of communication rested in 
one’s cognizance of the meaning symbolized.  Because a conversation of gestures is 
best thought of as the instinctive reaction to the action of another—when I sweep my 
arm to block a punch, or step back when confronted by another crossing my path—
according to Mead (1934), these articulations of meaning were performed without 
thought. Symbolic interaction, alternatively, represented articulations of meaning 
when a speaker encoded a particular message into language, and that message 
is decoded or interpreted by a hearer who was aware of the need to interpret the 
meaning.  The interaction, or communication of meaning, was therefore conducted 
through the use of symbols (language, utterances or speech acts) that act as objects 
containing an intended meaning (Blumer, 2004; Habermas, 1971, 1987).
Of importance for Habermas (1971; 1987; 1992) was the notion that both 
gestures and symbols, regardless of whether humans consciously interpret them 
or not, articulated a particular meaning. For Mead (1934), the meaning of either 
gestures or symbols was interpreted based upon the future implications for action 
held within that gesture or symbol. For example, Mead would argue that when 
248
another throws a punch at me, the meaning of the punch is instinctively reacted 
to on account of its future action: hitting me in the face. Alternatively, as is the 
example used by Blumer (2004), a student of Mead, when an armed robber 
articulates the command, “Put your hands up,” I contemplate the meaning based 
upon an interpretation of the robber’s future action: he is either bluffing or will 
react negatively to my failure to act upon his command—in truth, a game theoretic 
situation.  Furthermore, the robber interprets my reaction in relation to his future 
action. In either case, a meaning has been passed between individuals. The process 
of Mead’s logical reasoning eventually constructed a theory of social interaction 
that does not neglect the importance and influence of context and environment—
although Mead (1934; 1938) preferred to refer to these as objects.
1.1.  Objects and Influence upon Meaning
Although Habermas did not directly use Mead’s (1934; 1938) construct 
of objects, he did rely upon the extension of their influence onto meaning for 
individuals party to communication (Habermas, 1987). For this reason, it is useful 
to examine Mead’s concept, and then focus on the issues that provided significance 
for Habermas’ argument.  
Objects constitute the individual’s operating environment, the things 
toward which the individual is oriented, the focal points around which the 
individual’s activity becomes organized, and the implements by which the 
individual’s activity is built up in a step-by-step sequence. Put otherwise, 
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one would understand the organisation of a human being as an actor to the 
extent to which one would know the nature of the individual’s objects; and 
one would be in a position to understand any one of the individual’s specific 
acts to the extent to which one could identify the objects toward which an 
action is directed and observe how the individual uses objects in developing 
the line of conduct. (Blumer, 2004, p. 39)
Mead saw objects as the influences on human reactions to gestures, as well as 
human ability to interpret meaning within symbolic interaction. His characterization 
of objects was not one of stagnation nor isolation, but rather one of adaptation, 
development and social construction.
All of these things and their like may be objects to the individual—and are 
objects if the individual notes them or is aware of them. Taken together, they 
constitute the individual’s world of existence, that is, the things the individual 
deals with in life activity. To make this point clearer initially, let us point out 
that if there were something the individual could not note or did not note, it 
would not exist for that individual; being unaware of it, the person couldn’t 
refer to it, talk about it, direct action toward it, or do anything with regard to 
it. (Blumer, 2004, p. 40, emphasis in original)
Mead believed that such a notion provided ample explanation for why 
members of a culture would intuitively understand certain things, while others 
would not. Whereas adults see a chair (an object), and understand its meaning based 
upon some future action available (the action of sitting, relaxing, etc.), an infant—
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unaware of the object’s mode of operation or future action with which he or she 
may engage the object—does not understand the object’s meaning in the same way. 
The meaning one holds for the object is socially constructed, in this case, through 
the infant’s eventual observation of others (Blumer, 2004; Inhelder & Piaget, 1958; 
Piaget 1940/1968, 1959, 1963, 1977a, 1977b).
I employ part A of Figure 9.1 to represent an individual, a, and the objects 
of the individual’s world of existence.  I use part B of Figure 9.1 to represent the 
objects within the worlds of existence of individuals a and b. In this combined 
figure, I draw several points of significance for Habermas’ project from Mead’s 
(1934; 1938) work. First, Habermas held that communication between individuals 
(and by extension between organisations) exists concurrently within a tripartite 
scheme consisting of the subjective, the intersubjective, and the objective worlds 
(Habermas, 1971, 1975, 1976/1998, 1984, 1987, 1990/2001a, 1992, 1996). Second, 
the totality of objects of one party in a particular communication are rarely the same as 
those of another party. Third, the tendency of these particular objects being different 
among individuals means that individuals hold inherently different future actions 
in terms of symbolic interaction, and this quandary begs the question: Is genuine 
understanding achievable through symbolic interaction?  For Habermas, such 
discrepancy among worlds of existence—whether seen broadly as Mead’s objects 
or specifically as intentionality, motivation, rhetorical skill, power, or influence, 
among others—represented a major issue that any project seeking to represent a 
theory of universally achievable consensus must overcome (1971/1990).
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In his insightful critique of Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics, 
Habermas (1971/1990) argued that hermeneutics was both unlimited and restricted. 
b
a
a
A
B
Those Objects Known by the Individual a
Those Objects Unknown by the Individual a
Those Objects Known by the Individuals a and b
Figure 9.1 Mead’s Objects of Existence
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Hermeneutics is of significance at this point in the discussion because it represents, as 
Habermas suggested, “the art of understanding and of making-oneself-understood” 
(1971/1990, p. 245).  As such, its capacity and limitations guide its usefulness in the 
creation of consensus—and relationships of any type. Accordingly, its capacity is 
shown in its ability to engage the individual in the interpretation of any place, event, 
social interaction, culture, or phenomenon (or in Mead’s terms, object) that has ever 
existed, or might ever exist anywhere in the world. However, hermeneutics is also 
restricted by the individual engaged—specifically by the a priori objects of their 
experience (or in Gadamer’s words, traditions).
Part A of Figure 9.2 represents the hermeneutic circle, while part B of Figure 
9.2 extends the intentions of those who engage the circle toward understanding. 
Progress in knowledge construction is accomplished through iterative and timeless 
understanding-directed circumnavigations of the hermeneutic circle.  To this end, 
the hermeneutic circle is meant to continue in orbit of its focus indefinitely. At 
the heart of Habermas’ critique was the influence of an individual’s objects on the 
understanding reached through a hermeneutic mode of communication and reaching 
understanding. To this end, he presented an argument for an elevation of Gadamer’s 
philosophical hermeneutics to a hypothesis he called depth-hermeneutics. To 
achieve depth-hermeneutics, however, Habermas required the reader to explore his 
position in respect of distorted communication and communicative competence. I 
have thus set the stage for what I currently believe to be the most important aspect 
of Habermas’ project in terms of agonistic advocacy as a means of reconstituting 
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A
B
a new claim is 
made that is based 
on existing 
traditions
a new 
understanding 
results
the new 
understanding 
causes a 
modification of 
the tradition
Figure 9.2  Understanding and the Hermeneutic Circle
interorganisational relationships in accordance with rational behaviour.  I shall 
therefore examine both distorted communication and communicative competence.
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1.2.  distorted communication
Habermas (1971/1990; 1975; 1976/1998; 1984; 1987; 1990/2001b; 1992; 
1996; 2001) invested much effort in the analysis of the common-place phenomenon 
he described as distorted communication. Because Habermas’ project sought to 
construct a theory of communication where genuine understanding and consensus 
between individuals was universally moral, examples of non-genuine understanding 
were logically either amoral or immoral.   
For Habermas (1976/1983; 1981/1998; 1984), a communicative interaction 
among individuals was considered immoral when one discussant intentionally 
employed tactics that would result in personal advantage or success—be it their 
own personal advantage or the advantage of others. Such interaction was labelled 
strategic by Habermas and was characterized by “at least one of the parties 
behav[ing] with an orientation toward success, but leav[ing] others to believe that 
all the presuppositions of communicative action are satisfied”—thus, strategic 
communication represents “conscious deception (manipulation)” (1981/1998, p. 
169).  Under such light, strategic interaction is particularly helpful (and analytically 
consistent) when conjoined with the host’s perspective, and the pathopsychology 
of games as a third node in a triangulation upon contemporary interorganisational 
relationships.
Alternatively, an understanding that is void of (or in absence of) morality, 
while just as pathological as immoral understanding, accounts for unconscious 
deception. For Habermas (1971/1990; 1981/1998; 1984; 1990/2001b), unconscious 
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deception provided an account of two ætiologically distinct communicative 
circumstances. The first order of unconsciously strategic communication was the 
case where an individual is psychologically delusional, and, as a result of a defence 
mechanism, deceives him or herself about the intent of his or her communicative 
purpose (1971/1990; 1976/1998, fn. 2; 1981/1998). The second was found in the case 
where communication was unconsciously (and/or systemically) strategic through 
no contemporary fault of either the speaker or hearer (1971/1990). Such cases arise 
through recursively reconstituted traditions within the hermeneutic circle, and are 
based upon an initial or subsequent genuinely strategic or unconsciously strategic 
action (of the first order, see Figure 9.3). Habermas referred to all instances of the 
communicative modes described here, and in the previous paragraph, as distorted 
communication. To wit, distorted communication is ultimately defined as the 
antecedent of all non-genuine understanding.
1.3.  communicative competence and depth-hermeneutics
Habermas’ idea of communicative competence denoted an awareness held by 
the parties in a communication that distorted communication not only exists, but may 
also influence the hermeneutic process, and therefore the resulting understanding. 
A notion similar to that explored within the earlier presented discussion of the 
pathopsychology of games.  In The Hermeneutic Claim to Universality, Habermas 
(1971/1990) described communicative competence as a meta-hermeneutic and, 
forthwith, elevated his conception of depth-hermeneutics as critically enlightened 
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in comparison to Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics.
A critically enlightened hermeneutic that differentiates between insight and 
delusion incorporates the meta-hermeneutic awareness of the conditions for 
the possibility of systematically distorted communication. It connects the 
process of understanding to the principle of rational discourse, according to 
which truth would only be guaranteed by that kind of consensus which was 
achieved under the idealized conditions of unlimited communication free 
from domination and could be maintained over time. (Habermas, 1971/1990, 
Path of 
Hermeneutic
Circle
Understanding
Based on Distorted
Communication
Natural Path of
Genuine Understanding
Meandering 
Path of
Distorted
Hermeneutics
Figure 9.3 Influence of Distorted Communication on Understanding
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p. 267, emphasis in original)
Figure 9.3 represents a re-conceptualisation of the earlier part B of Figure 
9.2.  In part B of Figure 9.2, the extension of knowledge through the hermeneutic 
circle was achieved over time.  Figure 9.3 shows Habermas’ (1975; 1981/1998; 
1984; 1987; 1990/2001a; 1992) extension of knowledge grounded in consensus and 
understanding through the discursive redeemability of the validity claims proclaimed 
in speech acts.  Gadamer’s conceptualizing around the extension of knowledge is 
less specific (Gadamer, 1976/1990; Gallagher, 1992). Figure 9.3 depicts a loss of 
genuine knowledge as a result of multiple (and recursively geometric) instances 
of consciously or unconsciously strategic understandings that have redefined 
traditions and objects held by those party to the interaction. Habermas (1981/1998) 
characterized the supposition explored in Figure 9.3 as the “development of a 
decentered understanding of the world” (p. 168), and an all-too-common result of 
humanity’s ignorance of the ideal speech situation and the dominance of the system 
over the lifeworld—topics I explore in greater depth within section 2.
Figure 9.4 depicts Habermas’ reconciliation of Figure 9.3 through 
communicative competence. The once decentred understanding of the world is 
vigilantly and dynamically recentred as parties to the communication are ever-
cognizant of potential incidents of distorted communication. In section 2., I present 
the ways in which Habermas argued that communicative competence is actually 
employed by speakers and hearers. However, one point that Habermas (1971/1990) 
made merits inclusion at this time, in that it is more complementary to the generality 
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of the current discussion.
To protect speakers and hearers from distorted communication, Habermas 
(1971/1990) argued that communicative competence is aided by the use of natural 
language. Natural language is, in perhaps less Habermasian terms, the common 
vernacular shared by individuals engaged in communication. In most instances, 
this shared vernacular will be the everyday communication within a social 
setting. According to Habermas (1971/1990), the advantage of natural language 
was threefold. First, despite its simplicity, natural language is of enough depth, 
and is sufficient for clarifying the most complex symbolic interaction; second, a 
vernacular establishes the commonality of parties in communication as members of 
a community (see Sergiovanni’s, 1996, 2000, adoption of the term: Gemeinschaft); 
Natural Path of
Genuine Understanding
Points of Distorted Communication that
Were Recognized and Rectified through
Communicative Competence
Figure 9.4 Communicative Competence and Hermeneutics
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and third, parties place aside their ability to engage in linguistically veiled strategic 
speech acts, which are indicative of distorted communication.  Thus, if two speakers 
agree to communicate exclusively in a language in which they are both equally 
fluent, they are unable to disguise their strategic intentions within convoluted 
language-games.
2. Lifeworld and system and Their Implications for  
Communicative Competence and Interorganisational Relationships
There exists a vein of support within organisational theory literature for 
the applicability of models of interpersonal relationships in an examination of 
interorganisational relationships (Galaskiewicz & Krohn, 1984; Galaskiewicz 
& Wasserman, 1989; Van de Ven, 1976; Van de Ven & Walker, 1984; Westley 
& Vredenburg, 1997). Much of the discussion is rooted in both objectivist and 
subjectivist arguments that organisations are inherently human, and are therefore 
inescapably linked to human action and the Meadian objects an organisation’s 
membership possess. In this section, I explore the analogous position justified 
by Habermas’ historical materialism, and the implications of his theory of 
communicative competence within a context of interorganisational relationships.
2.1.  Validity claims and their redeemability in the Lifeworld
Notwithstanding his early publications in philosophical criticism, theory 
of crisis, and emergence of sciences (see Habermas, 1983), Habermas’ massive 
body of work has, since the early 1970s, repeatedly returned to an investigation of 
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understanding and its root in acts of speech. It can be said that in establishing his 
theory of communicative action, Habermas has sought to link all human interaction—
whether manifest in communication/linguistics, law, politics, economics, history, 
sociology, or organisational theory and behaviour—to understanding and speech 
acts. As such, it appears that to make sense of the implications of his work in any 
field of study, one must first grasp an insight into his detailed arguments surrounding 
these concepts.
Until now within this chapter, understanding has been classified as either 
genuine or distorted as a result of strategic action—conscious or unconscious 
manipulation of discourse for the purpose of individual gain. Yet, this binary 
classification of speech acts represents merely a superficial analysis of the basic 
canon of Habermas’ conceptualisation of understanding. His argument is generally 
expressed with the following path of reasoning: 
1. Progress and development is represented in the results of 
communication among individuals. 
2.  Communication is found in the act of reaching understandings among 
individuals. 
3. For an understanding to have been attained, those individuals party to 
that understanding must accept that the statements (or speech acts), 
the nature of which they are discussing, are both comprehensible and 
valid. 
Comprehensibility means that speech acts made by one individual are 
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comprehended by the hearer, and are linguistically accurate; validity, however, is 
more complex and is a function of the speaker’s claim that their speech act is true, 
correct, and truthful, and that this claim can be discursively justified (Habermas, 
1976/1998, 1984, 1987, 1990/2001a, 1990/2001b, 1992, 1996).
I examine validity in greater depth by first examining Habermas’ (1976/1998; 
1988/1998; 1990/2001a; 1996; 1996/1998) tripartite worlds of human existence—
subjectivity, intersubjectivity, and objectivity. I recall the earlier discussion of 
Mead’s (1934; 1938) objects, and the second point raised that the totality of objects 
of one party to a particular communication are rarely the same as those of another 
party.  Habermas (1971; 1990/2001a) deduced that such a rationale represented the 
existence of a personal subjective world confined within an individual’s own mind. 
However, further recalling the discussion in question (and specifically the notion 
depicted in part B of Figure 9.1) Habermas agreed with Mead’s supposition that the 
construction of some objects was dependent upon social interaction. To this end, 
Habermas referred to these socially shared or constructed objects as indicative of 
the intersubjective world—the world of social interaction and agreement of meaning 
confined only to those party to the interaction. The objective world represents the 
existential nature of reality.
Figure 9.5 represents a communicative human interaction among individuals 
a and b. As is shown, their communication takes place in relation to the three 
worlds described above. In accordance with Habermas’ (1976/1998; 1984; 1987; 
1990/2001a; 1990/2001b; 1992; 1996) theory, each speech act in which they engage 
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(either as a speaker or hearer) must be validated within each of the three worlds—
speech acts that seek genuine understanding as their goal raise claims to their validity 
(they leave the speaker’s mouth presupposing their validity is justified).
A speech act is valid within the subjective world (the world of the individual’s 
own mind and consciousness) when it is said to be truthful. In other words, the 
speaker honestly believes that the statement is true. A speech act is valid within 
the intersubjective world (the lifeworld of socially shared consciousness) when it 
is said to be correct. In this case, the speaker makes a statement that is appropriate 
ba
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Subjectivity World
Norms/ConsensusLifeworld
Figure 9.5  Human Worlds of Communication
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under the condition of meaning inherent within objects shared by both the speaker 
and hearer. Finally, a speech act is valid within the objective world (the world as 
external reality) when it is said to be true. In this final case, the speaker makes 
a statement indicative of existential (what I have endeavoured to call scientific 
within the context of this dissertation) presuppositions of reality—either something 
existentially is or it is not (Habermas, 1996/1998). 
To achieve genuine understanding, I always construct speech acts in 
such a way that their validity in all three worlds is assured. I will always make 
statements that I believe to be true (the claim to truthfulness), that are appropriate 
and reasonable in accordance with the meaning I ascribe to my world of social 
experience (the claim to correctness), and that are indicative of external reality (the 
claim to truth). When this is the genuine mode of communication shared by those 
party to an understanding, Habermas called this an ideal speech situation (i.e., the 
ideal conduct of discourse, not the ideal understanding). 
Habermas (1976/1998; 1984; 1987; 1988/1998; 1990/2001a; 1990/2001b; 
1992; 1996; 1996/1998) argued that any speech act that does not uphold these 
three claims to validity is a strategic action, and is not able to garner genuine 
understanding. Communicative competence, therefore, informs individuals that not 
all speech acts are valid in each of the three worlds, and provides the impetus for a 
hearer to challenge a claim to validity raised by any speaker in an attempt to discern 
actual truthfulness, correctness, or truth, and recentre the understanding (Habermas, 
1981/1998).
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As depicted in Figure 9.5, communication (denoted by the dotted line between 
individuals a and b) has been present for some time, and understanding has been 
achieved at a point in the past (although one is unable to say definitively that this 
understanding is genuine). The circular platform upon which the communication 
takes place represents these previously achieved understandings. Understandings 
comprise an intricate weave of validity claims that guide future collective or 
collaborative action—as I presented in section 1.—where past understandings (in 
Gadamer’s terms, traditions) provide the basis against which new interpretations (new 
knowledge, new understandings, re-evaluated traditions) within the hermeneutic 
circle may be made.
In the field of Educational Administration and in its attempts at establishing 
and maintaining interorganisational relationships, such understandings may be 
described as contributing to norms, promises, culture, climate, and collaboration. 
What is important to recognize, and which Habermas (1990/2001a) described in 
detail, is the placement of these understandings—which he alternatively called 
normative validity claims and norms (once an understanding has been achieved, I from 
here on call that understanding a norm). As is shown in Figure 9.5, understandings 
are generated within the intersubjective lifeworld, and the metamorphosis of an 
understanding into a norm implies that it may now be called upon in the construction 
of new understandings, and ultimately new norms. To illustrate the foundational 
nature of norms, I show them as beneath the individuals. Similarly, individuals 
a and b exist atop a shared norm—denoting the shared, intersubjective nature of 
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established understandings.
The placement of the individuals in Figure 9.5 atop the norms they share is 
of significance for one reason: individuals party to a particular norm may always 
demand that that particular norm be redeemed (no matter how far in the past and no 
matter how many norms have been established as a result). According to Habermas 
(1971/1990; 1976/1998; 1981/1998; 1984; 1987; 1988/1998; 1990/2001a; 1996; 
1996/1998), the redemption of norms is achieved through a process where the 
speaker of the validity claims upon which the original understanding rests either 
reaffirms the validity of the original speech act (to its truthfulness, correctness, and 
truth), or adjusts the original speech act in such a way that raises a new set of claims 
to validity in each of the three worlds. Such adherence to redemption provides, 
ultimately, a practical application of communicative competence.
2.2.  the delineation of human collectives: Lifeworld and System
Habermas’ focus on communication was an acknowledgement of the social 
nature of human existence. Yet it would be naïve to contend that the sole nature of 
modern human existence rests at the level of interpersonal relationships. Having 
said this, Habermas did believe that such a time may have existed in the past where 
all of the norms to which an individual was party would have been established by 
that individual with others.  Thus the individual was born unconnected to norms and 
established them with those he or she encountered during the course of his or her life. 
All of these norms, following Habermas’ argument, would be redeemable through 
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the application of communicative competence in the form of a challenge brought by 
the hearer to the speaker. In many ways, it is this stage of human collectivisation/
socialization to which our discussion has hitherto referred. I refer to this stage in 
later paragraphs as the intimate lifeworld.
Humans are, however, born into norms that have been established not 
through their own volition, but on their behalf—whether by their parents, members 
of their family or their community. In large part, norms (or rules) are established 
for children by their parents without the direct input or consent of the child.  Such 
norms, despite the method of their establishment, remain redeemable. When the 
child has wont and the intellect to demand the redemption of the validity claims 
that are sine qua non the speech act antecedents of the norms/rules to which they 
are subject, such demands appear with frequency. The child is thus engaged in his 
or her first pursuit of communicative competence and perhaps for the first time 
cognizant of the intersubjectively defined lifeworld, of which he or she is a member 
(Habermas, 1971/1990). Figure 9.6 depicts a redeemable norm established by the 
community. The individual wades through such norms, so to speak, until they are 
redeemed and fall below the individual as foundations of future understanding. It 
is important to recognize that although this communicative competence is manifest 
post hoc, it remains possible because of the reasonable proximity of the hearer to 
the speaker. I refer to this stage in later paragraphs as the community lifeworld.
Habermas (1971/1990; 1987) argued that as communication among 
individuals within the community becomes ever-more complex, norms evolve in 
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an amalgamative fashion: New norms are based upon a multiplicity of previously 
established one’s—assembled through a multiplicity of depth-hermeneutics (a 
scientific method of discovery). At a certain point, the combination of multiplicity 
and maturity of norms and general collective will-formation overstep their hitherto 
evolved purpose of simple collective organisation and “[o]rganizational complexity 
constituted at the level of political domination becomes the crystallizing nucleus of a 
new institution: the state” (Habermas, 1987, p. 165). It is at this point in the progression 
a
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Figure 9.6 The Redemption of Community Established Norms
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of human collectives/socialization that the individual no longer exists solely within 
the objective world and intersubjective lifeworld. Rather, the individual becomes a 
part of a rationalized lifeworld that Habermas (1987; 1988/1998; 1996/1998) called 
the system, a name I also employ in later paragraphs.  Through this rationalization, 
those well-established norms that have provided functional guidance and influence 
over the behaviour of the community become laws.
Figure 9.7 illustrates the experiential interplay for the individual between 
norms and system level laws. While intersubjective norms remain foundational for 
interpersonal understanding within the lifeworld, laws are elevated and supersede 
the lifeworld, governing (and, as Habermas, 1971/1990, 1975, 1987, 1988/1998, 
1996/1998, argued, dominating) its nature. It is important to draw a clear distinction 
between the lifeworld and system. In the lifeworld, action is coordinated “through the 
consensus of those involved,” whereas in the system, action is coordinated “through 
functional interconnections of action” (Habermas, 1987, p. 186). Habermas argued 
in this case that within the system, action was seen as a commodity of sorts. As 
such, the system seeks to rationalize or improve the efficiency of action (Cooke, 
1997; Habermas, 1987, 1988/1998, 1996/1998).
The transfer of action coordination from language over to steering media 
means an uncoupling of interaction from lifeworld contexts. Media such as 
money and power attach to empirical ties; they encode a purposive-rational 
attitude toward calculable amounts of value and make it possible to exert 
generalized, strategic influence on the decisions of other participants while 
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bypassing processes of consensus-oriented communication. Inasmuch as 
they do not merely simplify linguistic communication, but replace it with a 
symbolic generalization of rewards and punishments, the lifeworld contexts 
in which processes of reaching understanding are always embedded are 
devalued in favor of media-steered interactions; the lifeworld is no longer 
needed for the coordination of action. (Habermas, 1987, p. 183, emphasis 
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Figure 9.7 The Dominance of System Norms over the Lifeword
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in original)
Habermas (1987; 1988/1998; 1996/1998) found the result of this purposive-
rational attitude to be a forfeiture of the individual’s ability to demand redemption of 
validity claims raised by system-level norms—we “cede to the few the competence 
to act on behalf of [us] all …[and] relinquish [our]… right to orient [our] actions 
… by actual agreement with those present” (Habermas, 1987, pp. 170-171) where 
communicative action is rationalized as a commodity, not unlike money and 
power. Furthermore, he concluded that “[s]ystems theory can allow only empirical 
events and states into its object domain and must transform questions of validity 
into questions of behavior” (Habermas, 1975, p. 6, emphasis in original). To this 
end, the individual was systemically precluded from reaching any form of genuine 
understanding within the system domain. Within the system, communicative 
interaction was interpreted through a rationalized, purposive and success-oriented 
lens—as such, all communicative action involving system-based entities was 
inherently strategic and distorted.
B.  analysis and Implications for educational administration
I highlight two most salient points of this work for specific employment within 
the broader context of interorganisational relationships involving education.  First, the 
interrelationships described that, on Habermas’ view, are strategically manifest must 
be juxtaposed against the arguments made elsewhere in this dissertation regarding 
the psychological constraints at play within interorganisational “bargaining” and 
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games.  It is within Habermas’ thesis that strategic communication is consistent with 
Elster’s (2000) essential and incidental constraints—for one can certainly behave 
strategically both non-serendipitously, and serendipitously.  These behaviours were 
largely consistent with Habermas’ point.  Yet, while, it does not absolve the agent 
who is strategic in his communication from the immorality of his position, it does 
permit that both fallacious and truth-borne positions can be strategic, and therefore 
immoral (or amoral, as the case may be; I am not here debating morality).
The second point relates specifically to the adoption of theoretic constructs 
developed within a larger project that seeks as its zenith the universality of consensus, 
in terms of an admittedly realist, but agonist, position that excludes itself from such 
pursuits.  I justify this position through rational argument.  The agonistic position 
presupposes that individuals or organisations within the political will be taken 
seriously by those currently served within its dominant friend/enemy frame.    
1.  Educational Administration’s Emergence from Betwixt Two Fallacies
How will the agonist educational entity emerge from the sedimented politics 
within antagonism?  At the conclusion of Chapter Eight, I argued that (a) education 
was immersed within a dominant and false universe; (b) in its relations with this 
universe, educational administration is frequently inconsistent in its adherence to 
foundational principles of education, but, similarly, (c) so too is much of the debate 
within the foundational core of education (as a reified entity).  Indeed, this statement 
represents an answer to the question posed as the origin of this study: What are 
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the dominant foundational and philosophical structures of interorganisational 
relationships involving educational administration?  At this point in my thinking on 
the topic, the result could be described by Figure 9.8 where education (as an entity 
consisting of an administrative and foundational duality) rests within the public 
sphere.  On this account, the fallaciously dominant view manifest in modernity butts 
against education with administration at its periphery, and the fallaciously dominant 
view manifest in post-modern relativism butts against administration from within. 
Public Sphere
Educational
Foundations
Educational
Administration
Figure 9.8 Fallacious Interior and Exterior Abutments to Educational 
Administration
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While this view of these relationships is patently unrealistic, I only depict its nature 
as a point of departure, against which further illustrations may be judged.
Figure 9.9 is a more realistic characterization of educational entities.  While 
the core principles of education may be well articulated and secure, they rest deep 
within, but perhaps too deep for public consumption, if one accepts as accurate 
my belief that the sedimented view of education within the political represents 
contemporary public/political conceptualisations of our discipline.   In this figure, 
both foundational and administrative elements interact with the public sphere, 
because administrators do not occupy all points at which education is enjoined with 
the public.  
The view of education from the outside, while public polling demonstrates 
support in principle (Canadian Council on Learning, 2007), is fraught with problems 
in practice, as I have already discussed in Chapter Eight.  The philosophically central 
tenets demonstrative in epistemological concern for the growth of knowledge is 
routinely abandoned in favour of the relativist post-modern conclusion that everyone’s 
knowledge is useful, and that individuals’ opinions are somehow representative of 
knowledge.  I do not here advocate the position that information is knowledge (as 
a modernist might; or in the case of Lyotard [1979], as a postmodernist might) but 
that knowledge—growing through hypothesis testing, employing rational debate, 
and focusing upon foundations of recursively justified validity—is knowledge. 
Thus genuine (depth) hermeneutics is a knowledge process.  My point is that any 
argument advocating the obscuring and oscillatory manifestation of education as a 
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reified entity within the current F dominant public sphere is absurd—and therefore, 
since such oscillation is indicative of the current situation for education, educational 
entities as currently manifest are absurd, as well.
I now arrive at the point in the discussion where each of the pieces of 
my argument may be aligned into one conceptualisation of the structures of 
interorganisational relationships involving the administration of education.  I depict 
in Figure 9.10 my complete conceptualisation. Non-host type organisations (i(T)) 
(represented by the concept of hermeneutics within the figure) that engage in any 
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Figure 9.9  The Abutment of the Public Sphere to Education
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form of interorganisational relationship with host-type organisations (i(F)) do so 
within the contextual system of a dominant and false universe (F) superstructure. 
The superstructure is externally fed by the historical misinterpretation of human 
nature and neo-science.  Communication among these organisations, suffering 
false universe
Hermeneutics
genuine scientific 
advancement in 
knowledge (education)
Distorted 
Hermeneutics
Strategic/Distorted 
Communication
Psychopathology 
of Bargains
Misinterpretation 
of Human Nature
Neo-Science
Figure 9.10  A Conceptualisation of the Structures of Interorganisational 
Relationships Involving the Administration of Education
276
the effects of the psychopathologies of bargains and distorted communications 
(whether essentially or incidentally constrained) will ultimately result in distorted 
hermeneutics—precisely as I depicted in Figure 9.3.  As distortions increase through 
repeated circumnavigations of the hermeneutic circle, the falsity of the dominant 
universe in which such interorganisational relationships take place increases. 
Psychopathologies of bargains and distorted communications further increase, 
and the cycle of systemic distortion within the superstructure repeats.  As non-
distorted communication decreases within the confines of the system, non-host type 
organisations (i(T)) become increasingly sedimented within the superstructure.
A next logical question is what can be done?  I answer this question in two 
ways.  First, I explore my developing understanding of the key weaknesses of the 
superstructure described above.  Second, I focus upon intra- and extraorganisational 
solutions that are specific to education and its administration.
1.1  Weaknesses of a False universe superstructure
As was noted, Habermas (1971/1990) provided in his critique of Gadamer 
the means by which false and dominant superstructures that exist as the context for 
communication may be weakened in favour of legitimate processes.  I therefore 
repeat his point.
A critically enlightened hermeneutic that differentiates between insight and 
delusion incorporates the meta-hermeneutic awareness of the conditions for 
the possibility of systematically distorted communication. It connects the 
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process of understanding to the principle of rational discourse, according to 
which truth would only be guaranteed by that kind of consensus which was 
achieved under the idealized conditions of unlimited communication free 
from domination and could be maintained over time. (Habermas, 1971/1990, 
p. 267, emphasis in original)
I extend Habermas’ argument into the agonist project and the context of 
Figure 9.10.  The result is depicted in Figure 9.11.  To end the cycle of systemic 
distortions within the superstructure, the foundations of the false universe must 
be critically enlightened.  This means that before educators and educationalist can 
hope to be engaged in any form of genuine communication within the contemporary 
superstructure—and therefore any form of genuine interorganisational relationship—
the rules of engagement must be redefined.  As the discussion depicted in Figure 
9.10 showed, constraints within the superstructure do not permit the mechanisms for 
rational influences on change to exist.  The likelihood of their existence decreases 
with each navigation of the distorted hermeneutic circle.  I call to mind the final 
pages of Chapter Five, and specifically Habermas’ (1975) point regarding Piagetian 
motivational development as linked to “Weber’s connection between belief in the 
legitimacy of orders [Ordnungen] and their potential for justification, on the one 
hand, and to their factual validity on the other” (p. 95).  Further to this point, I recall 
the discussion in Chapter Seven of Weber’s (1919/1958) concept of the eternal 
yesterday and its linkage to French and Raven’s (1959/2005) description of expert 
power.   The result is an institutionalisation of distorted hermeneutic processes 
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where in each attempt at interorganisational relationships decreases the likelihood 
of a rational outcome.  To move beyond such detrimental and increasingly irrational 
results, it seems that interorganisational relationships must cease until the processes 
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outlined below in Sections 1.2. and 1.3. are complete.  Educators and educationalists 
must refocus their attention on developing a position of communicative competence. 
Their competencies must then be focused upon dismantling the foundations of the 
superstructure (that is, dominant misunderstandings of human nature and neo-
science, as depicted in Figure 9.11) and the processes within (strategic/distorted 
communication, also depicted in Figure 9.11) rather than entering the superstructure 
itself.
I now direct the discussion toward the second part of my answer to the 
question: what can be done?  I focus upon intra- and extraorganisational solutions 
that are specific to education and its administration in the sections that follow.
1.2  Intraorganisational competence
The result of this emerging study suggests that educators and educationalists 
must begin the reclaiming of education from its sedimentation within the public 
sphere by returning to first principles.  By first principles, I do not yet link education 
to any particular individual, so considerations of the child and the student must 
be held at bay for the time being.  From the results of this study, I suggest that 
educators and educationalists must agree that education is a scientific pursuit, as 
it has been defined in this dissertation.  Educators and educationalists must next 
examine, scientifically, if and how education is beneficial to humanity as a whole 
(not obscured by third order cultural anomalies), but as demonstrative in those 
questions that unite humans as a species.  The words of Rousseau (1763) come to 
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mind.
Were we to divide all human science into two parts, one common to the 
generality of mankind, the other particular to the learned, the latter would 
be very trifling compared to the former: but we seldom think of general 
acquisitions, because they are made as it were unknown to us, and even 
before the use of reason; and, moreover, knowledge is observed only by its 
differences, as in algebraic equations common quantities pass for nothing. 
[sic] (pp. 48-49)
Educators and educationalists must next examine how anomalies are best served by 
education, while not sacrificing those benefits deemed requisite for the whole.  
The instructions outlined above are unusual treatments, but they seem 
necessary if education is to be seen as worthy of debate within the broader political 
sphere.  Further, the instructions will be best served if examined by educators.  That 
an examination is happening may satisfy some critics currently within the political, 
outright.  But, not unlike the earlier game theoretic discussion of the meteorologist 
and the dog trainer, education is best served—indeed society is best served—if those 
within education examine education first, rather than submitting to F examinations 
by individuals who neither study education, nor fully grasp the f nature of their 
dominant behaviours.  From this discussion must emerge consistent articulations of 
what education is.  
I make these statements based on points that continue to emerged as a result 
of this study and those that have been foundational throughout this dissertation. 
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That educators and educationalists must arrive at a consistent statement depicting 
education to the public does not imply that it is objectively correct—only that it 
will be more objectively correct than any which might be achieved externally, or 
via principles contrary to the original first principles described above regarding 
knowledge.  It would seem that only once this theoretical position is achieved can 
educators and educationalist begin the practice of excavating education out from 
under its sedimented position within the political.
1.3  Extraorganisational competence
There is a recurring complaint among educators with whom I have spoken 
that the public believes it understands the job of teachers and how schools work based 
upon the fact that the vast majority of the public have attended school for a significant 
and memorable portion of their lives (see also Ungerleider, 2003).  The statement 
is a complaint because its premise assumes that the public understand little about 
education.  I believe that the point made above represents, optimistically, a question 
of responsibility analogous to that of chickens and eggs—but pessimistically, a self-
fulfilling prophecy.  For the statement begs the question, “What have you done 
to change this perception?  What have educators done, practically within their 
classroom and school, or during their conversations with the public, to change these 
presumed misconceptions?”  I put this question forward, within the context of the 
discussion presented above, as a rationale for the points I propose.
Christopher Hitchens somewhere wrote that what can be asserted without 
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evidence can also be dismissed without evidence.  I agree, and I present this 
aphorism to every class of students I teach.  Thus, evidence is required for public 
consumption, and public assertions made in reply must be held to the standard 
that communicative competence puts forward.  Educators must decide to uphold 
the philosophical position that arrives from the discussion assumed above as, at 
least initially, ethic (cf. Sears & Parsons, 1991).  In accordance with the hypotheses 
developed within this dissertation, for education to become a legitimate agonistic 
adversary, it must behave as a legitimate agonistic adversary.  It must provide solid, 
coherent, clear, and recursively redeemable arguments to justify its position to the 
public, and it must do so everywhere and at all times.
To educationalists, to academia, and to administrators I therefore assign the 
task of articulating a solid, coherent, clear, and recursively redeemable argument 
regarding education and its utility within the domain of the political proper.  To all 
teachers I assign this task within the domain of their interactions with parents and 
community.  But most importantly, to teachers of the social sciences I assign this 
task within all that you do.  It is from the debates within social sciences classrooms 
that students must come to appreciate the foundational position of education, 
and its foundational place within a society constituted on rationality.  Therefore, 
to administrators I further assign the obligation to ensure these debates—and the 
social and political skills honed in students within social science classrooms—are 
well supported.  I argue that the balance between the further sedimentation and the 
excavation of education from its currently absurd state depends directly upon such 
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support.  
To illustrate this point, I related in Chapter Eight how voting apathy among 
youth is rising, and as such, those individuals who hold potential sway within 
the political, and with whom education as an entity are most temporally familiar, 
are abdicating their views on the subject.  I similarly argued that it was improper 
to assume that as populations age, they become more conservative and self-
interested.  Yet, it would be irresponsible for education to take this argument as fact 
guaranteeing support—for these facts say nothing of how older individuals view 
the sedimentation or excavation of education.  Would it not be better to mitigate 
potential further sedimentation through the advocacy of (a) voting behaviour 
among youth, and (b) presenting clear and rational reasons for the presumption that 
education plays a vital role in the development of society?  Would not a reasonable 
course of action be to proselytize these two critical points?  Indeed educators and 
educationalists have a place within contemporary educational practice where such 
points are directly upheld: the social science classroom.  Administrators, what 
I propose is much more than an issue to be overseen through curriculum.  It is, 
indeed, an issue of the greatest importance for educational leadership.  I submit that 
the very future of education as educative depends upon such leadership.  Intra- and 
extraorganisationally administrators must lead.  Without leadership on these fronts, 
any discussion of contemporary interorganisational relationships is distorted and 
pointless.
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C.  A Reflection on the Context of the Study and the Central Question
In the first chapter of this dissertation, I described the context for the study. 
Three themes emerged from my discussion.  The first theme exposed the shifting 
conception of organisational life for schools that has accompanied the shifting focus 
of organisational studies from the formal to the informal (Selznick, 1948/2005). 
Implications of these shifts for leadership and decision-making were also explored 
(through Etzioni, 1967, 1986, 1989; and Hopkins, 2001) and the central problem on 
this front was articulated as the implied assumption of spontaneous generation of 
and aptitude for the justification of the organisational Form.  
Linked to the organisational shifts is the second theme: a humanization of 
student experiences, and a focus placed upon students with exceptionalities (Robson 
& Beattie, 2004). Attention placed upon the individual’s experience has raised 
questions related to the efficiencies embedded within the broader social welfare 
system (Chaskin & Richman, 1992; Robson & Beattie, 2004), and neo-liberal 
ideology has pushed for economic answers to questions of redundancies (Bardach & 
Lesser, 1996; Nelson, Prilleltensky, & MacGillivary, 2001). Efficiency and ideology 
represent the third theme, and the result has been an increase in interorganisational 
dialogue and relationships.  With the impetus for these relationships ideologically 
devised, their structures are situated within ideological conditions. 
The implication of the above described themes that I chose to examine in this 
document was summarized in the principal research question: What are the dominant 
foundational and philosophical structures of contemporary interorganisational 
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relationships involving educational administration?  The argument progressed in such 
a way as to explore the (a) development and (b) impact of contemporary relational 
systems writ large—in terms of social, political, and economic antecedents—and (c) 
popular responses to these systems.  I next sought to bridge what was learned in terms 
of relational systems with the broad experiences of educational interorganisational 
relations.  Finally, after having described the foundational and philosophical 
structures of contemporary interorganisational relationships involving educational 
administration in Chapter Eight, in earlier sections of the present chapter I explored 
the implications of my conclusions for educational leadership:  It is clearly the role 
of educational administration and educational leadership to remove all spontaneity 
from human understanding of the educational organisational Form.
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PostscrIPt
In a great many ways, this dissertation and its developing hypotheses have 
been focused upon threads.  The threads that bind us as a species, the threads 
that bind our interests as political, social and economic participants. My hope in 
writing this dissertation has been to expose the ways in which political, social, and 
economic threads bind educational interests to the acceptance of falsehoods about 
education and human nature.  My hope has also been to prescribe the means by 
which education’s bindings may be freed: through competent, rational, and agonistic 
discussion.  The means that I prescribe demand that educators and educationalists 
take education seriously as a discipline.
In writing this document I have not intended to provide an answer for specific 
ills in the form of an if / then statement.  Rather, I have endeavoured to highlight 
peculiarities of relationships that affect the manners in which epistemic and 
axiological decisions are made, which in turn affect the lives of so many individuals. 
I am concerned that the administrative rudder of the educational organisation is so 
frequently disembodied from its vessel that most intraorganisational linkages and 
relationships are reduced to managerialism, or do not exist at all.  So frequently 
do educators and educationalists look extraorganisationally for solutions to their 
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problems, when intraorganisationally within education solutions are at hand.  
Some of my propositions may be provocative, but  I wish to provoke an absent 
discussion, the fate of which will determine the longevity of any other discussion 
within the field that educators and educationalists might have, and most certainly 
the degree to which the foundations of our field coexist akin to its administration. 
Those researchers and practitioners who seek a more close alignment of theory and 
practice must surely see that my provocations are intended to contemporaneously 
bolster their laudable goal, but also warn them of the implications of such an 
endeavour.  For not only will the binding of theory to practice and practice to theory 
affect the pupil, it will affect every relationship among education and the political, 
social, and economic agents by whom power is brokered.
In Science, Delusion and the Appetite for Wonder (1996), the noted 
Simonyi Professor for the Understanding of Science at Oxford University, Richard 
Dawkins, contemplated the potential merit in compulsory “science appreciation” 
courses—akin to those found in music.  While I do not here advocate the need to 
go to the lengths of compulsory classes for school-aged students on “education 
appreciation,” every student by the end of high school should assume the discovery 
of such appreciation.  If we do not foster educational appreciation in our students, 
have we as educators not failed?  Yet every article and recommendation that is 
misguided in its understanding of education’s nature, purpose, function, and utility 
shows just that error: our failure to, at best, encourage the discovery of education’s 
nature, purpose, function, and utility independently among students, or at worst, 
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enable students to discover them through direct instruction.
Finally, I make a brief comment upon two long-perpetuated issues within 
this dissertation that have not been lost on me.  First, an orthodox Chomskian may 
interpret my position as advocating a perverse form of jingoism or the manufacture 
of consent.  I do not dismiss this critique, but will defer my response to another 
essay at another time.  Second, there is an interesting irony within my argument, 
to be sure.  I am here referring to the countless statements I have made herein that 
variously point out “misunderstandings” of education (which may be misconstrued 
as illegitimate interpretations) by individuals who maintain neo-liberal perspectives 
within the political.  Indeed, some readers may point to my advocacy of a Mouffian 
agonist goal for the arena of political discourse and action and juxtapose this goal as 
inconsistent with claims of a perpetuation of an illegitimate adversarial view.  Such 
a charge would be correct.  However, I articulate my view that the current state of 
affairs within the political demands friend/enemy reactions to garner attention, and 
I make no apologies for advocating such a course of action.  Ultimately, I submit 
that once educators and educationalists have re-established education within the 
political, educators and educationalists may only then work toward a more true 
agonist model—and I emphatically trust they will.
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endnotes
chaPter one
1 Specifically those created as a result of post-1991 Soviet influence—viz. 
longevous ideological influence.
2 See also Simpson and Gulley (1962); Thompson and McEwen (1958); and 
Turner (1976).
3 See also Galaskiewicz (1979) and Van de Ven (1976).
4 See also J. Allen (1998); Kasten (2000); and Sommers (1999).
5 Plato (c. 400 BCE/1945) referred to this as Form and Eco (2000) as innate 
Being, but arguably it has been more recently supplanted by, and distilled into, 
mission and vision in educational organisations.
6 This also seems relevant within the general Canadian University governance 
context (Woodhouse, 2001a, 2001b).
7 Multi-organisationally devised or otherwise.
8 See also Appleton et al. (1997); Atkins, Graczyk, Frazier, and Adil (2003); 
Atwal and Caldwell (2002); Chaudry, Polivka, and Kennedy (2000); Dinnebeil, 
Hale, and Rule (1999); S. L. Gardner (1992); Myrtle and Wilber (1994); 
Polivka, Dresbach, Heimlich, and Elliott (2001); Robson and Beattie (2004); 
Rosenkoetter and Streufert (1995); and Sloper (2004) who lend futher support 
to these claims.
9 By extension, ethical interorganisational behaviour.
10 See also Bommer, Gratto, Gravander, and Tuttle (1987); Fritzsche and Becker 
(1983, 1984, 1987); Fritzsche et al. (1995); Kahn (1990); and Kennedy and 
Lawton (1993). 
11  In Habermas (1971), see Chapter Three and the discussion of Marx’ 
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“Phenomenology of the Mind.” See also, Barhorst (1999); Chriss (1995); 
Rockmore (1989); Shabani (2000); Welton (1993); and S. K. White (1995).
12  See also: Sergiovanni (2000).
chaPter tWo
13  Whitehead (1933/1969) made a similar argument where he wrote, “So far as 
concerns methodology, the general issue of the discussion will be that theory 
dictates method, and that any particular method is only applicable to theories of 
one correlate species” (p. 283).
14  Plato (c. 400 BCE/1945) made a homologous claim in Book IV (§ 441c ff.) of 
the Republic when Socrates suggested to Glaucon that the just individual is one 
for whom each part of that individual provides the innate function for which it 
is best suited.
15  Cassam (1987) suggested that a Kantian transcendental act is necessary for the 
existence of any experiential act and Fuller (1945) concurred in his suggestion 
that all Kantian transcendental acts or systems are hermeneutic processes 
designed to understand systems of thought—to seek out those elements of 
thought that are a priori.  Others (Copleston, 1960; Durrant, 1943; Pippin, 1982; 
Rt. Hon. Lord Quinton, 1995b; Runes, 1962) confirmed such descriptions of 
Kantian transcendentalism; while Kant (1784/1890), himself, wrote: “I apply 
the term transcendental to all knowledge which is not so much occupied with 
objects as with the mode of our cognition of these objects, so far as this mode 
of cognition is possible à priori. A system of such conceptions would be called 
Transcendental Philosophy” (p. 16, emphasis in original).
16  See also: Eco (2000) for further clarification of Being (Sein).
17  The significance of Stewart (1995) and Madison’s (1990) point should not be 
underestimated.  In fact, it is a concept to which I return in Chapter Three, 
section 2.2., wherein I argue that the facility for language represents a category 
of the understanding† and where the socially constructed predilections of the 
apperception influence our semantic relations to particular element of syntax 
(or, more broadly, the transcendental object).
  † From this point forward, I refer to the Kantian (1784/1982) system 
that includes the categories of the understanding as the understanding°, that is, 
understanding marked with °.
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18  Kant (1784/1890) made a complementary argument related to the concept 
of time, which he regards as similarly an a priori sensibility required for our 
apprehending representations of material objects.  While out of place in the 
current discussion, the a priori linkage of our “faculties of understanding” 
(that is, understanding°—see Chapter Three, section 2.1.a.) to space and time 
becomes an important factor in the construction of the field of pictorial semiotics, 
discussed in the section that follows.  Furthermore, when discussed in relation 
to the apperception and the transcendental apperception, I can say without fear 
of hyperbole that this linkage will prove to be of decisive importance to the very 
foundations of this dissertation.
19 See, for example, Alvermann and Boothby (1986); Bazeli and Olle (1995); Dori 
and Hameiri (1998); Gerlic and Jausovec (1999); Horton, Lovitt, and Bergerud 
(1990); Hyerle (1996); Macklin (1997); Mayer (1991); McKenzie (1997); 
McKenzie (1997); Mento, Martinelli, and Jones (1999); Newton (1995); Paivio 
(1986); Paivio and Begg (1981); Phillips (1989); Pruitt (1993); Robinson and 
Kiewra (1995); Schreiber and Abegg (1991); Willoughby, Desmarias, Wood, 
Sims, and Kalra (1997).
20  Although this may suggest similarities with the requirements of my own 
thinking, I would distinguish a heuristic as the final product of my goal here a 
developing (hermeneutic) diagram.
21  As may be inferred through the discussion in Chapter Three, sections 2.1.b. 
through 2.2., the ante hoc character of the hermeneutic diagram is limited by the 
nature of the thinker’s apperceptive system.  The post hoc character is limited 
by the nature of the reader’s apperceptive system.
22  Particular (unknown) something: I use this term in its Kantian (1784/1982) 
sense—the transcendental object is a particular unknown something and 
is distinguished from the general and amorphous collection of all unknown 
somethings or noumenon.  It is upon the transcendental object, and through 
the transcendental apperception, that the understanding° forms its assumptions 
about the nature of things-in-themselves.
23  Transcendental apperception: in Kantian (1784/1982) critical philosophy, 
the transcendental apperception was the aperture-like function through which 
the development of knowledge via ordered reflection and imagination upon 
temporal/spatial sequences of transcendental-object-moments is possible—see 
Chapter Three, section 2.1. through 2.2.
24  Intentional object; intentionality: In the philosophy of mind (with roots in 
scholastic philosophy), intentionality represents any act of cogitation by a 
subject upon a particular object.  As Searle (1984) explained, and will provide 
the definition for this dissertation, intentionality does not merely “refer to 
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intentions, but also to beliefs, desires, hopes, fears, love, hate, lust, disgust, 
shame, pride, irritation, amusement, and all of those mental states (whether 
conscious or unconscious) that refer to, or are about, the world apart from the 
mind” (p. 16).  The intentional object, therefore, is the object upon which a 
mind’s intentionality is focused.
chaPter three
25  Descartes additionally argued that God is a third substance, neither mental nor 
physical.
26  I am here not making the claim, and no assumption of the sort should be made, 
that folk wisdom or folk psychology is utterly false—as is the notion advanced 
by Churchland (1981; 1989) and Stich (Ramsey, Stich, & Garon, 1990; Stich, 
1983; Stich & Nichols, 1993), among others.
27  Interesting is the fact that Huxley was oft referred to as Darwin’s bulldog on 
account of his academic defences of evolution, and yet held a view that while 
animal sentience may exist, it is largely pointless.
28  Searle’s (2004) word, not mine.
29  See any edition of the Index Librorum Prohibitorum published by the Holy See 
between 1793 and 1939.
30  Including Liebnitz and Spinoza.
31  Letters in Greek, denoted as follows {α}, indicate specific points of key 
ontological and epistemic importance to which I return in sections that follow.
32  Elsewhere in the passage, transcendental idealism is described as the doctrine 
which holds that “all objects of a possible experience, are nothing but 
phænomena, that is, mere representations; and that these, as presented to us—as 
extending bodies, or as series of changes—have no self-subsistent existence 
apart from human thought” (Kant, 1784/1890, p. 307).
33  “The [brain in a vat] hypothesis is an updated version of the sceptical arguments 
presented in Descartes’ first Meditation, that the entire world might be only a 
self-made figment of his imagination, or rather a fiction generated by an evil 
genius” (Steinitz, 1994, p. 214).
34  Gegenstand (pl. Gegenstände): meaning a physical or sensible object.  See note 
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and discussion accompanying footnote 39.
35  I have hereafter combined this and the sentence that immediately follows it into 
a single premise (ε).
36 To which I extend the premise, recalling Searle’s [1984] account at the closing 
claim of Section 1.3. and my own argument that such processes are neither 
mind- nor body-epiphenomonological, nor are they dualistic or monistic.
37  In effect, I have here merely restated the account concluding section 1.3.—at 
that time, however, it was not sufficiently explained for designation as a key 
premise.
38 According to Kant’s “Table of the Categories” and the discussion that 
followed it (1784/1890, p. 64ff; [A 80ff/B 106ff]), quantity represents the 
mathematical notions of unity, plurality and totality.  The category of quantity 
similarly represents mathematical notions os reality, negation and limitation. 
Relation and modality were considered by Kant to be “dynamical categories” 
(p. 67; B 110).  Relation includes the dualisms of inherence and subsistence, 
causality and dependence, and community agent and community patient. 
Beyond these amorphous definitions and some additional comments regarding 
their interrelations, Kant noted his disinterest in more clearly defining the 
categories: “I purposely omit the definitions of the categories in this treatise 
[some translations include the amendment: “although I may be in possession of 
them”].” (p. 66; A 82ff/B 108).
39  See: Schwarz (1982).  Hereafter, for clarity, I qualify object with the ° mark to 
signify the meaning Objekt rather than Gegenstand.
40  See Kant’s (1784/1890, pp. 86-88) account of the Logical Form of all Judgements 
consists in the Objective Unity of Apperception of the Conceptions contained 
therein, and his account of the Analogies of Experience (pp. 132-161).
41  Such drifting, Rousseau (1762/1957) called a variance in the lessons of our 
three teachers: nature, things and man.
42 I denote the schematic construction of the apperceptive system as the schemata 
and the language of perception [or language°]—the latter term I define in 
Section 2.2.
43 A process that is the reverse of that discussed in the previous section.
44 The theory behind which is largely rooted in materialism and the mind-
epiphenomonalism of Huxley and others.
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45  See in Kant (1784/1890) where: “By the word synthesis, in its most general 
signification, I understand the process of joining different representations to 
each other and of comprehending their diversity in one cognition. … [T]he 
synthesis of a diversity (be it given à priori or empirically) is the first requisite 
for the production of a cognition, which in its beginning, indeed, may be crude 
and confused, and therefore in need of analysis—still, synthesis is that by which 
alone the elements of our cognitions are collected and united into a certain 
content, consequently it is the first thing on which we must fix our attention, if 
we wish to investigate the origin of our knowledge.” (p. 62)
chaPter Four
46  I am here, of course, referring to a variety of cases within the United States 
faced by educational administrators related to science curricula, among which 
the opinion of the Federal District Court of the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
in the matter of Kitzmiller, et al. v. Dover Area School District, et al. (2005) 
is, at the time of writing, the most recently decided.  Further evidence, I 
would suggest, for the inclusion of a tale such as that of the rhizobium within 
a dissertation discussing educational administration and the linkages among 
various organisations (religious in this case).
47  Biologists would cringe at my description of these (especially the micro- variety) 
as anatomies, but for our purposes this nomenclature serves just as suitably as 
any other terminology they might debate but which is equally helpful for a 
writer who assumes readers with basic understanding of biology.
48 Look to the dates of earliest research, for example, in Bleckmann, Schmitz, 
and von der Emde (2004); Hackmann (2000); Waltrup, White, Zarlingo, and 
Gravlin (1997). 
49  While it is true that other primates (and indeed other species in orders, 
classes and phyla beyond our own) employ tools (Alcock, 1972; van Schaik, 
Deaner, & Merrill, 1999), none appear demonstrative of radically new ideas in 
MacIntyre’s (1984) sense, nor are any rooted in “contra”-evolutionary socialized 
phenomena (described later in this chapter).  Having said this, each example 
does seem to imply intentionality and may be a marked distinguishing feature 
of consciousness, an important notion for a later discussion in Chapter Six of 
epistemology in contemporary educational administrative philosophy found in 
the work of Evers and Lakomski (2000).
50  This point is rather clearly articulated in his second chapter: “but now I admit 
… that in the earlier editions of my ‘Origin of Species’ I perhaps attributed too 
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much to the action of natural selection or the survival of the fittest” (Darwin, 
1874, p. 61).
51 Lamarckian rather than Darwinian in nature.
52 This very point was meticulously detailed within the context of modern 
economic theory by Marciano (2005); see also Patterson (2005).
53 See Burrell and Morgan (1979).
54  I employ the word “predict” here with some caution, for my meaning requires as 
its backdrop the discussion of MacIntyre’s (1984) critique of the social sciences 
that I examine in Chapter Five.
55  This is argued in terms of relative time.  That is to say, in so much as the dates of 
earliest modern humans established by Underhill et al. (2001) may be regarded 
as accurate, the ratio of pre-wheel-human existence to wheel-human existence 
is roughly 22:1. 
56  An argument could be made that such endeavours might be forced upon other 
individuals, both the construction of roads, the finding of food and, perhaps, 
acts of species continuance.  While I do not dispute the historical record of 
societies where indentured or bonded servitude (for lack of a better euphemism, 
slavery) was the practice, and the likely employment of those bonded to the 
state in engineering projects of all variety (see for example the discussions of 
Egyptian Pharoh’s abolition of the death penalty and the Roman opus publicum 
and opus metali in Sellin, 1965), there exists a suggestion of practicality that 
persists at a more elemental level.   First, notwithstanding accepted issues of 
compelled labouring in earlier times, construction of any road is merely a 
singular event in the life cycle of that road; and, even in the case of the most 
brutal of despot, governments would be wholly pragmatically myopic if state 
sponsored programs of omni-present defence were to be initiated and sustained 
in perpetuity.  Second, in most cases, even the most despotic examples in 
history, roads, despite their means of construction, were monikered as gifts to 
the people—just who these “people” were is a separate issue, and is taken up 
later within this chapter. 
chaPter FIVe
57 The first Japanese in England had landed only thirteen years previous, and 
Europeans (mostly Portuguese and Dutch) had only reached Japan for the first 
time in the 1540s.  Adams served as the inspiration for James Clavelle’s John 
Blackthorne, the chief protagonist in the 1975 historical fiction Shōgun.
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58 This is perhaps only a half-truth, not to say that it is inaccurate, but that to be 
unapologetic is likely a morsel too modest. US envoy Caleb Cushing’s 1843 
mission to open China to American trade was undertaken, as Clark (1932) 
reported, “according to [Cushing’s] own words, ‘in behalf of civilization.’  The 
amazing letter from President Tyler, … which [Cushing] bore to the Emperor 
of China, breathed condescension and cited ‘the will of Heaven’ that a treaty 
should be the outcome of the mission” (p. 7).
59  Here, indeed, I mean to say “‘neo-scientific view’ of the world.”
60  I shall endeavour to highlight the MacIntyrian characters traditionally present 
in Asian society from their antithetical social Darwinian characters in pages to 
follow.
61  A careful reader will caution that I have portrayed MacIntyre as sharing some 
commonly held opinion with Habermas, or with Habermas’ reverence for Weber; 
but I am, in truth, attempting no such thing.  I do recognize and appreciate the 
differences of opinion that these two maintain regarding the work and place of 
Weber.  I attempt to adequately address this very point some pages farther into 
the argument. 
chaPter sIx
62  See, especially, chapter 6, “Natural Decision-Making,” but also chapter 1, 
“Theory, Mind and the New Cognitive Science,” for their Churchlandian/
Strong Artificial Intelligence elaboration on foundational cognitive questions. 
63  In a full-text search at the time of writing for “ +‘educational administration’ 
+‘game theory’ ” within a prominent electronic meta-search engine of scholarly 
works (scholar.google.com), only ninety raw results returned.  Removing those 
works that had no more than tangential relation to the topic,   Furthermore, 
a key-word search at the time of writing for “ ‘administration’ AND ‘game 
theory’ ”  within a prominent electronic search engine of educational resources 
(ERIC) returned twenty-two results.  Of these seventeen discussed simulations 
for use in the teaching of educational administration, one described statistical 
validation of game theoretic results for research analysis, one dealt with library 
administration and three provided a discussion of the use of game theory as an 
analytic tool for research conducted in the field of educational administration 
and decision-making. 
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64 Works written by many notable figures within the field (including Argyris, 
McGregor, Simon and Etzioni), Brown (1970) argued, independently concluded 
that all organisations share large numbers of internal structures and mechanisms. 
These shared structures made them reasonable candidates for game theoretic 
analysis.
65 Searle (2004) referred to this school as Strong A.I. (Artificial Intelligence) and 
Capra (2002) described it as Neuroreductionism and (Neuro-)Functionalism.
66 Supposedly, as opposed to von Neumann or Turing processing. 
67  See Searle’s (1984) discussion of the “Chinese Room.” 
68  Searle (1984) argued that such a usage of “current” technology as a view of 
the brain has much historical employ.  The Greeks argued that the brain was 
a catapult; Leibnitz compared the brain to a mill.  In the 1800s the Jacquard 
loom provided the view of the brain; in the 1940s it was a telephone cross-bar 
system. 
chaPter seVen
69  Valuing money over time is not an exact science and economists will employ a 
number of different factors to equate funds.  In the case of the value of US$20,000 
from 1956 in 2005 US dollars, Williamson (2006) explained that if based upon the 
Consumer Price Index, the sum would equal US$143,708.61; if based upon the 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) deflator, the sum would equal US$116,286.75; 
using the value of the consumer bundle (viz., the average annual expenditure 
of entities entitled to make spending decisions), US$191,259.02; using the 
unskilled wage indicator (based on US Bureau of Labor Statistics collected 
for variously designated unskilled labourers’ hourly wages), US$189,169.68; 
nominal GDP per capita, $321,837.94; and using relative share of US GDP, the 
value would equal $569,408.00. 
chaPter eIGht
70  The notion of sedimentation is here also distinguished from its use in Tolbert 
and Zucker (1996) as a constructivist view of objectification.
71  I here separate the notion of the teleological argument (currently associated 
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with intelligent design) from its more foundational and general association with 
the study of purpose.  Throughout this chapter, I refer exclusively to the latter 
form.
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